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6. THESIS ABSTRACT  
The potential for a gastroenteritis outbreak in a post-earthquake environment may increase 
because of compromised infrastructure services, contaminated liquefaction (lateral spreading 
and surface ejecta), and the presence of gastroenteritis agents in the drinking water network. 
A population in a post-earthquake environment might be seriously affected by gastroenteritis 
because it has a short incubation period (about 10 hours). 
The aim of this multidisciplinary research was to retrospectively analyse the gastroenteritis 
prevalence following the February 22, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch. The first focus was 
to assess whether earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction, and gastroenteritis 
agents spatially explained the recorded gastroenteritis cases over the period of 35 days 
following the February 22, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch. The gastroenteritis agents 
considered in this study were Escherichia coli found in the drinking water supply 
(MPN/100mL) and Non-Compliant Free Associated Chlorine (FAC-NC) (less than 
<0.02mg/L). The second focus was the protocols that averted a gastroenteritis outbreak at 
three Emergency Centres (ECs): Burnside High School Emergency Centre (BEC); Cowles 
Stadium Emergency Centre (CEC); and Linwood High School Emergency Centre (LEC).  
Using a mixed-method approach, gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors 
were quantitatively analysed. A damage profile was created by amalgamating different types 
of damage for the considered factors for each Census Area Unit (CAU) in Christchurch. The 
damage profile enabled the application of  a variety of statistical methods which included 
Moran’s I , Hot Spot (HS) analysis, Spearman’s Rho, and Besag–York–Mollié Model using a 
range of software. The qualitative analysis involved interviewing 30 EC staff members. The 
data was evaluated by adopting the Grounded Theory (GT) approach.  
Spatial analysis of considered factors showed that highly damaged CAUs were statistically 
clustered as demonstrated by Moran’s I statistic and hot spot analysis. Further modelling 
showed that gastroenteritis point prevalence clustering could not be fully explained by 
infrastructure damage alone, and other factors influenced the recorded gastroenteritis point 
prevalence. However, the results of this research suggest that there was a tenuous, indirect 
relationship between recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors: 
earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction and FAC-NC. 
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Two ECs were opened as part of the post-earthquake response in areas with severe 
infrastructure damage and liquefaction (BEC and CEC). The third EC (CEC) provided 
important lessons that were learnt from the previous September 4, 2010 earthquake, and 
implemented after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The ECs were selected to represent the 
Christchurch area, and were situated where potential for gastroenteritis was high. BEC 
represented the western side of Christchurch; whilst, CEC and LEC represented the eastern 
side, where the potential for gastroenteritis was high according to the outputs of the 
quantitative spatial modelling. Qualitative analysis from the interviews at the ECs revealed 
that evacuees were arriving at the ECs with gastroenteritis-like symptoms. Participants 
believed that those symptoms did not originate at the ECs. Two types of interwoven themes 
identified: direct and indirect. The direct themes were preventive protocols that included 
prolific use of hand sanitisers; surveillance; and the services offered. Indirect themes 
included the EC layout, type of EC building (school or a sports stadium), and EC staff. 
Indirect themes governed the quality and sustainability of the direct themes implemented, 
which in turn averted gastroenteritis outbreaks at the ECs. The main limitations of the 
research were Modifiable Areal Units (MAUP), data detection, and memory loss.  
It was concluded that gastroenteritis point prevalence following the February 22, 2011 
earthquake could not be solely explained by earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, 
liquefaction, and gastroenteritis causative agents alone. However, this research provides a 
practical method that can be adapted to assess gastroenteritis risk in a post-earthquake 
environment. Creating a damage profile for each CAU and using spatial data analysis can 
isolate vulnerable areas, and qualitative data analysis provides localised information. Thus, 
this mixed method approach can be used in other disaster contexts to study gastroenteritis 
prevalence, and can serve as an appendage to the existing framework for assessing infectious 
diseases. Furthermore, the lessons learnt from qualitative analysis can inform the current 
infectious disease management plans, designed for a post-disaster response in New Zealand 
and internationally. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES 
Earthquakes are a type of natural disaster that can give rise to extensive damage, and has 
the potential to cause large-scale impacts to society. An example of an impact is 
Gastroenteritis, an infectious disease commonly known as “stomach bug” or “intestinal flu” 
is an infectious disease that may occur in the aftermath of an earthquake. Occurrence of 
gastroenteritis outbreaks following an earthquake have been reported in the past (Ghorbani, 
Jafari, & Talebi, 2005). Earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, such as water network 
damage, may act as a possible exposure path for infectious diseases like gastroenteritis 
(Bartels & VanRooyen, 2012; Kouadio, Aljunid, Kamigaki, Hammad, & Oshitani, 2012). 
Damage to the water network may contaminate the water supply and become a pathogen 
source. Escherichia coli is the indicative pathogen used to identify water contamination, 
and Free Associated Chlorine (FAC) is used to eliminate E.coli (Ministry of Health [MOH], 
2008). In this study, it was considered if FAC was non-compliant (<0.02mg/L) then it was 
considered as a gastroenteritis agent, because if the water was contaminated and the 
chlorine concentration was not high enough then non-compliant FAC may act as a 
gastroenteritis agent (Gupta et al., 2007). If this contaminated water is consumed, it may 
give rise to an infectious disease (Laine et al., 2011). E.coli has been associated with 
gastroenteritis outbreaks in the past (Swerdlow et al., 1992). 
The effects of gastroenteritis incidences (mostly diarrhoea or vomiting) after a disaster tend 
to be disruptive to society rather than destructive. In spite of this, gastroenteritis can be 
highly contagious in a post-earthquake setting, especially where people congregate. One 
example of where people congregate, and gastroenteritis is likely to occur is at an 
Emergency Centre (EC), set up by authorities as part of a post-earthquake emergency 
response.  
An EC serves as part of the short-term disaster emergency response to provide essential 
provisions for people affected by the disaster. This poses the possibility of gastroenteritis 
prevalence at an EC, because of the surrounding infrastructure damage, and the potential 
for people arriving at the EC having been exposed to other pathogen sources. Studies on 
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ECs after a disaster have been documented but not copiously. Nor are they widely reported 
from a preventive perspective.  
Hence, this interdisciplinary research expands on the present knowledge of gastroenteritis 
prevalence after an earthquake from a disaster management perspective in two ways. First, 
it assess whether the recorded gastroenteritis cases were spatially clustered in order to 
determine whether those clusters were associated with the following factors: earthquake-
induced infrastructure damage; liquefaction ground damage (lateral spread and surface 
ejecta); gastroenteritis agents—Non-Compliant Free Associated Chlorine (FAC-NC) and 
E.coli.  
The second aim of this research is to analyse preventive protocols implemented that aided 
in preventing gastroenteritis outbreaks at the ECs after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
Understanding those two aims can provide useful protocols that may have been refined or 
created because of the unique situation as a consequence of the February 22, 2011 
earthquake. Thus, this research aims may provide new insights into the intractable 
relationship between contaminated drinking water supply, and gastroenteritis prevalence 
with respect to an earthquake’s damage profile. Meanwhile, the mitigative approaches 
identified can help to improve the existing epidemic management plans. Collectively 
investigating a possible infectious disease following an earthquake is enhanced by using a 
multidisciplinary approach.  
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions for this thesis are based on the context of the February 22, 2011 
earthquake at Christchurch, New Zealand. Because the study utilises the contextual events 
of real-life phenomenon—the February 22, 2011 earthquake—by definition, this study 
becomes a case study (Yin, 2008). Two successive parts form the research questions as 
outlined below: 
Quantitative analysis: Investigate whether earthquake-induced infrastructure damage 
(such as water and wastewater networks), liquefaction ground damage (lateral spread and 
surface ejecta), and gastroenteritis agents (E.coli and Free Associated Chlorine-FAC) 
spatially explained the recorded gastroenteritis cases after the February 22, 2011 
earthquake in Christchurch. 
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Qualitative analysis: Identify the preventive protocols implemented to avert gastroenteritis 
outbreaks at the ECs that were open to the public following the February 22, 2011 
earthquake. 
1.3 CHRISTCHURCH EARTQHUAKE: FEBRUARY 22, 2011 
EARTHQUAKE 
The Christchurch metropolitan area, located in the South Island of New Zealand, covers 
417 km2 of the Canterbury Plains (Brown, Weeber, & Reay, 1992). The city is located on 
Holocene deposits, and originally the site of swaps with poorly consolidated alluvial soil 
before developing into a service centre for agriculture and horticulture (Brown et al., 1992). 
Because of soil composition and high ground water level across the city, Christchurch city 
is susceptible to liquefaction ground damage, which means that under stress, the soil 
behaves like a “semi-liquid” due to loss of soil cohesion and stiffness from applied stress 
(Brackely, 2012). For example, there was newspaper report of liquefaction ground damage 
observed in Belfast after the Cheviot earthquake in 1901 (Berrill, Mulqueen, Ooi, & Pautre, 
1994). The liquefaction ground damage susceptibility in Christchurch has been extensively 
studied and produced many hazard maps prior to the 2010-2011 earthquakes in 
Christchurch (Brackely, 2012). Christchurch is located in the more tectonically active part 
of New Zealand, so is prone to earthquakes (Brown et al., 1992). Historical earthquakes 
closer to Christchurch have been recorded in the past even as far back as 1869 (Berrill et 
al., 1994).  However, the September 4, 2010 earthquake that took place in broke the 
region's 23-year earthquake-free streak. (Quigley et al., 2010). Christchurch city is the 
second largest city in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). In 2013 census, 
Christchurch city had a population of 341,469: a 2% decline since 2006 census (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2013).  
The Christchurch city is the study area for this research, which is illustrated in Appendix A, 
and the February 22, 2011 earthquake serves as the event, which frames the case study for 
this research. 
On September 4, 2010 there was a 7.1 magnitude earthquake (otherwise known as Darfield 
earthquake) with no loss of life (Quigley et al., 2010). Then, a subsequent 6.3 magnitude 
earthquake struck Christchurch on February 22, 2011 at 12.51pm (GeoNet, 2013). Because 
of the time of day, the earthquake resulted in 181 fatalities along with extensive 
infrastructure and liquefaction ground damage (GeoNet, 2013).  
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1.3.1 LIQUEFACTION GROUND DAMAGE  
The Canterbury earthquakes, and especially the February 22, 2011 earthquake, caused 
unprecedented large-scale liquefaction ground damage in Christchurch, which was 
collectively characterised by surface fissures, sand boils, ground depressions and 
resettlement; and sand/silt ejecta with muddy water that disseminated on the ground surface 
(Cubrinovski et al., 2011). This induced large-scale damage to structures, including 
commercial buildings, residential houses, bridges, and infrastructure networks. In fact, about 
6000 homes were deemed abandoned and another 15,000 homes sustained range of 
liquefaction ground damage (Cubrinovski, Henderson, & Bradley, 2012). Furthermore, given 
favourable wind conditions or vehicular disturbance, dried liquefied silt may pose health 
hazards if it becomes airborne and inhaled (Institute of Environmental Science and Research 
[ESR], 2012c).  
1.3.2 WATER NETWORK DAMAGE 
Christchurch’s water supply is sourced from deep aquifers (which are pumped into portable 
tanks on the hills), and wells across the city pumped into a reticulating pipe network 
(Christchurch City Council [CCC], 2012). The network is composed of 1600km of main 
pipes and 200km of submain pipes (Christchurch City Council [CCC], 2012). The water 
network suffered major damage due to pipe cracks and ground settlement,  instigating 
chlorination of water (Ministry of Health [MOH], 2012). As a consequence, water testing 
samples showed E.coli count to be above the basal level, and chlorination was implemented 
along with public health notices to boil water (MOH, 2012).   
Fifty-five temporary water supply sites were established with stationary water tanks, 
immediately following the earthquake (Gordon, 2011). However, Civil Defence Emergency 
Management (CDEM) media released on February 23, 2011 that an estimated that up to 
80%  of the city had no drinking water supply that day (CCC, 2011).This meant that over 
300,000 people had no access to reticulated water services for up to the day after the 
earthquake (MOH, 2012). By February 26, 2011,  about 50% of the city still had no access 
to water (Reid P., Brunsdon, Paul, & Oughton, 2004). 
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1.3.3 WASTEWATER NETWORK DAMAGE  
Likewise, the wastewater network was so damaged that by March 4, 2011, only 25% of the 
normal flow was received at the Bromley treatment plant (Gordon, 2011). A temporary 
sewerage system composed of chemical and portable lavatories was established, where 
sewerage services were unavailable (Potangaroa, 2011). Furthermore, silt and sand that was 
arriving at the plant caused the sludge removal system to fail at the Bromley treatment 
plant (Gordon, 2011). All sewerage was discharged to streams and rivers immediately 
following the February 22, 2011 earthquake, but by April 2011, 67% of the normal flow of 
sewerage was arriving at the treatment plant (Gordon, 2011). There were prompt power 
outages in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake (Gordon, 2011). Both of the 66kV 
cables were inoperable which supply electricity to urban areas (Eidinger, 2011).  
Under the CDEM Act 2002 (which promote; co-ordinate; provide local; and national 
emergency response in NZ) a regional emergency was declared at 1445 hours on the day of 
the February 22, 2011 earthquake, followed by the declaration of a state of national 
emergency on February 23, 2011, at 1030 hours (McLean I., 2012). As a result, additional 
resources such as chemical lavatories for residents and emergency personnel were 
mobilised nationally, and internationally (McLean I., 2012). Even though New Zealand has 
experienced natural disasters in the past, the February 22, 2011 earthquake was the first 
occasion in which a national emergency has been declared (McLean I., 2012). The state of 
emergency was repeatedly extended for 10 weeks until April 30, 2011 (McLean I., 2012; 
NZPA, 2011). 
The earthquake caused widespread damage to the water network, wastewater networks, 
and caused severe liquefaction ground damage throughout many parts of Christchurch 
(Giovinazzi et al., 2011). Even after such damage, there were no reported gastroenteritis 
outbreaks for weeks following the earthquake (Dell, 2012). Yet, some cases of 
gastroenteritis were being reported at ECs (Dell, 2012). Indeed, for these reasons, 
Christchurch following the February 22, 2011 earthquake is a candidate for a case study. 
Furthermore, this research enables the recording of specific details pertaining to ECs that 
may help to deepen the current understanding of gastroenteritis management in a post-
disaster context. Thus, fostering lessons learnt for the future. 
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1.4 RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
This research explores the spatial association amongst the recorded gastroenteritis cases and 
their associated factors as well as successful protocols implemented at ECs that prevented a 
gastroenteritis outbreak. Table 1-1 provides a brief synopsis of the contents of each chapter. 
Abbreviations used in this research are provided at the beginning of this research. Each chapter 
includes objectives and succinct chapter summary where required. 
Table 1-1: Research chapter outline 
CHAPTER 
NUMBER 
TITTLE 
CHAPTER PURPOSES 
1 Introduction Outlines the research context for the research, the study area, and provides 
research road map. 
2 Literature 
Review 
The literature review begins with core definitions; and describes the issues 
surrounding infectious diseases and natural disasters (and especially 
earthquakes), in particular earthquakes. This is followed by an outline of the 
vital factors that influence gastroenteritis after a natural disaster and New 
Zealand’s relevance to gastroenteritis and Emergency Centres. The chapter 
continues with a discussion of selected Emergency Centres established after 
the disaster, and identifies a number of research gaps in the literature. Finally, 
the section concludes with a review of the methods used in this study, and by 
outlining the study area along with the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
3 Methods Describes the quantitative methods used for spatial analysis of recorded 
gastroenteritis cases, earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction 
ground damage and gastroenteritis agent and non-compliant Free Associated 
Choline (FAC). The qualitative components for interviews are described, 
including design of the questionnaire. 
4 Results The results for the quantitative and qualitative analysis are summarised using 
maps and tables. The results chapter identified successful protocols 
implemented. An extended result section for interview results is provided in 
Appendices M, N and O that delves onto the details of the interview results. 
5 Discussion Foster discussion on the final coherent outcomes for qualitative and 
quantitative results. The study’s limitations are discussed along with directions 
for future research are highlighted.  
6 Conclusions Outline whether the research questions were answered. Furthermore, the 
implications of these findings are also discussed.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE  REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main aims of this multidisciplinary literature review are to understand the current 
information on Infectious Diseases (IDs) following natural disasters, according to the outline 
provided below:  
 To establish the research questions in a global context by understanding whether IDs 
occur in the aftermath of natural disasters with a specific focus on increased 
gastroenteritis prevalence after an earthquake 
 To identify significant factors associated with IDs after an earthquake because it may 
highlight factors to consider in the quantitative analysis 
 To understand which factors may have implications for New Zealand's ID 
management plans, and to assess existing mitigative protocols for ID at Emergency 
Centres (ECs) 
 To collate current preventive protocols implemented to avert those IDs at Emergency 
Centres (EC) by studying selected case studies which may highlight important factors 
to consider for qualitative analysis 
 To outline the research gaps: what this research will contribute to our current 
understanding 
 To review methodologies used in past studies and to assess whether they may be 
applicable to answer the research questions 
 Recapitulate research objectives and succinct summary of the literature review. 
2.2 CONTEXT DEFINITIONS 
This section explains in detail the key terms with the purpose of describing how they will be used 
in the context of this research.  
An epidemic is “the occurrence in a community or region of cases of an illness, specific health-
related behaviour, or other health-related events clearly in excess of normal expectancy” (Porta, 
2008). 
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Gastroenteritis is a type of Infectious Disease (ID). It is an infection due to the inflammation 
of the gastrointestinal tract (both stomach and small intestine) caused by pathogenic viruses 
(Norovirus), bacteria (Escherichia coli, Vibrio Cholerae) and their toxins or parasites 
(Aghababian, 2010). Norovirus agents account for up to 35% of all acute diarrhoeal outbreaks 
in the world (DuPont, 1997). Symptoms of infection include combination of diarrhoea, 
abdominal discomfort, vomiting, and nausea (Hall, 2004). Vomiting is usually the major 
symptom in children (MOH, 2009). In most cases, gastroenteritis episodes last for 1-2 days 
experiencing diarrhoea up to 5 stools a day and vomiting, which majority of patients recover 
relatively quickly (Hall, 2004). Gastroenteritis can last between 1-2 days (or longer) and can 
affect people of all ages but people who are most susceptible are children under five years, 
women 20-40 years; and older people (over 60 years) (Aghababian, 2010; Hall, 2004). Sources 
of gastroenteritis can include contaminated food and water whilst transmission is via faecal-oral 
routes such as consuming contaminated food or water (Dreyfuss, 2009; ESR, 2012a) The virus 
can also disseminate through touching contaminated surfaces, objects, and substances (Bruce A. 
et al., 2009). 
An outbreak investigation is one of the main functions of a public health service, especially 
after a natural disaster. An outbreak refers to an epidemic that is limited to a localised incidence 
of a disease (like a village or group of people) from a common-vehicle exposure (ESR, 2012a; 
Gordis, 2000). This research, unless stated otherwise, in specific case studies, outbreaks will be 
the preferred term. Thus, the study of outbreaks or epidemic is termed epidemiology (ESR, 
2012a; Gordis, 2000). This discipline examines disease distribution, and determinant occurrence 
in a population. Epidemiology is often associated with associated with human mortality and 
morbidity, particularly in a post-disaster environment. However, mortality is closely associated 
with earthquake-related injuries after a disaster.  
Infectious-disease epidemiology usually involves the following principles within a population 
(Gordis, 2000): aetiology (cause of disease); disease transmission routes (such as person-
person contamination); health factors and population characteristics; and natural prevalence of 
the disease.  
Prevalence is occurrence of the disease (gastroenteritis for this research) by measuring the 
number of people who have the disease divided by the population at risk of having the disease 
(Porta, 2008). This is known as prevalence (Porta, 2008). When this measure (prevalence)  is 
associated  with a specific point in time, it is referred to as point prevalence (Porta, 2008).  
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Surveillance for IDs in this context uses three different types throughout the literature review. 
Active surveillance is when a public health professional collects data from health clinics and 
laboratories (Porche, 2004). Passive surveillance is ID information provided by medical clinic 
or health care provider (Porche, 2004). Lastly, Sentinel surveillance is when group of public 
health providers collect data for specific health problems (Porche, 2004).   
In this research, epidemics and outbreaks are amalgamated into a single collective group, 
henceforth, referred to as outbreaks. Gastroenteritis cases (or gastroenteritis prevalence) are 
viewed as a single group including diarrhoea, bacterial and viral gastroenteritis arising from 
heterogeneous mix of pathogens aforementioned. 
 
2.3 INFECTIOUS DISEASES AFTER A DISASTER 
Assessing whether IDs occur following a disaster within the literature review is very 
important. This is because it provides international viewpoints and arguments that may need to 
be considered for this research. The key principles of infectious-disease epidemiology are 
copiously studied in a post-disaster context, for example studies, from Alexander (1982); 
Benca et al. (2007); Glass and Noji (1992); Kouadio, Aljunid, Kamigaki, Hammad, and 
Oshitani (2012); Noji and Toole (1997). The occurrences of IDs after a natural disaster are a 
highly discussed area. Some authors suggest prevalence of IDs is exaggerated, whilst other 
authors suggest some presence of influential factors depict IDs after a disaster. Proceeding 
sections outlines those concepts, which are constantly evolving because of the immense 
literature present on the subject.  
Amongst those suggesting that the prevalence of infectious diseases in the aftermath of a 
disaster is exaggerated is Alexander (1982), who points out that despite the chaos that 
eventuated after the Southern Italy earthquake in 1980, there was, lack of disease 
epidemiology (Alexander, 1982). In 2011, Lemonick (2011) indicated that ID epidemics are 
relatively rare after natural disasters like earthquakes; in particular, disease transmission from 
dead bodies is overstated (Lemonick, 2011). Michel, Demoncheaux, Boutin, and Baudon 
(2007) suggested there is a high level of perceived risk for IDs resulting from chaos after a 
disaster and media influence amongst a population. Some experts like Orellana (2001) and 
Seaman (1990) even argue such “fear of epidemics” has led to establishment of unnecessary 
practices such as non-endemic immunisations. Furthermore, majority of research from authors 
such as Kouadio et al. (2012) and Floret, Viel, Mauny, Hoen, and Piarroux (2006) has 
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identified there is no direct link to epidemics after natural disasters by conducting a literature 
review of documented material on databases over a period of 20 years. 
However, many factors may promote the occurrence of IDs after natural disasters. In 1992, 
Aghababian and Teuscher agreed that a region’s susceptibility to infection risk increases after a 
disaster due to disrupted infection control measures in the aftermath of a disaster (Aghababian 
& Teuscher, 1992). They argue that potential for epidemics to occur always exits; infection risk 
increases due to amplification of existing transmission routes with the introduction of new 
pathogens (Aghababian, 2011). Richard et al. (2011) further add that intensity, scope of 
disaster, infrastructure, and population displacement are related to population health 
consequences. This notion is shared by Howard, Brillman, and Burkle (1996). Howard et al. 
(1996) further state the potential for epidemics to occur always exists and that these risks are 
triggered because of large-scale deterioration of circumstances following a natural disaster, 
including environmental factors, changes in the distribution of population, and the thriving of 
endemic organisms, all of which can contribute to a less robust public health response. Dye 
and Wolpert (1988) provided early historical evidence of a positive correlation between 
earthquakes, influenza, and three major epidemics of Kala-azar using historical data (from 
1875-1950) in India. 
Nonetheless, Lemonick (2011) does acknowledge the occurrence of IDs following disasters 
and proposes that IDs after a natural disaster are more due to lack of resources, disaster 
systems in place, and areas that are disproportionately affected by disasters (Lemonick, 2011). 
Watson et al.(2007) also agreed that this “perceived” high disease risk predominately stems 
from the presence of dead bodies. Michel et al. (2007), agree and further adds that population 
characteristics, along with disease ecology, are more influential factors. Both teams further 
suggest that in order to minimise illness associated with outbreaks, especially in high-risk 
population there needs to be rapid detection and response (Michel et al., 2007). 
Similarly, Toole (1992) points out another influential factor: the disaster itself is less important , 
but the post-disaster situation is more influenced by the secondary effects fostered from the 
natural disaster. This dynamic drives population displacement, especially overcrowded shelters 
(such as refugee camps). Thus, the occurrence of ID is most strongly affected by the events 
following the disaster. Toole (1992) further emphasises that without this factor in place, the 
threat of communicable diseases is profoundly exaggerated in rapid-onset disasters like 
earthquakes (Toole, 1992).  
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Recently, Murthy and Christian (2010)  attempts to unify the debates by suggesting that ID 
prevalence is not related to the magnitude or the intensity of the disaster itself (Murthy & 
Christian, 2010). Instead, an interrelated combination of pathogens introduced without pre-
existing immunity; susceptibility of the population; and increased path transmission (Murthy & 
Christian, 2010). Furthermore, Murthy et al. (2010) also suggest that areas with high baseline 
may not greatly increase the incidence of IDs with damaged infrastructure. It is a concept that 
has been demonstrated from work carried out by  Piarroux et al. (2011) from studying the 
cholera epidemic, caused by the organism V.cholerae O1 following the Haiti earthquake. Their 
work suggests that Cholera was introduced into the Haiti region by asymptomatic Nepalese 
UN workers (where there was a confirmed outbreak of Cholera at the time in Nepal) coupled 
with the existing poor infrastructure. The virus used the river as a vector to disseminate 
pathogens across the Haiti River (Piarroux et al., 2011). People were drinking water from the 
river, which only added to the population’s susceptibility (Piarroux et al., 2011). Because 
Cholera was not recorded in Haiti for over century, local health institutions lacked the 
knowledge about Cholera in Haiti (Piarroux et al., 2011). Arguably, this situation demonstrates 
the implications of emerging pathogens as consequences of natural disasters. 
Furthermore, some authors have noted that IDs after a disaster are also time-sensitive. An ID 
can occur immediately after a disaster or up to several months later. A 5-year study conducted 
by Bissell (1983) showed that after series of Hurricanes in the Dominion Republic in 1979, 
there were increased epidemic levels of gastroenteritis in the short-term and typhoid appeared 
five to six months after the disaster. Thus, ID after a disaster is prone to both the immediate 
and long-term time frames. Bissell (1983) also re-iterates that the perceived level of low IDs 
stems from gathering epidemiologic data, and there needs to be a shift in surveillance systems. 
A viewpoint shared by Waring and Brown (2005), who suggest that there is a greater need for 
ID surveillance in terms of pre-impact epidemiologic infection. This is a notion reiterated by  
Howard et al. (1996). 
Despite vigorous debates of the past, there is now growing acceptance that ID risk after a 
natural disaster is greater in developing countries (Toole, 1997; Watson, Gayer, & Connolly, 
2007; World Health Organisation [WHO], 2006). For example, in Bangladesh after the 2004 
floods, there was a diarrhoeal disease outbreak with more than 17,000 cases reported (Watson 
et al., 2007). Although as Lemonick (2011) mentioned, it may be argued that natural disasters 
are common in developing countries, with increased susceptibility of populations, which lack 
resources and support structures (Lemonick, 2011). 
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Over the years, a growing consensus has emerged: the risk of IDs after natural disaster is real, 
but exaggerated for different reasons. Nonetheless, it may be said that most authors have 
similar viewpoints, albeit for a range of different reasons. These viewpoints on natural 
disasters leading to IDs are ultimately attributable to the following overarching factors: 
disaster consequences; population displacement; pathogen transmission; damaged 
infrastructure; population susceptibility and characteristics; and basal levels of IDs, as opposed 
to natural disaster characteristics (disaster scale and onset). 
Nevertheless, even though the real risk of IDs spreading might be low, as Watson et al. have 
stated in 2007 and as shown in Table 2-1, Watson et al. (2207) also reiterates that conditions 
and circumstances can synergistically favour an outbreak irrespective of where the disaster 
takes place (Waring & Brown, 2005). This is why epidemics after natural disasters have taken 
place in the past. Evidence for outbreaks that have occurred in both developed, (such as Japan) 
and developing countries (such as Pakistan) is illustrated in Table 2.1. For example, in 1992, 
Cerro Negro Volcano in Nicaragua eruption plume produced 1.7million tons of ash over three 
years, covering 200 square kilometres, and leading to acute increased prevalence of diarrhoeal 
diseases from 13.8 (per 1000 people) to 45.1 (per 1000 people) amongst children (1 yr.) in one 
week after the eruption (Malilay & Real, 1997).  
 
2.4 EARTHQUAKES: A UNIQUE DISASTER ASSOCIATED WITH 
GASTROENTERITIS  
Each natural disaster is unique. However, an earthquake has few characteristics distinguishing 
it from other natural disasters. Understanding these characteristics may highlight important 
factors that heighten the risk of IDs following an earthquake. Isolating this can help provide 
comparable factors with the February 22, 2011 earthquake.  
Notably, earthquakes often have continual aftershocks, especially directly after the main 
earthquake; this can hinder evacuations and compound existing damage. Thus, earthquakes are 
one of the main natural disasters that have the capacity to cause immediate casualties (Bartels 
& VanRooyen, 2012). Earthquakes tend to be concentrated, so populated areas closer to the 
hypocentre may expect greater damage than those furthest. In addition, subsequent events after 
the initial earthquake can thwart recovery efforts and increase mortality. For example, the 
tsunami spawned by the 2004 Indonesian 9.3 magnitude earthquake caused large-scale human 
casualties of more than 175,000 people (Guha-Sapir & Van Panhuis, 2009). The subsequent 
event, the tsunami, caused more damage and loss of life than the earthquake itself.  
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Nonetheless, gastroenteritis incidences have shown to increase after an earthquake. In a 
previous study of the Northridge California 1994 earthquake, there was an increased 
incidences of gastroenteritis reported to hospital rose from 80 to 200 in one week after the 
earthquake at Fernando Valley Emergency Rooms in California (Durkin, 1996). Another 
example is Chi-Chi earthquake in 1999 where gastroenteritis cases rose compared to basal 
incidences (K. T. Chen, Chen, Malilay, & Twu, 2003). Furthermore, the Kashmir earthquake in 
2005 caused a 20% increase in gastroenteritis incidences (Karmakar et al., 2008). This was 
likely to be caused by faecal contamination of tap water and springs, which may have been 
exacerbated by intermittent rain after the earthquake (Karmakar et al., 2008). Coupled with 
Table 2-1, this suggests that IDs following an earthquake are not rare; instead depends largely 
on the character and severity of the disaster itself: the risk a real one.   
Although IDs such as gastroenteritis are not generally considered to be serious infections, they 
may spread quickly with the propensity to create a social impact post-disaster (Aghababian & 
Teuscher, 1992). For example, when Cholera was detected after the Haiti earthquake (albeit 7 
months after the earthquake), 1500 patients were presented with symptoms of Cholera within a 
period of 48 hours at L’Hôpital de Saint Nicolas (Walton & Ivers, 2011). Moreover, 
gastroenteritis can cause dehydration, particularly in children, due to diarrhoea and vomiting 
(BMJ, 2009; Desselberger and Gray (2003). In a post-earthquake situation, the water network 
services may be unavailable, and coupled with short incubation time required for 
gastroenteritis to develop (minimum 10 hours), gastroenteritis has the potential, in the worst 
case, to limit human resource capacity during the first few days to weeks following a disaster. 
For people with gastroenteritis symptoms, a range of actives may become complicated. This 
can range from staff unable to help at work; being isolated from society when emotional 
support is needed; and inability to protect one’s own family at a distressing time. Thus, 
ultimately this may propagate a societal response in the aftermath of an earthquake. These 
reasons highlight that it is imperative to explore factors that may underpin the increased 
prevalence of an ID’s following a natural disaster.  
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Table 2-1: Examples of infectious diseases following disasters. These infectious diseases events can 
be due to subsequent events occurring following the disaster. The abbreviations are TSU= 
Tsunami, EQ= Earthquake. 
 
  
Disaster 
Event 
Infectious Disease Country Year Source 
Tohoku EQ 
Diarrhoea (Norovirus), influenza 
 
Japan 2011 (Nohara, 2011) 
Haiti-EQ Cholera, diarrhoea Haiti 2010 
(Abrams et al., 2012)  
(Pfrimmer, 2010) 
(Walton & Ivers, 2011) 
Bam 
Earthquake 
Respiratory tract infections and 
gastrointestinal infections 
Iran 2003 
(Ghorbani, Jafari, & Talebi, 2005) 
(Honarkar, Baladast, Khorram, 
Akhondi, & Masoodi, 2005)  
(Jafari, Radfar, & Ghofrani, 2007) 
El Salvador 
EQ 
Diarrhoea El Salvador 2001 
(Woersching & Snyder, 2003, 
2004) 
EQ 
Diarrhoea (transient increase) 
 
Turkey 2000 (Vahaboglu et al., 2000) 
Kashmir 
EQ 
Diarrhoea 
 
India 2008 (Karmakar et al., 2008) 
Chi-Chi EQ 
Respiratory infections and acute 
gastroenteritis 
Taiwan 1999 (K. T. Chen et al., 2003) 
California 
EQ 
Coccidioidomycosis Outbreak 
 
United States 
of America 
1997 (Schneider et al., 1997) 
California-
EQ 
Gastroenteritis 
United States 
of America 
1994 (Durkin, 1996) 
Tohoku 
TSU 
Influenza 
 
Japan 2012 (Hatta et al., 2012) 
Aceh TSU 
Tetanus, Dengue and Malaria, 
Respiratory infections (transient 
increase) 
Indonesia 2004 
(Guha-Sapir & Van Panhuis, 2009) 
(Aceh Epidemiology, 2006) 
Aceh TSU Diarrhoea Thailand 2004 (Guha-Sapir & Van Panhuis, 2009) 
Floods 
Diarrhoea 
 
China 2007 (Ding et al., 2013) 
Leptospirosis Brazil 2001 (Barcellos & Sabroza, 2001) 
Diarrhoea and Malaria Mozambique 2000 (Kondo et al., 2002) 
Hurricane 
Katrina 
Diarrhoea, Tuberculosis 
United States 
of America 
2005 
(Hamilton et al., 2009; Yee et al., 
2007) 
Hurricane 
Allison 
Diarrhoea 
United States 
of America 
2001 
(Waring, Reynolds, D'Souza, & 
Arafat, 2002)  
Volcanoes Acute Diarrhoea Nicaragua 1997 (Malilay & Real, 1997) 
Tornado 
Mucormycosis (Cutaneous): 
Fungal Infection 
United States 
of America 
2011 (Prevention, 2012) 
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2.5 FACTORS THAT HAVE LEAD TO EPIDEMICS IN THE PAST 
This section presents a review of critical factors that have led to an epidemic in the past, 
conditioning the sort of quantitative analysis in the context of the February 22, 2011 
earthquake. Although some factors may not be directly associated as an epidemic risk factor, 
they can contribute to secondary effects, which in turn act to enhance an epidemic risk factor 
(Toole, 1992). Because of this, an interdisciplinary literature search was necessary to 
understand the various direct and indirect factors associated with IDs after a natural  disaster. 
Many authors including Landesman (2012)  and (WHO, 2006)  have outlined many IDs’ risk 
factors, and using these authors as a guide, the most common factors are explored in the 
following sections. 
 
2.5.1 PRE-EXISTING LEVELS OF AN INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
An important factor influencing epidemics is the basal levels of an ID, which is vital to the 
definition of an outbreak, especially after an earthquake (Schneider et al., 1997; Waring & 
Brown, 2005). As Murthy and Christian (2010) suggest, countries with high basal levels of IDs 
due to poor infrastructure may not have increased prevalence of those IDs following a disaster. 
Likewise, the opposite is also true: countries with developed infrastructure and low basal rates 
hold the “reserve capacity” to minimise infectious disease risk after a disaster  (Murthy & 
Christian, 2010). Seaman (1990) also noted that areas with high population concentration may 
have high basal incidences of diarrhoeal illness.  
 
2.5.2 ECOLOGICAL CHANGES RESULTING FROM THE DISASTER  
It is vital to consider ecological the factors that have arisen due to an earthquake. Ecological 
factors are presumptive sources of hazards that may lead to infectious diseases (Lawson, 
2001). The most important consequences of ecological changes are those which affect 
communities living in the aftermath of a disaster. Ecological factors considered in this study 
are two categories: geological and environmental.  
Geological effects have the propensity to cause subsequent events. These subsequent events 
can range from earthquake-induced landslides, liquefaction, and river avulsion (Dellow et al., 
2011; Evans & Bent, 2004). Such factors can in turn result in population displacement. An 
earthquake-induced landslide is an example of a sequential event that proceeds from an 
earthquake. In 2001, the El Salvador earthquake (MW 7.6) triggered a destructive landslide, 
which swept into a residential area causing 585 deaths and displacing many people (Evans & 
Bent, 2004). In another example, boulders, rock falls, and rock slope failures induced  nearly 
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100 homes to evacuate as a result of the February 22, 2011 earthquake, (Dellow et al., 2011; 
Giovinazzi et al., 2011).  
Soil liquefaction has been observed in most large earthquakes and often appear as viscous 
surface flood material; thus, substantially altering the environment (Durkin, 1996; National 
Research Council Committee on Earthquake Engineering, 1985). Liquefaction ejecta can be 
contaminated with sewerage—a nutrient rich broth for microbes to harbour ID agents. Work 
conducted by Institute of Environmental Science Research [ESR] (2012)  in New Zealand 
indicated that E.coli can be sustained in sewage-contaminated liquefaction ejecta for up to 5 
months, even in the absence of additional sewage contamination (ESR, 2012b). Subsequent 
geological effects, after an earthquake, can alter the surrounding environment, which in turn 
can foster ID causing agents.  
Subsidiary environmental factors such as weather events after a disaster can amplify or restrict 
gastroenteritis exposure paths. For instance, a lodge, experienced about 780 gastroenteritis 
cases with 33% attack rates in Montana United States. Warm weather melted the snow that had 
been darkened by ash fall from Mt. St. Helens volcanic eruption, a month prior in 1980 (Bruce 
G. et al., 1983). The melting of ash-contaminated snow resulted in heavy water runoff, 
contaminating the Montana city water system, which was considered to be the source of the 
gastroenteritis outbreak (Bruce G. et al., 1983). Likewise, basal rates of gastroenteritis 
incidents were higher in the hotter, northern parts of Australia (G.Hall, Hanigan, Dear, & Vally, 
2011). By studying the spatio-temporal pattern of gastroenteritis over the observational period, 
they found that for every 5°C rise in temperature across the 8 days, there was a 13% increased 
risk of gastroenteritis (G. Hall et al. (2011). Thus, temperature and weather can influence IDs. 
Another subsidiary factor, although to a lesser extent in New Zealand, is vector-borne disease, 
and the emergence of emerging zoonotic diseases (WHO, 2005a). Generally, disasters like 
floods promote favourable breeding grounds due to concentrated organic matter (Wiley & 
Stephens, 1953). Rodent vectors depend on disaster type, intensity, geographic location, 
seasonal variation, and existing preventative measures in place (Wiley & Stephens, 1953). 
Nonetheless, in November 2010, mosquito species (found commonly in Christchurch and 
Kaikoura areas) were larger in size and numbers due to the fetid, stagnant raised water table 
bought up by liquefaction following the September 4, 2010 earthquake in North of 
Christchurch city (Rowe, 2010).   
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2.5.3 PUBLIC UTILITIES DAMAGES  
Water is essential for the maintenance of human health, sanitation, and personal hygiene. Each 
person requires a minimum of 15-20L per day (Noji, 2005). After a public water shortage in 
Taiwan, gastroenteritis incidence rose for an average of 15 hours due to contamination 
occurring during the repairs carried out to the pipe network. This case suggests how important 
water shortages can be, even for a short time (Huang et al., 2011).  
Drinking contaminated water is the ultimate source of IDs (most notably gastroenteritis), and 
so has been the subject of a great many studies over the years:  Bruce G. et al. (1983); Esrey, 
Feachem, and Hughes (1985); Gupta et al. (2007); Laine et al. (2011); Laursen, Mygind, 
Rasmussen, and Ronne (1994); McCann, Moore, and Walker (2011). Drinking water from a 
contaminated well in 1999 led to an E.coli outbreak in New York (Watson, Gayer, & Connolly, 
2007). Water networks are highly susceptible to earthquakes due to the pipe nodes and pipe 
leakage (L. Chen, Li, & Ye, 2004). Pathogens that ingressed through broken pipes was the 
primary cause of Cryptosporidiosis outbreaks and E.coli in North America and United 
Kingdom (Gale, 2001; Swerdlow et al., 1992). Likewise, the Kashmir earthquake in 2005 led 
to the contamination of the water supply from the stream, tube well, and tap water (Karmakar 
et al., 2008).  
Moreover, uncontaminated water reticulation systems are home to a myriad of microbes, most 
of which are harmless; yet, some of those microbes are chlorine-resistant (Ingerson, and Reid, 
2012). This is important because chlorine is used to remove pathogenic microbes such as 
E.coli (MOH, 2008). In a post-disaster environment, chlorine resistant microbes can 
contaminate the water by replicating within the water network. Furthermore, WHO’s work on 
preventing the spread of communicable diseases at mass gatherings (particularly evacuation 
centres) specified that an adequate water supply can improve sanitation conditions and reduce 
existing gastroenteritis cases by preventing dehydration (WHO, 2008). These studies, thus, 
highlight the importance of a clean drinking water supply.  
Earthquake factors (intensity and soil conditions) can damage a sewerage network leading to a 
dysfunctional system (Alexander, 1982). In the absence of alternate sewage systems, 
unsanitary conditions may prevail. This was the case after the MW 7.0 earthquake on January 
12, 2010 in Haiti, where already delicate sewerage system led to further deterioration of the 
situation (McGarvey et al., 2008). This effect was compounded as people left Port-au-Prince 
for the surrounding areas; thus, further stressing the already poorly functioning system 
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impending unhygienic practices (Red Cross, 2010). Faecal-oral transmission is the main 
infectious agent for diarrhoea (Esrey et al., 1985). Hence, improving sanitary conditions by 
effective excreta disposal methods forms the main barrier to reduce faecal-oral transmission 
(Lasen et al., 2010). Collectively water and sewerage system forms the major mechanism for 
large-scale transmission mechanisms to effect a population on a regional scale.  
Other important essential infrastructure to consider is transportation. Transport is essential in 
post-disaster setting, as access to roads, ports, bridges, and rail may be damaged after an 
earthquake (Chang, 2000; Gordon, Richardson, & Davis, 1998). Earthquake-damaged roads 
can hinder people travelling to get medical attention (Zhang et al., 2012). Chang and Nojima 
(1999) further highlighted the need to view separate transportation components—such as road 
and rail—as a network. The network’s performance can  play even a larger role when rerouting 
maps are required to distribute resources following a disaster (De La Torre, Dolinskaya, & 
Smilowitz, 2012). 
Electricity supply is another essential infrastructure. Electricity failure can influence the risk of 
infection. For example, lack of electricity led to an increased incidence of diarrhoeal illness in 
New York City in 2003 (Marx et al., 2006). Marx and his team explained in 2006 that the 
power outage (which lasted up to 3 days) caused a growing concern for public health about  
consumption of thawed food thereby, acting as an exposure route for ID-causing agents which 
may have led to diarrhoeal illness (Marx et al., 2006).  Hence, essential infrastructure can be a 
source of both direct and indirect routes for pathogen exposure. 
 
2.5.4 POPULATION DISPLACEMENT 
Population displacement in this context refers to large group of people fleeing their homes in 
order to avoid the effects of a natural disaster. There is mounting evidence that population 
displacement is a major contributor towards ID epidemics after a disaster. Meticulous work 
conducted by Toole (1987; 2006), Watson et al. (2007), and WHO (2005b) supports this 
notion. Population displacement, particularly large volume of people, encourages pathogen 
transmission due to changes in local ecology (Kouadio et al., 2012). As Kouadio in 2012 
suggested, this change in environment can vary from impacts on essential human needs 
(shelter, water, food) to adjustments to the new biotic environment, which in turn can make 
people more susceptible to IDs (Kouadio et al., 2012). It is important to note that 
overcrowded conditions can also occur at households, thereby encouraging the spread of IDs 
(Baker et al., 2012). Although large population migration is usually associated with refugees 
moving into crowded refugee camps because of civil war as Toole (2007) implies; mass 
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migration can take place after natural disasters. Yet, person-to-person transmission was 
associated with increased incidence of Norovirus gastroenteritis since 2002 even in cruise 
ships (Cramer, Blanton, & Otto, 2008).  
Mostly a household does not constitute homogeneous individuals; instead a household is a 
macro-representation of a community, and composed of heterogeneous individuals with 
varying degree of infection disease vulnerability. Overcrowding in a household can lead to 
infectious disease spreading without the influence of earthquake effects (Baker et al., 2010). 
However, it can be argued these conditions are heightened immediately after an earthquake. 
Different structures of the population can affect the overall “herd immunity,” which is 
important in disease tolerance as a whole within a population (Kun et al., 2010). 
 
2.5.5 POPULATION DEMOGRAPHIC 
Population demographics can also influence IDs following a natural disaster. An important 
population composition is the disabled community requiring special care which can be 
vulnerable to infectious diseases, especially if level of independent care is low (Paton & 
Johnston, 2006). After the Great East Japan Earthquake, medical treatments were given without 
producing a disability certificates and specific clinics for disables people were available to cater 
specific needs (WHO, 2011a). Likewise, other population compositions such as young children, 
especially those still dependent on adults for care, are also vulnerable to IDs (Bruce A. et al., 
2009).   
Elderly is defined as a person who is older than 65 years of age and is vulnerable to disaster 
effects (Fernandez, Byard, Lin, Benson, & Barbera, 2002). As Fernandez explains, elderly 
within a population can increase vulnerability to an infectious disease after a disaster due to 
their impaired physical mobility and chronic health related conditions, which limits an 
individual’s independence to cope in post disaster setting (Fernandez et al., 2002). 
 
2.5.6 SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
Socioeconomic status is an important factor of infectious disease incidences. Work conducted 
by Baker et al (2012) shows that socioeconomic disparities are related to hospital admissions 
for infectious diseases in New Zealand. Hence, under additional stresses in the aftermath of an 
earthquake it can have a brimming effect within a society. Further Kun et al (2010) conducted a 
survey study to elucidate that after an earthquake, disease prevalence is common amongst low-
income households. Tearfund (2005) have stated that disasters widens the socioeconomic gap 
due discrepancies in resources available (Tearfund, 2005). Such inequalities leads to asset 
erosion within in a household after a disaster (Cosgrave, 2008).  Although this is more evident 
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in developing countries, Baker et al (2012) have shown that such situations are growing as part 
of the population composition within New Zealand (Baker et al., 2012). Increasing incidence in 
several categories of infectious diseases is most likely to be caused by fundamental social 
determinants (income variation), housing conditions, and access to health services (Baker et al., 
2010). 
Overall the aforementioned factors can operate synergistically and successively (or indirectly or 
directly) to influence IDs such as gastroenteritis, after natural disasters like an earthquake. 
These and additional factors encountered from the literature review are summated in Figure 2-1. 
The figure represents the ambit of ID causing agents, exposure paths (both indirect and direct) , 
and population characteristics that can give rise to an ID after a disaster.  Given the combination 
of those factors that can evoke people to leave their home and seek many types of emergency 
shelters are shown in Figure 2-1.  
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Figure 2-1: Summarises the indirect and direct factors that may lead to an infectious disease following a natural disaster and the subsequent migration to emergency shelters. The indirect factors are hazard and vulnerability whilst the 
direct factors are the exposure routes identified. The arrows depict migration routes people may choose to take following a natural disaster. The references to foot notes are given below. 
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2.6 NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT 
The case study for this research is located in Christchurch. Therefore, it is important  to obtain a 
working knowledge on the existing prevalence of gastroenteritis, and of existing ID management plans 
in New Zealand (NZ) because it can provide information on existing protocols and give context to the 
research. This in turn can inform methods or isolate areas in need for further studying.   
2.6.1 GASTROENTERITIS PREVALANCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW ZEALAND 
In New Zealand, it is estimated there are 4.66 million cases of nonspecific gastroenteritis cases in one 
year with  about 53,000 cases of Norovirus gastroenteritis per year, which means that every person 
experiences gastroenteritis, to some degree, every year  (Bruce A. et al., 2009; Lake, Baker, Garrett, 
Scott W.G., & Scott H.M., 2000).  In New Zealand, gastroenteritis can last up to 171 hours in the 
absence of a post-disaster environment (MOH, 2009) . Arguably, it may be considered that infection 
period can be elongated if access to sanitary conditions and fresh water supply is hindered in a post 
disaster setting. In 2006, there was a waterborne outbreak (with excessive E.coli readings of 7.4-
220/100mL in the drinking water supply) at Cardorona ski field in 2006 which was attributed to water 
contaminated with sewerage (Ball, 2006). 
 
In New Zealand, notifiable gastroenteritis cases are recorded from mandatory reporting from medical 
practitioners to the Notifiable Disease Surveillance System in New Zealand, which is managed by ESR 
on behalf of Ministry of Health (Ball, 2006). Not all gastroenteritis cases are notifiable, and the criteria 
for notifiable gastroenteritis cases in NZ are outlined in MOH (2012b). Gastroenteritis cases arising 
from E.coli strains causing diarrhoea are considered to carry high public health  importance in New 
Zealand (MOH, 2012b). Nonetheless, NZ also has a plan in place for informally-reported cases of 
gastroenteritis and outbreak management plan  using both passive and active surveillance systems for 
public health officials (ESR, 2012a).     
2.6.2 PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS AFTER A DISASTER IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
In New Zealand, 20 regional District Health Boards (DHB) encapsulate the health system across the 
country as part of the health and disability sector within Ministry of Health (Community and Public 
Health [CPH], 2013). The health board pertaining to the Canterbury region is known as the Canterbury 
District Health Board (CDHB). The CPH is a part of the CDHB provides the public health services in 
New Zealand (CPH, 2013). In the aftermath of the February 22, 2011 earthquake, the CPH operated 
jointly with Ministry of Defence Emergency Management (MCDEM) at multiple organisational levels 
to protect the public against continual public health challenges. The challenges included infectious 
diseases, drinking water, sewage and housing (CDHB, 2012). The New Zealand CDEM promotes, co-
ordinates, and provides local; and national emergency response in NZ. 
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2.6.3 EMERGNECY CENTERS IN NEW ZEALAND 
According to 2010 Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act in New Zealand 
welfare means: 
“The response the CDEM sector and their welfare partner agencies will deliver to those people 
(individuals, families/whanau and communities) directly affected by an emergency. This includes 
provision of food, shelter, clothing, financial assistance, psychosocial (psychological and social) 
support and extends throughout response and recovery” 
Hence, an Emergency Centre (EC) (or otherwise known as emergency shelter or welfare centre) 
forms an essential component of the public health response by providing essential  goods and services 
to those affected in a post disaster environment. For example, consider the welfare response during 
the plight situation after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The earthquake caused major damage to 
homes, water, and sewerage systems (Giovinazzi et al., 2011). In response, several pre-planned 
emergency centres (Burnside High School, Cowles Stadium, Pioneer Stadium, and Rangiora) were 
opened (Dell, 2012). During the initial days following the earthquake, several hundred people were 
accommodated at these sites (Dell, 2012; McLean I., 2012). The ECs recorded no infectious disease 
transmission internally, although a small number of families arrived at emergency centres with pre-
existing symptoms of gastroenteritis (Dell, 2012; Johnston, 2012). This further reiterates the 
importance of investigating one of the main aims of this project: to investigate interventions that 
successfully prevented a gastroenteritis outbreak within an emergency centre. The results of this 
literature review did not uncover any further cases of disasters in NZ, where ECs have been opened 
because of a disaster response, besides the September 4, 2010 and February 22, 2011 earthquakes. 
However, NZ has a national pandemic plan, which was put in place as the country's template for 
dealing with infectious diseases after the emergence of pandemic influenza.  
 
2.6.4 NEW ZEALAND INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PLAN 
In 2009, WHO declared the first pandemic in 41 years, estimating that 18% of New Zealand’s 
population was infected with pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) (Bandaranayake et al., 2010).  Non-
seasonal influenza became notifiable, which enabled to isolate 3211 cases (Bandaranayake et al., 2010). 
As a result, the cases were reported to the national notifiable disease database (Bandaranayake et al., 
2010). Due to societal and economic impacts, and the threat to health service delivery, the MOH 
released a revised Influenza pandemic plan in 2010 including provisions for welfare care (MOH, 2010). 
Within this document, contaminant measures were included to limit pandemic dissemination of 
pathogens (MOH, 2010). They included border management strategies due to the unique NZ 
geography; cluster control from strict surveillance; provisions restricting the movement of isolated 
communities where no cases of infection are observed; hygiene measurements; and social distancing 
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(closure of children’s education institutes). The guidelines are kept general so professionals are able to 
operate as the situation evolved. These actions are now embedded into the overall New Zealand 
influenza plan 2010 (MOH, 2010). 
Nonetheless, on an international scale, case studies have provided evidence of gastroenteritis 
outbreaks that have occurred at evacuation centres following a natural disaster. This is important  to 
the present research because the documented case studies may highlight important issues that can 
prevent ID outbreaks at ECs. Case studies have isolated important lessons: contamination sources, 
interventions carried out to limit pathogen dissemination and lessons collated from those experiences. 
It is important to note that one of those lessons gaining growing acceptance is to establish smaller 
functioning emergency centres, which seemed to be preferred compared to the larger emergency 
centres (McLean I., 2012; Mitchell, 2012). A notion that is supported by WHO because of the 
apparent increased interpersonal relationship and privacy (WHO, 2011b). Arguably, this option may 
help to alleviate overcrowding issues: a large factor associated with communicable diseases (Toole, 
1997).  
 
2.7 EMERGENCY CENTRE INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND WELFARE 
SURVEILLANCE 
Noji (2005) has shown that up to 80-90% of the 200,000 displaced people, after the Nicaragua 
earthquake in 1972 stayed with relatives. Despite this, even minimal population displacement can lead 
to overcrowded shelters Toole (1992). Thus, shelter type influences overcrowding. Overcrowded 
shelters increase the number of people exposed to an infection, especially in winter months 
(Aghababian, 2010). Other factors such as compromised personal hygiene like hand washing can wane 
in importance due to scarcity of clean water and soap. Plotinsky et al. (2006) showed how basic hygiene 
practised in a Texas EC after Hurricane Katrina, and believed it was a major factor that contributed to 
the absence of a gastroenteritis outbreak (Plotinsky, 2006). Moreover several authors have suggested 
the importance of establishing surveillance as a preventive protocol, especially syndromic surveillance 
in absence of laboratory resources in a post-disaster environment (WHO, 2008). Toprani et al (2006) 
also supports the above notion by highlighting the importance of direct surveillance at ECs, in addition 
to sentinel and active surveillance, at the “Megashelter” during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. It is also 
considered that syndromic surveillance is better because the surveillance can operate with limited 
public health resources and cater to specific evacuation centre characteristics (such as different 
demographic features, number of evacuees, health status) (Toprani et al., 2006). 
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Hence, the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has implemented a shelter assessment 
tool to assess evacuation shelter conditions (CDC, 2012). Primarily aimed at environmental health 
practitioners, the tool aids in identifying environmental conditions, recording data for future 
planning, health and safety issues, and establishes a hierarchy of priorities. Furthermore, the tool can 
be used as a supplement for current protocols (CDC, 2012). New Zealand has an adapted version of 
the shelter assessment that was carried out at some Emergency Centres (EC) after the February 22, 
2011 earthquake (Dell, 2012). Nevertheless, the templates such as the checklists derived from 
experience can be invaluable in a post-disaster setting. Often, this information can be incorporated 
into a larger assessment framework unique to each region because it can share data between 
evacuation centres (Toprani et al., 2006). Another similar checklist is also available through the 
Sphere Project (The Sphere Project, 2011).  
 
For welfare surveillance, The Sphere Project is a self-regulatory tool comprising a voluntary code for 
effective humanitarian relief (The Sphere Project, 2011). The guide contains a set of minimum 
standards, followed by key actions to achieve those standards (The Sphere Project, 2011). Key 
indicators are given to assess progress towards the standards. The project has a generalised format; so, 
it is applicable for various types of disasters that require humanitarian assistance. However, the project 
does not provide information on ‘how’ to achieve the set standards. The key message is that for 
different disaster situations, customised methods are required. Nevertheless, it is a valuable tool as it 
caters to ground floor staff whereas WHO programmes appear to cater for national and global scales. 
The following international case studies are examples that were set up following a natural disaster that 
have implemented protocols to prevent ID outbreaks at ECs. An analysis of these case studies can 
isolate vital overarching protocols to be investigated in this research.     
 
2.7.1 THE GREAT JAPAN EARTHQUAKE  
A magnitude 9.0 earthquake stuck Japan on March 11, 2011 produced a tsunami (WHO, 2011b). Sendai 
city, in the Tohoku region, was one the worst affected areas and the tsunami that followed took 15, 848 
lives (WHO, 2011a). Despite extensive disaster preparedness programmes, the sheer intensity of the 
tsunami destroyed basic infrastructure and displaced more than 440,000 people into 2398 evacuation 
centres (WHO, 2011b).  
There were 300 emergency shelters in Ishinomaki City made available for evacuees on March 16 th after 
the water had receded (WHO, 2011b). During the first week, evacuation centres were functioning 
without running water and power with depleting basic supplies (WHO, 2011a). There was a growing 
need for pharmaceutical supplies, as many of the elderly had no access to essential routine medications 
such as diabetes. It took two weeks to put in place a public health response to staff loss and resource 
26 
 
shortages (WHO, 2011a) (WHO, 2011b). By March 17th, after one week,  cases of gastrointestinal 
infection and influenza-like illnesses were reported, and continued to be reported into week three 
(Takahashi, Goto, Yoshida, Sumino, and Matsui (2012); WHO (2011b). Shiogama detected 
gastroenteritis incidences as well as other communicable diseases (such as respiratory diseases) and 
non-communicable diseases (WHO, 2011b).  
Two outbreaks of influenza occurred at two of the evacuation centres at Miyani Prefecture (Hatta et al., 
2012). Kanamori et al (2011) believed that many evacuation centres had poor environmental 
maintenance, unsanitary conditions, and inadequate disposal of infectious waste including faeces and 
nappies (Kanamori, Kunishima, Tokuda, & Kaku, 2011). It was found that evacuees were sheltered in 
crowded conditions (less than 1-2m spacing). In addition, poor air ventilation, reduced hand hygiene 
from limited water supply, and absence of the public health system immediately following the event 
had contributed to increased pathogen transmission (Kanamori et al., 2011). From March 23, 2011 to 
April 10, 2011, 8 out of 16 centres reported 1-42 cases of gastroenteritis with cases numbers declining 
soon after (WHO, 2011b). Prompt action was taken within all the evacuation centres to minimise 
pathogen dissemination, which are highlighted in Table 2-3.  
In addition, daily surveillance using mobile phones in 40 large-scale evacuation centres was established 
(Yuzo, Tamano, Partridgea, & Kasaia, 2011). In fact, using mobile phones has been shown to be an 
effective method of ID surveillance following a disaster (Yang C., Yang J., Luo, & Gong, 2009). It 
enables the amalgamation of disease-resistance environments and implementation of infection control 
measures (WHO, 2011a). Emergency shelter assessments were conducted by medical response teams 
(WHO, 2011a). Evacuation centres were utilised for long a time; even on May 11, 2011 there were still 
79, 776 evacuees housed in 901 evacuation centres (WHO, 2011a). As the summer months approached 
and evacuees began to cook at the ECs, food safety education was provided (WHO, 2011a). However, 
based on post-surveillance data, no major communicable disease outbreaks were reported in the 
affected evacuation centres (WHO, 2011b). This suggests that most cases were sporadic, or by the time 
syndromic systems were available, most of the initial gastroenteritis clusters had waned. Thus, 
establishing early syndromic surveillance at the outset should be a key priority for disaster management 
plans. 
2.7.2 HURRICANE KATRINA  
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused extensive calamity and displaced thousands of people. As a result, 
on 31st of August, a “Megashelter”, the Reliant Park Complex, was used to house about 27,000 
evacuees (Yee et al., 2007).  The shelter contained essential food, water, shelter and a temporary clinic 
staffed with local hospital district. Within three days, there was increasing acute gastroenteritis 
incidences (defined as vomiting and/or diarrhoea), and an outbreak was confirmed soon after (Figure 2-
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2). The gastroenteritis outbreak consisted of multiple strains of Norovirus that affected more than 1000 
evacuees of all ages (Yee et al., 2007). Further microbial analysis of stools suggested that multiple 
exposure routes acted as infection sources. Thus, cocktail of interventions were used to reduce 
gastroenteritis incidences (Figure 2.2). As the number of reported cases rose, the allocation of various 
resources (such as soap, paper, and hand sanitisers) was increased (Yee et al., 2007). Immediate 
introduction of interventions commenced (Figure 2-2) in a similar fashion to the Great Japan 
Earthquake. They included educating evacuees on hand-washing; increased number and maintenance of 
portable lavatories; and cleaning with bleach-based cleaning products (Yee et al., 2007). Although the 
number of cases decreased towards the final closure days, there were still incidences of Norovirus 
gastroenteritis, which continued until the clinic at the Megashelter was closed. At the Megashelter, the 
initial syndromic surveillance was conducted using a checklist for general disease trends including 
diarrhoea and vomiting, which in turn were fed into a generalised database to obtain morning reports 
for the incident command centre, medical staff, and other officials (Yee et al., 2007). This highlights 
how crucial it is to implement preventive measures before an outbreak is identified. 
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Figure 2-2: Depicts the timeline for epidemic curve for Norovirus gastroenteritis outbreak, interventions and 
events at the Reliant Park Complex “Megashelter” between 2-12 September 2005 (Yee et al., 2007).  
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2.7.3 SUMMARY OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE PREVENTION EMPLACED AT 
EMERGENCY CENTRES 
Here follows a summary of the main aspects of gastroenteritis interventions implemented at ECs along 
with an account of some additional literature to promote better health conditions at ECs. 
Table 2-2: Summary of preventive protocols to avert gastroenteritis outbreaks at emergency centres. 
Preventive 
Intervention 
Description Source 
Clean Water Provide clean drinking water for personal use (for staff and 
evacuees). 
(International 
Association of 
Venue 
Managers Inc 
[IAVM0], 
2010) 
Landesman 
(2012); 
Ministry of 
Health (2010); 
Rebmann 
(2007-2008); 
The Sphere 
Project 
(2011); WHO 
(2006, 2008, 
2011a); Yee et 
al. (2007) 
Functional Sewerage 
System 
Appropriate measures for excretion disposal (includes medical 
waste and rubbish disposal) and chlorine-based cleaning for 
bathrooms. One lavatory for every 20 people for short-term 
accommodation. 
Hand Washing Make available multiple hand washing options, which includes 
alcohol-based hand sanitisers, foot-operated soap and water 
hand washing systems. Maintain availability of alcohol 
disinfectants at the entrance of shelters and in dining areas. One 
hand-washing fixture for every 15 people. 
Ventilation and 
Bedding space 
Provide appropriate ventilation especially in sleeping area with 
40-50 feet of air space for a person.  
Strong leadership To maintain order and morale. 
Psychosocial support 
with support services 
Provide morale and mutual support to promote recovery. 
Public health 
surveillance 
Syndromic surveillance with active and sentinel surveillance 
systems.  
Public Health 
education 
Educate evacuees using posters, handouts and announcements. 
Encouraging use of face marks.  
Provide health clinics 
and public health 
personnel 
This includes medical staff such as a nurse to maintain good 
public health practices and conditions in the shelters, and to 
report any potential outbreaks/incidences through surveillances. 
The clinics should also house mass dispensing plans for 
emergency medications (such as insulin for diabetes, and 
epidural pens for adverse allergy reactions). 
Isolation units 
Management 
Incoming evacuees into the evacuation centre should be 
screened for fever, cough, skin rash, vomiting, and diarrhoea. If 
one of these conditions is met then a room in advance should be 
used to house evacuees awaiting evaluation or transfer. 
Child care facility Educate evacuees on sanitary procedures and nappy changing 
stations. 
Shower facilities Provide shower facilities to maintain body hygiene. One shower 
for every 15 people. 
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2.8 RESEARCH GAPS IDENTIFIED 
In the light of many viewpoints about which influential factors most affect an infectious disease 
following a natural disaster; it is vital to view the consequences of disasters (such as earthquakes) as 
unique events. For example, the subsequent effects of an earthquake on the exposed population are 
modified by the highly contextual local factors which extend across the environment, infrastructure 
damage, geological conditions, and the population demographics. Thus, the February 22, 2011 
earthquake is unique and needs to be examined. 
Gastroenteritis prevalence is one of the effects following an earthquake, which can depend on those 
factors demonstrated by Kouadio et al. (2012); Lemonick (2011); Michel et al. (2007); Toole (1992); 
Watson et al. (2007). However, little work has been attempted to link gastroenteritis prevalence, 
geologic conditions, and infrastructure damage. Therefore, this thesis studies the February 22, 2011 
earthquake in this manner in an attempt to spatially assess the factors that may underpin gastroenteritis 
prevalence after an earthquake; specifically for a case study following widespread water and 
wastewater infrastructure damage.  
Christchurch had no reported outbreaks of gastroenteritis to the NZ disease surveillance system 
following the February 22, 2011 earthquake (Dell, 2012; MOH, 2012a). However there were 
confirmed cases of people arriving at ECs with gastroenteritis symptoms (Dell, 2012). Therefore, it is 
beneficial for the national and global knowledge base to understand what preventive steps were 
practiced at ECs to prevent gastroenteritis spread, or, originated within an EC. Furthermore, public 
health and emergency operating centres have begun to develop an emergency gastroenteritis plan 
(Dell, 2012). Timely research on such topics is highly important following a disaster because 
information can be lost due to factors such as population mobility and memory loss. If this happens, 
then an opportunity to learn from a practical experienced event, which has low probability occurrence 
with high consequence, is lost. In short, a vital learning curve missed.  
 
2.9 METHODOLGY REVIEW 
Implementing a methodology to answer the research questions involved evaluating literature for 
appropriate methods for quantitative and qualitative research questions.  
2.9.1 QUANTIATIVE SPATIAL METHODS 
From a disaster management perspective, a multidisciplinary approach must be adapted beyond the 
realms of morbidity and mortality to address IDs after an earthquake. However, for communicable 
diseases there is limited information on how to represent the interaction with different factors in a 
synergistic manner. This is most likely due to two main reasons. First ID incidences tend to occur from 
multi-exposure routes. Interconnected routes vary in intensity exposure to different factors. Second, 
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during an earthquake, factors that are more distal can be enhanced due to subsequent events from an 
earthquake (like liquefaction and landslides). Understanding this synergistic interaction from a spatial 
viewpoint is a major component in this project using Christchurch earthquakes as a case study. Some 
authors have attempted to show this interaction. For example, work conducted by  Emmanuel et al 
(2011) and (Gilbert & Pfeiffer, 2012) used landscape epidemiology to derive spatial maps by 
understanding geologic and vegetation conditions that enable disease transmission using GIS 
technology.   
Over the past decades, there have been various disease mapping and spatial regression methods some 
of  which are reviewed by Auchincloss, Gebreab, Mair, and Diez Roux (2012); (Rushton, 2003),  
(Fischer & Getis, 2010) (Daniel, 2005). Disease mapping is concerned with  calculating relative risk 
estimates whilst spatial regression considers the relationship between relative risk and potential risk 
factors (Wakefield, 2007).  Table 2-3 shows range of these methodologies and their applications. As 
evidenced by Table 2-3, the studies vary from disaster-based studies (Piarroux et al. (2011) to spatial 
distributions of infections (Hu, Clements, Williams, & Tong, 2011), and explorations of population 
characteristics (Saurina et al., 2010).  It appears that G-statistics and Moran’s I statistic are the most 
commonly used methods for detecting spatial clustering. The Besag–York–Mollié (BYM) model 
seems to be a popular choice for spatial regression. These spatial applications were mostly depicted 
by the software available and the type of data considered in the study. 
Three particular cases from Table 2-3 show similar research aims to those of this study, but under 
different research contexts. Kingston and Semple (2005) investigated gastroenteritis outbreak and 
water-borne disease transmission routes in an outbreak of gastroenteritis in Jamaica. In a similar 
fashion, Sarker et al. (2007) investigated the relationship between gastroenteritis and faecal 
contamination of the water supply. Both studies’ research questions resemble this study’s quantitative  
component, but, in the absence of a post-disaster context. However, that post-disaster context 
resembles the study by Piarroux et al., (2011), who investigated cholera in the context of the Haiti 
earthquake. The Haiti earthquake had a similar magnitude and depth to those of the February 22 2011 
earthquake in Christchurch. 
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 Table 2-3: Examples of spatial methods used to study spatial patterns of disease. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disease or Outbreak 
Studied 
Study 
Location 
Global or 
Local 
Moran’s I 
Statistic 
(Spatial 
Autocorr
elation) 
 
Getis-Ord 
General  
(High/Low 
Clustering in 
ArcGIS) or 
Getis-Ord Gi* 
(Hot-Spot-
ArcGIS) 
Regression Models Other Analysis Methods Source 
Spatial analysis of 
Haemorrhagic fever with 
Renal Syndrome 
China 
   “Spatial Scan Statistics” were 
applied using a likelihood 
function in SaTScan 
software. 
(Fang et al., 
2006) 
Ecologic study to investigate 
the association between 
cancer mortality and 
proximity to incinerators; 
and hazardous waste 
treatment plants 
Spain Towns 
(1997-2006) 
  Using Besag–York–
Mollié (BYM)  
 
(García-
Pérez et al., 
2013) 
Spatial relationship 
between 
Verocytotoxige-nic 
Escherichia coli 
(VTEC) incidence and 
livestock density 
Ontario, 
Canada 
  Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) 
Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE)  
Cartographic outputs 
(Gyles, 1999) 
Spatial analysis of notified 
Dengue fever infections 
Queensland 
Australia 
  Logistic Regression 
Models- empirical 
Bayesian analysis 
Choropleth maps 
Local indicators of spatial 
association (LISA) 
(Hu et al., 
2011) 
Spatial analysis of notified 
Cryptosporidiosis infections 
Brisbane, 
Australia 
  Spatial Empirical 
Bayes Rates 
Smoothing 
Spatial Classification 
and Regression Tree 
(CART) 
 
(Hu, 
Mengersen, 
& Tong, 
2009) 
Spatial patterns of Dengue 
Chachoeng-
sao  
Province 
Thailand 
   Tracking Analysis 
Local indicators of spatial 
association (LISA) 
Kernel Density Estimation 
method 
(Jeefoo, 
Tripathi, & 
Souris, 2010) 
Spatial and temporal trends 
for Lymphoblastic 
Leukaemia and Type 1 
diabetes 
   
Using Besag–York–
Mollié (BYM) with 
CAR Model for spatial 
effects 
 
(Manda, 
Feltbower, & 
Gilthorpe, 
2009) 
Spatiotemporal analysis to 
understand social and 
environmental drivers of 
Malaria risk. 
Vietnam 
  Zero—inflated 
Poisson regression 
models 
 
(Manh et al., 
2011) 
Spatial association between 
Larynx cancer and 
socioeconomic conditions 
between 1994-2004 
Girona 
(Spain) 
  Using Besag–York–
Mollié (BYM) 
 
(Saurina et 
al., 2010) 
Epidemiological 
investigation of an outbreak 
of acute diarrhoeal disease 
India 
  Scan statistic using a 
Poisson Model 
(Kulldorff, 1997) 
Spatial Clu8steres using 
SaTScan 
(Sarkar et 
al., 2007) 
Geographic clusters and risk 
factors associated with 
gastroenteritis 
Kingston, 
Jamaica 
  Regression analysis 
using SPSS Software 
  Kernel Density 
(Kingston & 
Semple) 
Cholera Epidemic mapping Haiti 
  Regression Model 
with spatial 
variability-Quasi-
Poisson Model 
 
Spatial Clustering using 
SaTScan 
Spearman Correlation 
(Piarroux et 
al., 2011) 
Diarrhoeal illnesses 
associated with Water 
Supply 
North 
Rhine-
Westphalia, 
Germany 
   Incorporated a Water-
Supply-Structure-GIS model 
(WSS-GIS) 
(Kistemann, Herbst, 
Dangendorf, & Exner, 2001) 
(Dangendorf, 
Herbst, 
Reintjes, & 
Kistemann, 
2002) 
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2.9.2 QUALITATIVE APPROACHES 
The following section reviews possible methods that may be used for the qualitative analysis in 
this research. Amongst the variety of qualitative research methods, there appear to be five 
popular methods: phenomenology, narrative research, ethnography, case studies, and grounded 
theory ( Creswell (1998); Patton (2001)).  
Phenomenological research explores the particular narrative of an individual (Creswell, 1998). 
For example, work conducted by Hearns and Deeny (2007) using the phenomenological 
approach to understand support for aid workers after complex emergencies. Similarly, the 
narrative method mainly involves studying a phenomenon or a method (Silverman, 2013). For 
instance,  Tuohy and Stephens (2012) used narrative theory to explore how flood stories in 1999 
disaster are told. Ethnography is affiliated with developing patterns of beliefs, behaviour and 
language (Creswell, 1998). One example of this is the work by  Shrum, Duque, and Ynalvez 
(2007) which used video ethnography to understand infrastructure damage using Hurricane 
Katrina. A case study explores issues researched within a context or a situation. For example in 
New Zealand, a case study was used to understand the pandemic H1N1 Influenza (Williams, 
Begg, & Burgess, 2010). Finally, Grounded Theory (GT) refers to an explanation or a process 
unpacked through the analysis of qualitative data (Creswell, 1998). For example, GT was 
applied to understand evacuation decisions in impoverished areas after Hurricane Katrina 
(Eisenman, Cordasco, Asch, Golden, & Glik, 2007).  
These five methods have similarities and differences between them. Similarities include research 
approaches for data collection and the research process, such as data collection, analysis 
strategies, and overall conclusions (Creswell, 1998). For all of the aforementioned methods, 
there are multiple sources of data collection, like  interviews (semi-structured and structured), 
participant observation, field notes, and journals (Marshall & Rossman, 2010). The 
Phenomenological and narrative based approaches involve a single person or phenomenon from 
a descriptive perspective. Although useful, most are not appropriate methods to answer this 
study’s qualitative research question.  
However, GT and case study approaches are able to answer the question, but GT seems to be the 
best approach. This is because GT specifically asks what or how by studying an action (or a 
process) involving participants’ views—the essence of this study’s qualitative research question 
(Creswell, 1998) (Bitsch, 2005). Combined studies using GT have been conducted in the past, 
such as Rudolph and Repenning (2002); and Thornberg (2012). However, it is difficult to 
compare the GT methods implemented between different studies, because of the context-specific 
qualitative data involved. Thus, GT has been adapted to suit the data. However, over the years 
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different GT viewpoints have emerged which are considered important to understanding the 
underlying concepts in order to select the best suitable method for qualitative part of this 
research. 
2.9.3 GROUNDED THEORY 
Since GT’s inception, the methodology steps have remained more or less constant, but two 
divergent viewpoints that underpin the principles have emerged over the years. Whilst Glasser 
promulgated the so-called “classical” variant of theory, Strauss and Corbin transformed classical 
GT into a more analytical approach. Recent and progressive work from Strauss and Corbin 
explains delineated steps on how to conduct, analyse, interpret and verify data to develop a 
theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Strauss and Corbin, 1994, Strauss and Corbin, 1990). In doing 
so, Strauss and Corbin aimed to make GT more palatable to various scientific fields and cater to 
mixed-methods approaches using qualitative and quantitative methods within a study. Strauss 
and Corbin also permits literature review as a starting point for data collection and use the 
literature review to verify the theory from a broad perspective (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).  
On the other hand, Glasser’s state that using the literature review changes the traditional 
comparative approach of GT, because it gives the investigator preconceived ideas which 
consequently demote analysis and any emerging theories from those data. Thus, Glasser 
advocates leaving the literature review as the last step in GT methodology—to prevent 
contaminating the newfound theory. In the same tradition as Glasser’s approach, Charmaz 
(2006) has put forward a limbic GT approach, which promotes the idea that GT only serves as a 
set of guidelines, which are adaptable to suit the research objective(s); because, theories are 
developed form an interpretive point of view form participants (Charmaz, 2006).  Innumerable 
authors have compared these divergent views of GT approaches, and offered many viewpoints 
on GT (Duchscher & Morgan, 2004; Heath & Cowley, 2004; Laws & McLeod, 2004).  
However to cater to this study’s research objectives, Strauss and Corbin’s (2006) approach was 
used whilst acknowledging Charmaz’s viewpoint that theories developed are an interpretive 
portrayal only. Strauss and Corbin’s methodology better suited the research question and the 
mixed methods style of the study. More importantly, it was imperative to select a methodology 
that suited the research question and data; not the reverse. 
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2.10 LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
 Infectious Diseases do occur following a disaster globally, and why they occur is of 
great interest, with both divergent and similar viewpoints 
 Even though “fear” of IDs have led to misperception of IDs’ risks occurring following a 
disaster, there is a collective consensus from many authors that IDs tend to occur 
because of the subsequent consequences following the disaster and other associated 
factors 
 The associated factors include: disaster consequences; population displacement; 
pathogen transmission; damaged infrastructure; population susceptibility and 
characteristics; and basal level of an ID 
 The factors that may give rise to gastroenteritis after an earthquake, and which are 
highlighted in Figure 2-1 include: contaminated water, pre-existing levels of 
gastroenteritis, weather, population displacement, and poor surveillance 
 New Zealand has about 4.66 million cases of non-specific gastroenteritis cases in one 
year, and there is mandatory recording of notifiable gastroenteritis cases according to the 
MOH criteria in New Zealand, and the outbreak plan such as the H1N1 Influenza 
pandemic in 2009 serves as the most significant outbreak in NZ 
 There are past outbreaks of gastroenteritis following an earthquake, especially at ECs 
(Table 2-2), and the results of this literature review indicate in NZ, no EC plan has been 
activated to the scale of the February 22, 2011 earthquake 
 Protocols practiced to prevent gastroenteritis at ECs after disasters include hand 
washing, portable lavatories, surveillance for IDs, clean drinking water, and educating 
evacuees 
 The research gap is the need to incorporate quantitative and qualitative methods to study 
a unique disaster fingerprint 
 A review of the methodological literature indicated that for spatial statistics, Moran’s I 
statistic, Hot Spot analysis, and Besag–York–Mollié (BYM) model were most commonly 
used with Grounded Theory using Corbin and Strauss (2008) guidelines was best for 
qualitative component of this research.   
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Thus, given the vast scale of damage and the urgency that surrounded Christchurch city in the 
aftermath of the February 22, 2011 earthquake, there were no recorded gastroenteritis outbreaks 
(Dell, 2012). This coupled with diverse literature on issues and examples relating to infectious 
disease following a disaster highlight how important it is to explore the research questions 
underpinning the present work.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the methods used to assess the two thesis aims: the first was to assess 
whether earthquake-induced infrastructure, liquefaction ground damage (lateral spread and 
surface flooding), and gastroenteritis agents spatially explained the recorded gastroenteritis 
cases after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The second, to identify the preventive protocols 
implemented at the ECs following the February 22, 2011 earthquake that averted gastroenteritis 
outbreaks. The former used quantitative methods whilst the latter applied qualitative approach. 
The following sections comprehensively describe methods utilised for quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. 
3.2 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The literature review identified the significant factors that can contribute to increased 
gastroenteritis prevalence after an earthquake. This guided data collection efforts. For example, 
the literature review has shown that damaged water and wastewater network damage may 
increase gastroenteritis exposure routes. In additioHPn, Escherichia coli (E.coli) and Non-
Compliant Free Associated Chlorine (FAC-NC) have shown in the literature review to be 
associated as gastroenteritis agents.  
 
3.2.1 DATA COLLECTION AND TYPE OF DATA 
Data was sourced from both private and public institutions by requesting in writing. The study 
assumes the February 22, 2011 earthquake returned the existing damaged to a severe state 
following the September 4, 2010 earthquake in the study area. The study assumes there was no 
net migration change to the population (immigration is balanced by emigration). The study 
period extended from February 22, 2011 to March 28, 2011 (35 days) inclusive, and limited to 
those days because of data availability. The study was limited to those days because of data 
availability. All collected data was curtailed to reflect the 35 days. E.coli transgressions, FAC 
(non-compliant), gastroenteritis cases must have been sampled within that specific time frame. 
The study assumes that infrastructure repairs were a reflection of the damage that was caused 
by the February 22, 2011 earthquake. However, these repairs continued well after the time 
frame set for this study. Despite this, repairs that were logged after this time frame was 
included in the study because the repairs largely reflected the damage caused by the February 
22, 2011 earthquake.   
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3.2.2 STUDY VARIABLES 
The earthquake-induced infrastructure damage considered in this study were the water network 
pipe damage (which included both the main and submain pipes) and the wastewater network 
pipe damage. Liquefaction was represented as a percentage of Census Area Unit (CAU) that 
suffered liquefaction damage as lateral spreading and surface ejecta. There were two 
gastroenteritis agents considered: E.coli and FAC-NC. The factors considered in this research 
and their sources are outlined below. Descriptive details for each factor are provided in 
Appendix B.   
Water Network Repairs 
The study assumed the February 22, 2011 earthquake caused the water network damage 
(including the main and submain pipe) in Christchurch city. Damage in this context referred to 
pipe bursts. The data collated was repairs thereby implying that pipes were damaged in order to 
be repaired. Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) provided the data. The 
data set obtained verified the damaged pipes were in service, albeit at reduced service capacity.  
Wastewater Pipe Repairs 
The February 22, 2011 earthquake damaged the wastewater pipes that resulted in subsequent 
pipe repairs. The damage repairs were largely sewer mains, although other types of repairs were 
considered in the analysis such as pipe cracks. Thus, the repairs were taken as proof of damage. 
The data was obtained from SCIRT and showed the individual locations within the network that 
required repair. 
Liquefaction Damage 
Liquefaction damage was observed liquefaction of individual properties quantitatively 
categorised into the following: lateral spreading, ejected material, and graded according to the 
labels shown in Appendix C. It was assumed that earthquake characteristics—such as ground 
acceleration and shaking intensity—directly reflected the level of observed liquefaction. The 
data was collated from Tonkin & Taylor Limited. Henceforth in this study, lateral spreading and 
ejected material will be collectively termed liquefaction ground damage. 
Escherichia coli Transgressions 
The maximum acceptable value of E.coli in drinking water, for regularity purposes, is less than 
one E.coli count per 100mL (MOH, 2012a).  E.coli transgression is the occurrence of E.coli 
that endanger water quality (MOH, 2008). A major transgression is considered when E.coli 
counts are greater than 10 per 100mL (MOH, 2012a). The water testing sampling teams from 
Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) were sent out across the city to collect drinking 
water samples from street addresses, and commercial premises for E.coli testing across 
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Christchurch daily. This testing commenced two days after the February 22, 2011 earthquake 
and continued until mid-June 2011. Christchurch City Council (CCC) Laboratories and 
Canterbury Public Health (CPH) staff conducted this process (Dell, 2012). Data received from 
CPH comprised of E.coli transgression counts (MPN) per 100mL (Dell, 2012). Although host 
of heterogeneous mix of pathogens may have contributed to gastroenteritis, E.coli is the 
common indicator organism used to detect water contamination (Ball, 2006; BMJ, 2009). 
Free Associated Chlorine or Free Available Chlorine 
Free Associated Chlorine (FAC) was the residual chlorine available to disinfect the drinking 
water supply (MOH, 2008). According to the NZ’s drinking water standards, the FAC 
concentration must be greater than  0.2mg/L. (MOH, 2012a). The data was collected from 
CDHB. Non-Compliant FAC (FAC-NC) is when FAC concentrations are less than 0.2 mg/L. 
FAC (>0.02mg/L) is used within the water network if the E.coli count is greater than 1-2 
MPN/100mL (MOH, 2008). Presence of E.coli is often the indicative organism tested to verify 
contaminated water (MOH, 2008). This study considered that FAC-NC as a gastroenteritis 
agent because when FAC limits are non-compliant, there is the opportunity that gastroenteritis 
agents may remain in the drinking water supply.  
Acute Gastroenteritis cases 
Acute gastroenteritis cases were non-specific gastroenteritis cases reported by Institute of 
Environmental Science and Research Limited (ESR). The notification criteria to report acute 
gastroenteritis cases to ESR are outlined in (MOH, 2012b). The confirmed cases were 
aggregated per CAU over the 35 days following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The 
recorded cases included basal levels of recorded gastroenteritis cases within the area.  
Census Area Unit and Population  
Christchurch population was included in the study using the 2006 NZ census data, the latest 
data set available at the time of data analysis (NZStatistics, 2012). The lowest common 
denominator to express population was a CAU where the boundaries were defined by NZ 
statistics (NZStatistics, 2012). There were 121 CAUs for the study area. The study presumed 
that the population from 2006 NZ census was representative of the Christchurch’s population at 
the time of the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Further, the study assumed there was no overall 
change in population immigration or emigration in Christchurch after the September 4, 2010 
earthquake. 
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3.2.3 DAMAGE PROFILE TABLE  
A table, termed “damage profile table” amalgamated various data types that originated from 
different organisations into a single table, represented for each CAU. Thus, each row in the 
profile table represented a CAU with the corresponding columns referring to water damage, 
wastewater damage, liquefaction ground damage, E.coli, FAC-NC, and  recorded gastroenteritis 
cases. There were 121 CAUs in the study area. Because the majority of data was spatial, 
ArcMap10.0 software was used to create the profile table using the spatial join operation to 
amalgamate the data. This meant, column data was aggregated per CAU, which converted point 
data into count data, because the spatial join operation “counts” the number of point data within 
a CAU boundary. Repeating this process for the 121 CAUs provided a “damage profile,” for 
the study area whereby each CAU had a profile entailing damage counts of all factors. This 
profile table formed the basis for spatial analysis henceforth. 
Recorded gastroenteritis cases were exempted from spatial join operation because the original 
data were aggregated per CAU. Liquefaction ground damage, however, required some pre-
processing before undergoing spatial join operation. The raw data for liquefaction ground 
damage had irregular private land areas that were liquefied. Therefore, calculations were 
necessary to convert those separate areas into total percentage of liquefied area per CAU. This 
was achieved using the steps outlined below on ArcMap10.0: 
1. Calculate liquefied areas with light orange to dark red categories in Appendix C. 
2. Use spatial join to obtain total private liquefied areas per CAU. 
3. Divide the total private liquefied area per CAU by total area of CAU and    
multiply by 100. 
It is important to note that spatial join operation discards the magnitude of each factor outlined 
in Appendix C. For example, spatial join operation cannot discriminate to reflect intensity of 
repair damage in water and wastewater pipes; and show degree of E.coli or FAC-NC in each 
point data. For example, it cannot differentiate between 5MPN/mL and 8MPN/mL for E.coli. 
 
3.2.4 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Descriptive analysis consisted of two components: spatial and non-spatial analysis. Frequency 
distributions formed non-spatial analysis to address the spread of counted data per CAU using 
the profile table. In SPSS19 software, the frequency distribution tables and bar plots were 
created for each variable. The corresponding frequency distributions were categorised into 
deciles (10-quintiles).  
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Spatial analysis illustrated the frequency distributions by taking into account the geographical 
distributions using thematic maps in ArcMap10.0. The legends were classified using the natural 
breaks (Jenkins) classification system in ArcMap10.0 for the thematic maps. First, three 
thematic maps were produced using recorded gastroenteritis cases followed by thematic maps 
for other factors outlined in Appendix B. The first map compared gastroenteritis cases for the 
South Island (per CAU) over 35 days (22/2/2011–28/3/2011) following the February 22, 2011 
earthquake. The second map concentrated in Christchurch by mapping recorded gastroenteritis 
cases before the earthquake (22/2/2010- 28/3/2010) and the third map after the earthquake 
(22/2/2011 –28/3/2011). These maps were created in ArcMap10.0. 
 
3.2.5 SPATIAL STATISTICS 
Spatial statistics took into account the effects of geographical variation at the lowest 
geographical unit, which was at CAU. The literature review identified three statistical tests  that 
were carried out as part of spatial analysis. Namely, those were Moran’s  I (spatial 
autocorrelation), Hot Spot (HS) analysis and Besag–York–Mollié Model (BYM Model). The 
first two techniques used ArcMap10.0 while the latter method used WinBUGS14 software. All 
techniques assume the following from (Mitchell, 1999) : 
 Null hypothesis states that no spatial patterns were exhibited 
 Population within a CAU is uniformly distributed 
 Any residuals created because of spatial analysis are normally distributed. 
Collectively, Moran’s I and HS evaluated the clustering effects of each variable whilst the 
BYM Model statistically analysed whether gastroenteritis point prevalence spatially explained 
water pipe damage (main and submain), wastewater pipe damage, liquefaction ground damage, 
E.coli, and FAC-NC. 
 
3.2.6 GLOBAL MORAN’S I  
Moran’s I evaluated whether an exhibited pattern is clustered for a given set of features and its 
associated attributes (Fischer & Getis, 2010; Getis, 1992). Thus, Moran’s I is a statistic that 
measures spatial autocorrelation (Getis, 1992). Moran’s I statistic was evaluated using 
ArcMap10.0 software via spatial autocorrelation operation on ArcMap10.0, which incorporated 
the global Moran’s I statistic calculations (ESRI, 2013). In particular, the spatial autocorrelation 
operation  assumes that similar geographic features are placed closer to each other (Mitchell, 
1999). Value of each CAU reflected the influence of neighbouring CAUs (Mitchell, 1999). The 
input data for Moran’s I statistic was variables from Appendix B.  
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The outputs for Moran’s I statistic using spatial autocorrelation in ArcMap10.0 was Moran’s I 
index, z-score, p-value and the type of spatial pattern exhibited. Moran’s I index is a value 
between -1 to 1(Mitchell, 1999). A value of Moran’s I index less than zero indicate the spatial 
pattern is dispersed (CAUs with high and low counts are scattered) (Mitchell, 1999). A value 
equating to zero shows no apparent spatial pattern and a Moran I index greater than zero 
indicates the pattern is clustered (similar counts for CAUs are found together) (Mitchell, 1999). 
The z-score and p-values refer to the standard normal distribution. The z-scores are standard 
deviation. The p-value is the probability: probability the spatial pattern was created due to 
random process. Thus, a small p-value (small probability) indicates it is unlikely that the 
observed spatial pattern is due to any random process. Hence, very high or low z-scores are 
related to small p-values. The critical z-scores and p-values for probability confidence interval 
are shown in Appendix D. The spatial autocorrelation operation formed the stepping-stone to 
frame subsequent spatial statistics tools in order to analyse the potential clustering effects 
within Christchurch city.  
 
3.2.7 HOT SPOT  
The G-Ordi Gi statistic evaluated the location of statistically significant spatial clusters within a 
local area (Getis, 1992). The G-Ordi Gi statistic can identify local “pockets” of association that 
may not be found using the global Moran’s I (Getis, 1992). The HS operation particularly 
suited the scale of the study area because CAU was considered at local level. The Hot Spot 
(HS) operation within ArcMap10.0 was used to evaluated the G-Ordi Gi statistic (ESRI, 2013; 
Getis, 1992). The HS operation was carried out for each factor outlined in Appendix B. The 
resultant was a thematic map with z-scoring and p-values. A high z-score reflected intense 
clustering of high counts (referred to as hot spots), whilst a low z-score meant clustering of low 
counts (cold spots).  
 
3.2.8 SPEARMAN’S RHO 
Spearman correlation coefficient, henceforth referred to as Spearman’s rho (σ), was calculated 
for factors outlined in Appendix B using SPSS19. Although correlations do not necessitate 
causation, it can suggest how variables can interact, and are influenced by each other (Pallant, 
2010). Spearman’s rho is a type of non-parametric technique suited for count data. Identifying 
multicorrelation (high correlation among independent variables) is an important part of 
regression modelling. 
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3.2.9 BESAG–YORK–MOLLIÉ MODEL 
The purpose of using a spatially explicit model is to understand whether there is spatial 
variation in gastroenteritis explained by factors considered in this research. Two mechanisms 
were considered. The first postulated that gastroenteritis point prevalence can be explained by 
damages to the water network, wastewater network, liquefaction ground damage (lateral 
spreading and surface ejecta) and gastroenteritis agents—FAC and E.coli. The second 
mechanism aimed to find out whether the recorded E.coli counts were spatially explained by 
damage from water, wastewater, liquefaction ground damage (lateral spreading and surface 
ejecta), and FAC-NC counts.  
 
To investigate those two mechanisms, a Bayesian hierarchical conditional autoregressive 
model, Besag–York–Mollié (BYM) Model, that was first developed by Besag was applied 
(Besag, 1974, 1975, 1986; Besag, York, & Mollié, 1991). Since its publication, it has been 
adapted and used as a common platform for disease mapping and spatial regression, in 
particular to spatially quantify environmental area-specific factors; and incidence (García-
Pérez et al., 2013; Manh et al., 2011; Saurina et al., 2010; Smith, Charlwood, Takken, Tanner, 
& Spiegelhalter, 1995). This adapted model may be viewed as a General Linear Regression 
Model (GLM) with an associated spatial component—Conditional Autoregressive Model 
(CAR)—which takes into account the geography of the study area (Besag et al., 1991). 
Henceforth this model, Besag–York–Mollié Model, will be referred to as the BYM Model. 
 
To implement the BYM model, the WinBUGS14 software was used. The code to apply the 
model in WinBUGS14 was adapted from an example in the WinBUGS14 manual that 
explored the rates of lip cancer; initially studied by Clayton and Kaldor in 1987 as well as 
Bresow & Clayton in 1993 (Thomas, Best, Lunn, Arnold, & Spiegelhalter, 2004). 
 
Using the adapted code, two models were considered. The respondent variables were 
gastroenteritis point prevalence (GAST-Model 1) and E.coli (ECM-Model 2), respectively. 
The covariates for Model 1 and Model 2 were selected factors from Table B -1; and outlined 
in Appendix B and F. Model 1 aimed to investigate if the recorded gastroenteritis point 
prevalence could be explained by the selected covariates; whilst, Model 2 asked the question: 
if the selected covariates spatially explained the observed E.coli count. The response 
variables (gastroenteritis point prevalence for Model 1 and E.coli for Model 2) in cell ί were 
assumed to follow a Poisson Distribution with mean, 
i (Equation 4.0). The log of the mean 
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was then modelled as a linear function of putative risk factors for each respective model 
(Equation 4.1, 4.2). This is a standard set-up for Poisson GLM  (Thomas et al., 2004). 
)( ii PoissonY                  (4.0) 
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Where: Y is the dependent variable, which in this study is gastroenteritis point prevalence (per 
CAU) for Model 1 and E.coli count (per CAU) for Model 2 
( i ) denotes observation for each CAU 
Covariant coefficients were a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 
GAST = the expected cases of gastroenteritis point prevalence using the population of the study 
area as the maximum number of people that can have gastroenteritis per CAU (Model 1) 
ECM = the expected cases of E.coli using the population of the study area as the maximum 
number of people that can be exposed to E.coli per CAU (Model 2) 
WSB = water submain pipe damage count per CAU  
WSM = water main pipe damage count per CAU 
WW = wastewater pipe damage count per CAU 
FAC-NC = Free Associated Chlorine that is Non-Compliant (less than 0.2mg/L) count per CAU 
Ec= E.coli count per CAU 
LIQ = percentage of liquefied area per CAU 
E = spatial residual for each CAU. 
 
The residuals, E, is the discrepancy between the predicted and observed risk. The residuals 
were  assumed to be spatially correlated as described in (Besag et al., 1991). The geographical 
spatial unit considered for this study was CAUs, and the study area map is shown in Figure A-
1. Each CAU had a unique size and shape. To compensate for this irregularity population size 
was included in the analysis. Two CAUs were considered neighbours if one CAU shared a 
border with another CAU. To fully specify the BYM model, non-informative prior Gaussian 
Distributions were assigned to all parameters. This is a standard procedure when no prior 
information is available (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2003). Combining prior information 
with likelihood produced Posterior Distributions, which was used to produce the risk factor 
effect estimates the CAU estimates (posterior medians) as well as 95% credible interval 
(Gelman et al., 2003) for them. CAU specific residuals were also evaluated. The regression 
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coefficients a1-a6 reflected the Estimated Effects (EEs) of the covariates on the respondent 
variables (Model 1 and Model 2). The above is further explained punctiliously by Lawson 
(2012), Lei et al. (2008), and Thomas et al. (2004).  
 
The WinBUGS14 code is shown in Appendix E. A model was run for 10,000 iterations in total 
with 5000 burn-in (which means running the model without recording anything, because the 
convergence has not been reached yet) iterations with the remainder 5000 iterations for which 
output was recorded. Once convergence has been reached, the results do not fluctuate greatly. 
The convergence inspection was carried out by a visual check of the iteration history within the 
WinBUGS14 software.  
 
Once the model has converged, the following outputs were recorded: Deviance Information 
Criterion (DIC), the predicted responses, covariate coefficients, and maps of expected counts; 
and residuals. DIC compares the complexity and “goodness of fit of data” of different models 
which is implemented in WinBUGS14 (Best, Richardson, & Thomson, 2005; Cowles, 2004). 
The lower the DIC, better the model. For any two models, 1-2 DIC difference was considered 
not very different, a 3-7 DIC change indicated suggestive difference whilst >7 DIC mean strong 
indifference (Best et al., 2005). Because DIC is sometimes unstable, it was recorded after 5000 
iterations and then again, after 10000 iterations to make sure a model had converged. 
 
The EEs of the regression-covariate coefficients were recorded and considered significant, if 
the 95% Bayesian Credible Interval (CI) excluded zero. The calculated expected counts or 
cases from the BYM Model for each dependent variable were mapped using ArcMap10.0. In 
addition, the residuals (E) for each CAU were recorded and mapped via ArcMap10.0. The 
Moran’s I was evaluated using ArcMap10.0 (otherwise known as spatial autocorrelation in 
ArcMap10.0) for residuals to check for spatial aggregation. Appendix F shows various 
covariates that were tried for Model 1 and Model 2. For each model, the DIC was calculated to 
see which of the model combinations (C1-C12) showed the best fit to the data.  
 
3.3 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The qualitative method involved interviewing volunteers at Emergency Centres (ECs) that were 
open to the public following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. This was the main source of 
data used to understand the successful mitigative steps that were undertaken to prevent 
gastroenteritis outbreaks within a welfare centre. The Figure 3-1 summarises the qualitative 
research method. The interviews were analysed adapting the GT approach described byCorbin 
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and Strauss (2008). The qualitative analysis involved the following sections for interview 
analysis where the proceeding section is contingent on the previous.  
 
3.3.1 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
The literature review highlighted key overarching elements that were adaptable to different 
situations. Because of this reason, the literature review was used, albeit minimum to retain the 
essence of a GT approach. The questionnaire had the following major elements: sewerage 
facilities; rubbish disposal; health care; power and communication systems; drinking water; 
personnel hygiene; and preventative measures aimed to avert gastroenteritis incidences at ECs. 
The literature review highlighted the aforementioned overarching concepts. Additional 
elements included EC layout, operational times, staff and shift details, food preparation; and 
affiliated organisations. Each element had subsidiary questions. The questions on the major 
elements were open-ended to foster discussion from participants. Collectively, the 
questionnaire was organised into four major categories: welfare volunteer details, welfare 
operational services, essential lifeline services, and infection preventative measures with future 
recommendations. The questionnaire is included in Appendix G. 
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Figure 3-1: Represents the qualitative methods used in the study. The green boxes outlines the 
interview methods while the blue boxes shows the adapted grounded theory used to analyse the 
interviews. Abbreviation EC=Emergency Centre. 
 
3.3.2 SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS 
The questionnaire and its complimentary documents were reviewed by the Human Ethics 
Committee (HEC) at University of Canterbury and approval was granted to conduct the 
interviews as part of this research (HEC reference number: HEC 2012/161). The questionnaire 
included a participant invitation letter, participant information sheet, and a consent form:  
 The invitation letter was an invitation to take part in the study along with other 
information such as interview length 
 A participant information sheet provided the study’s purpose, interview structure and 
participants’ obligations; and how the results from the interview will contribute 
towards study objectives 
 The consent form verified the participants’ permission to conduct the interview, and 
that the participant understands the interview will be audio recorded 
 The consent form had to be completed by the participant before commencing the 
interview. 
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3.3.3 RECRUITING PARTICIPANTS  
Initially the investigator planned to interview 30 participants equally from Burnside High 
School EC (BEC), Linwood High School EC (LEC), and Cowles Stadium EC (CEC). 
However, due to time restrictions, there were 16 participants from BEC to represent the west 
side of Christchurch and collective 14 participants from CEC and LEC to portray the east side 
of Christchurch. The CEC and LEC participants were collectively grouped because those 
participants interchangeably refereed to both of the ECs throughout their interviews due to 
their experience.  
It is important to note that as the interviews commenced, it became apparent that LEC was not 
open to the public after the February 22, 2011 earthquake because of liquefaction ground 
damage. This was not known prior to commencing the interviews; and, it was clear that 
information pertaining to LEC was important for the February 22, 2011 earthquake. However, 
LEC was included in the study, because it contained important information such as identifying 
themes as part of study analysis. The HEC at University of Canterbury granted approval to 
extend qualitative data collection by including LEC participants in the study. Thus, this study 
considered three ECs: two ECs after the February 22 2011 earthquake and one EC after the 
September 4, 2010 earthquake.  
Participants were required from range of job roles and responsibility levels such as ground floor 
volunteers to upper management volunteers. Thus, list of potential candidates to participate in 
the interview was obtained from the EC manager, and the questionnaire package was emailed to 
everyone on the list, followed by a phone call a week later. In addition, the researcher presented 
at EC meetings and handed out the questionnaire packages to recruit participants. After the 
presentation, interested participants’ contact details were collected to schedule an interview 
time. Questionnaire packages were emailed to other potential participants and followed-up with 
a phone call a week later. Participants were given the option of conducting the interview in 
small focus group style with up to five participants or an individual interview because of time 
constraints. 
There was a single criterion for candidates to be able to take part in the study: participants must 
have volunteered (either in a volunteer or paid role) at one of the three ECs for the February 22, 
2011 earthquake. It was mandatory for potential LEC participants must have volunteered at 
least once at LEC following the September 4, 2010 earthquake. There was no minimal time 
limit set for which a participant had to volunteer at an EC in order to take part in the interview. 
In doing so, it enabled the interviewer to seek participants with variety of job roles, whilst the 
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EC was open to the public. This in turn created a robust data collection. Thus, the study 
assumed, any additional factors—such as gender or age—were considered negligible, other 
than the criterion placed earlier. 
 
3.3.4 CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEWS 
Before conducting the interview, information in the invitation letter, information sheet and 
contents of the consent form were verbally explained (and given a hard copy of the documents) 
to all of the participants intending to take part in the interview. If participants wished to proceed 
with the interview, a consent form was completed and the interview commenced. As mentioned 
in the information sheet, the interviewed participants were given two weeks to sever their 
interview from the study. Part of the interview included annotating on a google printed map of 
the EC building about the EC layout. The interview was audio recorded which was 
supplemented with the interviewer taking notes throughout the interview. Participants had a 
copy of the questionnaire prior, and during the interview. As a result, participants had time to 
prepare for the interview beforehand, if they wished. After the interview, the interviewer gave 
some chocolate treats to all participants as a token of thanks. The one-off interviews were 
scheduled to last 30 minutes, but in most cases extended to one and half hours, especially for 
the focus groups. 
 
3.3.5 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
As mentioned in the literature review, the interview analysis applied and adapted methods 
outlined by Corbin and Strauss (2008).  First, the audio recordings were transcribed into text 
data by creating a transcript of each interview. This was followed by open coding, axial coding 
and selective coding before creating a “story line” that consolidates grouped concepts 
(identified during axial coding) to present as theories derived from interview data. The 
following sections describe open, axial, and selective coding. 
 
3.3.6 TRANSCRIBING 
The software NVIVO10 was used to transcribe the audio-recorded interviews. Each interview 
audio file was exported into NVIVO10, and segmented into three-minute intervals. From here, 
each audio segment was manually transcribed to create a synchronised transcript with the audio 
file. As a result, the transcript framed the basis for open, axial, and selective coding. Memos 
were written, within NVIVO10, and by hand throughout the analysis process. After 
transcribing, frequency counts of all the transcripts were carried out. It identified the most 
frequently used words (excluding definite, indefinite articles and prepositions) for the last part 
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of the question within the questionnaire: protocols implemented that prevented a gastroenteritis 
outbreak at an EC (Appendix G).  
3.3.7 OPEN CODING 
Open coding involved listening to the audio recording whilst reading the transcript  to identify 
similar concepts that can be grouped together. A concept was mostly considered, but not limited 
to repetitive or unique key words, ideas, sayings, or notions. Open coding was carried out to 
categorise similar concepts into nodes. A node was a range of attributes such as phrases, people, 
words, practical ideas that were carried out, and the EC itself. Nodes can be created within the 
same transcript or between different transcripts.  
Open coding was carried out by listening to the audio whilst following the transcription. This 
enabled to let the interview data to speak for itself. Once a node was identified, information 
relating to that node was highlighted and categorised using NVIVO10. Moreover, listening to 
the audio recording whilst open coding checked the transcribing was carried out correctly.  
It is important to note that parts of the audio recording referring to annotating the EC floor 
plans were not transcribed. Instead, part of the audio recordings detailing floor plans were “cut” 
(using a NVIVO 10 feature called clips) and coded into nodes using the direct audio recording. 
This was done because it was difficult to transcribe the material in the audio recording whilst 
participants were annotating.  
3.3.8 AXIAL CODING 
Building interconnecting relationships between established nodes formed the primary objective 
for conducting axial coding. It is important to note that Strauss and Corbin’s (2008) information 
on axial coding was used as a guideline only. Nodes that were similar in content or ideas were 
amalgamated into a general node. The dissimilar nodes remained the same. A node (a general or 
a dissimilar node) was incisively summarised into a table termed Axial Table (AT) that 
contained information such as memos written and welfare centre details. Furthermore, ATs 
helped to identify conflicting answers and cross-referencing participants’ answers because 
information pertaining to all ECs were visually represented. 
The ATs were printed, laid on the ground, and rearranged repetitively by reading the material on 
the ATs. This continuous, yet iterative, interplay between nodes formed the foundation for 
establishing connections among isolated nodes. As a result, network of interconnected nodes 
were identified as well as chronological time line of activities for each EC. This created the 
platform for selective coding.  
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3.3.9 SELECTIVE CODING 
Selective coding integrated and represented the established connections from axial coding into 
a framework and timelines for each EC—building the overall story line. In this study, this 
process was referred to as theory building. The framework, which was expressed as a flow 
chart showed how each element interacted with another in a hierarchical manner. Deriving this 
chart was an iterative process. The framework chart encompassed all the components that 
interacted together to prevent a gastroenteritis outbreak at ECs. Putting the interconnected 
events into a chronological order created the timeline. Additional notes were also summarised 
for each EC. The EC layouts were also refined by digitising the original EC maps. Checks were 
conducted to inspect for any gaps in the framework, timelines, EC layouts, and summary notes. 
The first check was using the aforementioned resources to answer the questions in 
questionnaire. Whilst the GT approach cannot corroborate or disprove the theory generated 
from the data, it is important to establish that sufficient information has been collated to answer 
the research questions adequately  (Glaser, 1998).  Any questions that could not be answered in 
the questionnaire highlighted areas for further investigations or rechecking the original data for 
errors. The second and final check was to return to some of the senior participants to check 
whether the final EC layouts generated were correct. This was needed because collating 
annotated diagrams from each interview may have led to incorrect information.  
3.4 METHODOLOGY SUMMARY 
 This chapter described two overarching methods used in the study using the February 
22, 2011 earthquake: quantitative and qualitative  
 The quantitative methods used to understand spatial association between recorded 
gastroenteritis cases and its associated factors 
 The quantitative method commenced with creating a damage profile table, which 
amalgamated the factors considered in this research per CAU 
 Range of methods was described for quantitative analysis that included the following 
tests: frequency distributions, thematic maps, Spearman’s Rho, Moran’s I, Hot Spot 
analysis, and the Besag–York–Mollié Model 
 The aim of the qualitative methods was to investigate the protocols implemented at ECs 
that prevented gastroenteritis outbreak following the February 22, 2011 earthquake  
 Qualitative analysis involved designing a questionnaire and conducting interviews for 
30 participants from three ECs 
 An adapted GT from Corbin and Strauss (2008) was applied to analyse the interviews 
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 The major components of the interview analysis were transcribing, open coding, axial 
coding and selective coding.  
 
Collectively quantitative and qualitative methods describe mechanisms to assess and 
prevent gastroenteritis outbreaks in a post-earthquake setting.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter four presents the results of the quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative 
results begin with illustrating the gastroenteritis prevalence in Christchurch after the 
Canterbury Earthquakes. Followed by outlining the spatial association of factors described in 
Table B1 to B3 using the following tests and techniques: thematic maps, frequency 
distributions and Spearmen’s rho (σ), Moran’s I, Hot Spot (HS) and the Bayesian Hierarchical 
Conditional Autoregressive Model—the BYM Model. Given the presence of gastroenteritis risk 
factors, the qualitative technique—Grounded Theory (GT)—outlined the mitigative practices 
that were carried out to prevent a gastroenteritis outbreak at an Emergency Centre (EC).  
 
4.2 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
4.2.1 GASTROENTERITIS POINT PREVALENCE 
Two gastroenteritis clusters were identified by mapping the gastroenteritis point prevalence 
(per CAU) over the South Island: Christchurch and Invercargill (Figure 4-1). Christchurch city 
showed the largest cluster of gastroenteritis cases recorded over the 35 days (22-02-2011 to 28-04-
2011). The red square in Figure 4-1showed that 91% of gastroenteritis point prevalence was in 
Christchurch. Moreover, Figure 4-2 illustrates a 14-fold increase in recorded gastroenteritis 
point prevalence over Christchurch city as a whole by comparing recorded gastroenteritis point 
prevalence (per CAU) for 35 days before the earthquake (22-02-2010 to 28-04-2010) and after 
the earthquake (22-02-2011 to 28-04-2011)1.  
 
4.2.2 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS  AND SPEARMAN COEFFICIENT 
CORRELATIONS 
All frequency distributions produced similar power-law graphs for factors in Table B1-3: large 
frequency of low damage counts with small frequency of high damage counts per CAU. The 
frequency distributions are shown in Figure H-1. 
                                                          
1
 The 2010 data included only gastroenteritis cases as defined by Ministry of Health Communicable disease definitions by 
contract, the 2011 database included all enteric disease cases. Moreover, GPs in Christchurch had been alerted to the importance of 
notifying enteric disease, so there was an increase in reporting of such cases outside the normal reporting criteria, which led to the 14-fold 
increase in gastroenteritis cases. The student was not aware of this information prior to the completion of her thesis, and neither her 
supervisors were made aware of these methodological constraints. This finding does not negate the results of the thesis study itself, of 
which, the main aims were to identify any possible correlation between gastroenteritis cases with the earthquake-induced infrastructure 
damage, liquefaction ejecta on the ground, and the presence of gastroenteritis agents in the potable water along with mitigative factors 
that were carried to prevent gastroenteritis outbreaks at emergency centres. 
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The Spearman Rho (σ) shown on the original column-matrix format is provided in Appendix I. 
The Figure 4-3 shows the summarised matrix of Spearman’s Rho, which identified three levels 
of associations: high, medium and low. All Spearman’s Rho were significantly different from 0 
at p<0.01. The summary matrix followed the lower diagram on Figure 4-3, which generalised 
the three association levels. It follows that there is a high association between infrastructure 
damages (LIQ, WW, WSM, and WSB). A medium-level association between those collective 
infrastructure damages and FAC-NC, and a low-level association between GAST; and expected 
count of E.coli. In turn, GAST had a low-level associated with expected count of E.coli and 
collective infrastructure damages. In addition, there is also a medium-level association between 
LIQ and WSB. 
 
4.2.3 THEMATIC MAPS 
Thematic maps in Figure 4-4 and 4-5 shows the geographical distribution of damage counts for 
factors described in Table B1-3. The maps demonstrate that areas with high damage counts 
(with low frequency shown via frequency distributions) were aggregated together. This is 
shown by a highlighted area, a brown outlined in Figure 4-4 and 4-5. However, E.coli count did 
not display this highlighted area and visually looked interspersed, Figure 4-4A. 
 
No single CAU had the highest damage category for all of the factors, but heterogeneous mix 
of high damages were illustrated by the aggregated zone for eastern suburbs. They included 
Aranui, Avondale, Bexley, Chisnall, Ensors, Rawhiti, Linwood East, Linwood North and South 
Brighton (Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5). However, Avondale had the highest categories of water 
(main and submain) network damage, wastewater network damage, and liquefaction ground 
damage. South Brighton showed the single CAU with the highest count categories E.coli, FAC-
NC, and gastroenteritis point prevalence (Figure 4-4). For example, New Brighton area fell into 
the high damage category for all of the factors—with the exception of wastewater damage. 
 
4.2.4 SPATIAL AUTOCORRELATION 
For this study, for all factors, the Moran’s I index was positive. Because of the high z-score 
signifies statistical significance, the spatial pattern was classed as clustered (Table J -1). 
Notably, E.coli and gastroenteritis point prevalence had the lowest Moran’s I index 0.015 and 
0.05, respectively. The results are shown on Table J-1. Clustering of the factors was statistically 
significant at 1% level (because of the z-scores greater than 2.58) and at 5% significant level 
since the z-score range was 1.96-2.58 (Figure D-1).  
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Figure 4-1: Gastroenteritis cases for South Island, New Zealand (NZ) between 22/2/2011 –
28/3/2011 (35 days). The left hand side map shows NZ map with the study area outlined in a 
black square. The centre map shows South Island with gastroenteritis cases (aggregated per 
Census Area Unit [CAU]) highlighted in blue. The purple square represents the small cluster 
within Invercargill city whilst the red square shows the larger cluster in Christchurch City.  
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Figure 4-2: Gastroenteritis cases in Christchurch after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The above map 
shows recorded gastroenteritis cases recorded from 22-02-2010 to 28-03-2010 whilst the bottom map 
displays gastroenteritis cases from 22-02-2011 to 28-03-2011.  
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4.2.5 HOT SPOT ANALYSIS 
The Hot Spot (HS) operation, which was built into ArcMap 10.0, produced thematic maps that 
illustrated CAUs with high and low damage counts that were statistically significant. The high 
and low damage counts, referred to as hot and cold spots respectively are shown in Figures 4-6 
and 4-7.  In both of the figures (Figure 4-6 and 4-7), HSs were categorised into the orange-red 
shades whilst a cold spot was shown by the blue shades. Neither figures showed cold spots. 
 
South Brighton was the common HS for E.coli, FAC-NC, gastroenteritis cases and main water 
pipe damage (per 10,000 people)—Figure 4-6. New Brighton was the single overlapping CAU 
between Figures 4-6 to 4-7. Some CAUs had interspersed HSs towards the central to west side 
of Christchurch (such as Addington, Belfast South, Bryndwr, and Northcote). Contrastingly, 
Figure 4-7 showed HSs aggregated in similar CAU across the four maps. Bexley was the 
common CAU amongst water (main and submain pipes), wastewater, and liquefaction ground 
damage amongst HSs (Figure 4-7). It is also important to mention there were some isolated 
CAUs with HSs scattered (Figure 4-6 and 4-7). Interestingly, HSs in the FAC-NC map (Figure 
4-6B) corresponded to HSs shown on the water (main and submain pipes) and wastewater maps 
in Figure 4-7A, B and D. 
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Figure 4-3: Spearman’s Rho (σ) associations between various factors that were recorded after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The table corresponds to 
the relevant   Spearman’s Rho associations and their category levels. There were three significant Spearman’s Rho levels identified: low, medium and high. 
The low association level is blue coloured boxes with dashed arrows. The medium-level is depicted by green the coloured-diamond shape accompanied by 
the dotted-arrows. The red circles and solid-line arrows reflect a high Spearman’s Rho. The black double-dashed line shows statistically non-significant 
SPCC correlation. All infrastructure (WW, WSM & WSB) and LIQ is collectively named “infrastructure and liquefaction damage” platform for easy 
navigation. Percentage of liquefied areas is the liquefaction ground damage due to lateral spreading and surface ejecta. 
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Figure 4-4: Thematic maps for aggregated Escherichia coli (E.coli) in map A; Free Associated Chlorine Non-Compliant (FAC-
NC) in map B; and recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The yellow shape 
overlaying FAC-NC map shows the aggregated areas with high counts of FAC-NC. The gastroenteritis cases were recorded 
over 35 from February 22, 2011.  
A 
B 
C 
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Figure 4-5: Illustrates infrastructure and liquefaction damages that are aggregated into each Census Unit Area (CAU) after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Liquefied areas are ground damage due to 
lateral spreading and surface ejecta. 
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Figure 4-6: Hot Spot (HS) results for gastroenteritis- factors following the February 22, 2011 earthquake in 
Christchurch. The yellow shade indicates no clustering, whilst the red and blue shades indicate hot and cool 
spots, respectively. The hot spots are high values that are clustered together with statistical significance 
(orange-red shades). Cold spots show areas statistically significant low values that are clustered together (blue 
shades). Escherichia coli is referred to as E.coli. 
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Figure 4-7: Hot Spot (HS) results for infrastructure and earthquake factors following the February 22, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch. The yellow shade 
indicates no clustering, whilst red and blue shades indicate hot and cold spots, respectively. The hot spots are high values that are clustered together with 
statistical significance (orange-red shades). Cold spots (blue shades) show areas statistically significant low values that are clustered together. There are 
aggregated spatial locations of HSs for each map whereas water network damages showing to aggregated areas of HSs. Liquefaction is ground damage due to 
lateral spreading and surface ejecta.  
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4.2.6 SPATIAL ANALYSIS: BAYESIAN HIERARCHICAL CONDITIONAL 
AUTOREGRESSIVE MODELLING 
The Besag–York–Mollié Model was used in the WinBUGS14 software and was run to test two 
associations: the first to understand whether the gastroenteritis cases spatial distribution was 
explained by liquefaction ground damage (lateral spread and surface ejecta), FAC-NC, and 
infrastructure damage. The second, if E.coli counts may have acted as a gastroenteritis agent 
due to liquefaction ground damage and infrastructure damage. The BYM models were 
combined with ArcMap10.0 analysis, which produced the following outputs: DIC, model 
coefficients, expected counts for model combinations, and corresponding residual maps. The 
residual maps were then used test for spatial autocorrelation using ArcMap10.0. The original 
data tables summarising the recorded inputs are shown in Table B-1to B-3.  
 
According to DIC the best factor combination (the lowest DIC) for Model 1 was E.coli (C2 
with DIC=202.4). That is, E.coli data best “fitted” the recorded gastroenteritis cases. For Model 
2, the best factor combination (with DIC of 208.9, as shown in Table 4-1) was C11. Thus, 
combination of water damage (main and submain pipes), wastewater and liquefaction data best 
fitted the E.coli data. In Model 2 there was minimal DIC difference between different factor 
combinations (less than 1-2 range set at the outset). Because of this, the second best factor 
combination was considered for further analysis in Model 2— C9. This means the combination 
of water (main and submain pipes), liquefaction and FAC-NC, may have explained the 
recorded E.coli counts. These factor combinations— C2, C9, C11—had the lowest DIC, which 
meant they were the only factor combinations considered for further analysis. 
 
4.2.6.1 MODEL COEFFICIENTS 
The raw coefficients from each model were converted into an Estimated Effect (EE), which is 
summarised in Table 4-1. The EEs, an important output of the BYM Model shows the effect of 
covariates on a factor combination. The EEs were considered statistically significant if the 95% 
Credible Interval (CI) excluded zero. In Model 1, C2 showed all statistically non-significant 
EEs. In contrast, Model 2 produced statistically significant EEs. In the C11 combination, 
liquefaction ground damage was a statistically significant EE (Table 4-1). It means that a single  
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liquefaction ground damage unit (1% of the total CAU area) is associated with an increase of 
E.coli count (MPN/100ml) in drinking water supply by 5%, per CAU (Table 4-1). Likewise, C9 
(with the second lowest DIC for Model 2) had two factors that were statistically significant— 
FAC-NC and LIQ (Table 4-1). Thus, for every unit increase of FAC-NC (per MPN/100ml), the 
E.coli count in drinking water supply increases by 6%, per CAU. Liquefaction ground damage 
had the same EE as C9 (Table 4-1). Comparing EEs from both of the models shows water 
submain pipe damage tend to be negatively associated with risk of gastroenteritis and E.coli 
because of the negative EEs. For all the factor combinations the EE for a1 was negative (Table 
4-1). For example, the C9 combination’s EEs for WSB was -3%.  
 
4.2.6.2 WINBUGS14 MAPS 
The expected count maps produced by WinBUGS14 using the BYM model is shown in Figure 
4-8. The expected counts for all the three factor combinations were low for the overall study 
areas, except for eastern suburbs in Christchurch (Figure 4-8A, C, and E). The residual maps 
from Figure 4-8 shows the discrepancy between the expected and the observed counts (or 
cases) for a dependent variable within factor combination. An overestimated residual is when 
the expected counts that were calculated in the BYM Model were much higher than the 
observed counts from the input data. An underestimated residual is the opposite; the expected 
counts (or cases), which is lower than observed counts from the input data. Both overestimated 
and underestimated residuals represent the discrepancy between the expected counts that were 
calculated in BYM Model. The underestimated residuals are shown in blue shades while the 
overestimated residuals are represented by red-orange shades (Figure 4-8). The green shades 
show areas with minimal residuals in Figure 4-8 (minimal discrepancy between the calculated 
expected counts and the observed counts from input data).  
 
In Model 1, the residual map (Figure 4-8B) shows the least range of residual discrepancy, yet 
the DIC was much higher, indicating poor data fit. The residuals from Model 2 show two 
combinations—C9, C11—with the range of overestimated and underestimated residuals (Figure 
4-8D, F). The C11 residual map (Figure 4-8F) had the largest ambit of residuals in spite of the 
lowest DIC amongst Model 2 factor combinations (Table 4-1). Furthermore, Moran’s I statistics 
(using the spatial autocorrelation operation in ArcMap10.0) verifies that the all residuals maps 
were statistically clustered, as shown on Table K-1, so that CAUs showing underestimated, 
overestimated and minimal residuals were statistically aggregated.  
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Table 4-1: WinBUGS14 results for two dependent variables: gastroenteritis cases and Escherichia coli (E.coli) counts with respective factor combinations. 
Lower the DIC, better the model fit. Positive coefficient indicates increases in likelihood; a negative coefficient has the opposite effect. The abbreviations 
included in the table are a (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) =denote coefficients considered in the model, CI= Credible Interval, Ec= Excpected Count of E.coli, 
WSB=Water submain pipe damage count, WSM = Water main pipe damage, WW= Wastewater damage count, L= Liquefaction ground damage (lateral 
spread and surface ejecta) per CAU in percentage, FAC-NC= Non-Compliant Free Associated Chlorine (0.02mg/L). All data counted per Census Area Unit 
(CAU). 
 
 
Combination Number 
Coefficient 
label 
Estimated Effect 
(EE)(%) 
Confident Interval 
 (2.5%,97.5%) 
DIC 
Model 1 DIC10000 
C1:W+WW 
a1=WSB 0.5 (-2,3) 
212.7 a2=WSM 0.1 (-4,0.1) 
a3=WW 0.3 (-0.6,1) 
C2: Ec a6=EC 2.7 (-3,8) 202.4 
C3: FAC-NC +Ec 
a4=FAC-NC 1.5 (-2,4) 
210.2 
a6=EC -0.5 (-8,7) 
C4 :W+WW+Ec 
a1=WSB 1.0 (-2,4) 
209.8 
a2=WSM -1.2 (-5,2) 
a3=WW 0.4 (-1,1) 
a6=EC 3.1 (-3,8) 
C5:W+WW+FAC-NC +L+Ec 
a1=WSB 0.7 (-2,4) 
214.0 
a2=WSM -0.9 (-5,3) 
a3=WW 0.3 (-1,1) 
a4=FAC-NC 0.6 (-3,4) 
a5=LIQ 0.2 (-2,2) 
a6=EC 1.8 (-7,11) 
Model 2 DIC5000 
C6: W+WW 
a1=WSB -4 (-9,1) 
210.1 a2=WSM 9 (2,13) 
a3=WW 0 (-2,2) 
C7: W+L 
a1=WSB -2 (-9,3) 
209.8 a2=WSM 4 (-1,16) 
a5=LIQ 5 (1,9) 
C8: W+FAC-NC 
a1=WSB -3 (-7,3) 
209.9 a2=WSM 5 (-3, 12) 
a4=FAC-NC 7 (2,9) 
C9: W+L+FAC-NC 
a1=WSB -3 (-7,1) 
209.3 
a2=WSM 4 (-3,10) 
a4=FAC-NC 6 (2,9) 
a5=LIQ 5 (1,8) 
C10: W+WW+FAC-NC 
a1=WSB -3 (-8,3) 
209.4 
a2=WSM 4 (-3,12) 
a3=WW 0 (-2,2) 
a4=FAC-NC 7 (3,11) 
C11: W+WW+L 
a1=WSB -1 (-7,3) 
208.9 
a2=WSM 5 (-0.3,11) 
a3=WW -1 (-2,1) 
a5=LIQ 5 (1,9) 
C12: W+WW+FAC-NC+L 
a1=WSB -3 (-7,2) 
209.6 
a2=WSM 5 (-2,11) 
a3=WW 0 (-2,1) 
a4=FAC-NC 6 (4,9) 
a5=LIQ 4 (1,7) 
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Figure 4-8: WinBUGS14 risk and residual maps. Figures A, B, and C represent the risk map for various factors while B, D, F shows the corresponding residual maps, respectively. The residual 
indicate area that the considered factors did not explain the observed response variable (recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence for Model 1 and Escherichia (E. E.coli). An overestimated 
residual is when the expected counts are higher than the observed counts from the input data. An underestimated residual is the opposite; the expected counts (or cases) are lower 
than observed counts from the input data. The underestimated residuals are shown in blue shades while the overestimated residuals are represented by red-orange shades. The 
greed shades represent areas with minimal discrepancy. 
67 
 
4.3 QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
4.3.1 EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE SURROUNDING THE EMERGENCY CENTRES 
Given the infrastructure damages shown in the quantitative analysis, the purpose of qualitative 
data analysis was to identify the successful mitigations that were carried out to prevent 
gastroenteritis outbreaks at an Emergency Centre (EC). An EC is represented by an area called 
a Ward. A ward, for electoral reasons, is a division of territorial authorities (NZStatistics, 2012) 
Hence, there is an emergency centre representing an ward. The location and management of an 
EC is maintained by often, but not limited to, volunteers pertaining to its corresponding ward. 
For this reason, the earthquake factors from Table B1 to 3 are displayed per ward in Figures 4-9 
to 4-10. Both Cowles Emergency Centre (CEC) and Linwood Emergency Centre (LEC) 
pertained to Hagley-Ferrymead Ward whilst Burnside Emergency Centre (BEC) was under the 
Fendalton-Waimairi Ward. 
 
Table 4-2, summated the people that may have been exposed to the earthquake-induced 
infrastructure damage and gastroenteritis agents. Consider, the BEC ward area, which was 65% 
larger with 27% more residents housed compared to CEC. However, CEC ward suffered 89% 
more liquefaction ground damage (lateral spread and surface ejecta); 67% more wastewater 
network pipe damage; 56% more water main pipe and 50% more water submain pipe damage. 
Likewise, CEC ward had more gastroenteritis cases and its agents: 56% more FAC-NC counts 
and 49% gastroenteritis point prevalence compared to BEC (Table 4-2). However, CEC had 
67% less E.coli counts compared to the BEC ward. Moreover, it is evident from Table 4-2, 
Figures 4-9 and 4-10 that east side of Christchurch sustained high earthquake-induced 
infrastructure damages (Figure 4-10); liquefaction ground damage; gastroenteritis cases; and 
one of its agents (FAC-NC). The west side of Christchurch had overall minimal damage, except 
with high E.coli count. Because of this reason, CEC was chosen to represent east side whilst 
BEC represented the west side of Christchurch. LEC was open following the September 4, 
2010 earthquake. The data for Table 4-2 was garnered following the February 22, 2011 
earthquake. Therefore, LEC was not included in data summary for Table 4-2. Reasons for 
including LEC are outlined in section 4.4.  
 
4.3.2 EMERGENCY CENTRE OBJECTIVE AND COMPONENTS  
The main purpose of an EC in February 22, 2011 was to provide temporary relief for “2-3 
days” for people who were destitute because of the earthquake. The operational hierarchal 
structure of an EC is shown in Figure L-1. The ECs operates collaboratively with the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC) liaison officer to oversee required operations to maintain an 
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EC. The lower tiers operate on welfare aspects (WSTL) whist SSTL maintains technical aspects 
of the EC. The WSTL is responsible to maintain the EC layout; look after evacuees and social 
services; EC resources are utilised appropriately; and feedback information on welfare issues to 
support section, especially if any further resources are required. The purpose of support section 
is to provide technical aspects such as stock take for incoming resources, and maintaining 
communications with Emergency Operation Centre (EOC)—regional emergency coordinating 
centre—and submit situation reports.  
 
A situation report, otherwise known as a sit report, is a document signed by the ECS, that 
updates the EOC summarising an EC status: the number of evacuees presently; resources 
available like food and water bottles; social services available; staff housed; any particular 
issues; and resources required by the EC. It is a “snap-shot” of the EC operations at the time. 
The EOC depicts how often a sit report is lodged, which in all three ECs were every 2 hours. 
Resources required by the EC must be sent to EOC using a sit report. Collectively, the welfare 
and support sections cater to provide the essential necessities for evacuees on a temporary 
basis.
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Figure 4-9: Ward Representation for recorded gastroenteritis prevalence and gastroenteritis agents—Escherichia coli and 
FAC (non-compliant)-following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Abbreviations are BS EC=Burnside High School 
Emergency Centre, CS EC=Cowles Stadium Emergency Centre, LW EC=Linwood High School Emergency Centre. 
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Figure 4-10: Ward representation for infrastructure damage: water (main and submain pipe damage), wastewater and liquefaction ground damage (lateral spread and surface 
ejecta) following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Abbreviations are BS EC=Burnside High School Emergency Centre, CS EC=Cowles Stadium Emergency Centre, LW EC=Linwood 
High School Emergency Centre. 
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Table 4-2: Summary of gastroenteritis risk factors, infrastructure, and liquefaction ground damages per ward after the February 22, 2011 earthquake for 
two emergency centres.  
 
 
Summary of Variables 
Ward: Fendalton-Waimairi  
EC Name: Burnside High 
School (BEC) 
Ward: Hagley-
Ferrymead 
Name: Cowles 
Stadium (CEC) 
Difference between wards 
EXPOSURE 
Ward Area (km) 7259.7 1561.4 65%  decrease in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
Number of Residents 54342 31419 27%  decrease in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
Population Density (Km) 1975 2185 5%   increase in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
GASTROENTERITIS 
AND ITS CAUSATIVE  
AGENTS 
E.coli count in Drinking Water supply 20 4  67%  decrease in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
FAC-NC Count in Drinking Water Supply 48 154 52%   increase in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
Average Gastroenteritis Prevalence  
(per 10,000 people) 
8.3 24.0 49%   increase in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
Sum of Gastroenteritis Prevalence  
(per 10,000 people) 
174 240 16%   increase in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
EARTHQUAKE 
INDUCED DAMAGE 
THAT MAY HAVE 
GIVEN WAY TO 
GASTROETNERITIS  
AGENTS. 
Water Network Damage Count- Main 
Pipes 
47 126 46% increase in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
Water Network Damage Count- Submain 
Pipes 
98 292 50%   increase in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
Wastewater Network Damage Count 83 413 67%   increase in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
Liquefied Area of Lateral Spread and 
Surface Ejecta (%) 
3 28 89%   increase in Hagley-Ferrymead 
Ward 
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4.4 CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS 
The one-off interviews were scheduled to last 30 minutes, but in most cases extended to one 
and half hours, especially for the focus groups. Initially the investigator planned to interview 30 
participants equally from BEC, CEC and LEC. However, due to time restrictions, there were 16 
participants from BEC to represent the west side of Christchurch and collective 14 participants 
from CEC and LEC to portray the east side of Christchurch. The CEC and LEC participants 
were collectively grouped because those participants interchangeably refereed to both of the 
ECs throughout their interviews due to their experience. 
 
Axial coding textural analysis revealed top 10 keywords common in participants’ transcripts 
using word frequency (Figure 4-11). Word frequency tool was a feature within NVIVO10 that 
isolated the emerging keywords. These keywords reflect what participants considered as 
important factors that averted gastroenteritis incidences at an EC. Hence, top 10 keywords 
framed the basis for selective coding to implore two key ideas: first, understand the context 
surrounding the keywords, and the second, interdependency of those keywords.  
 
Selective coding identified two overarching themes that prevented gastroenteritis outbreaks at 
ECs: indirect and direct themes. The indirect themes were the EC type of building and EC 
layout. The EC layout was further influenced by the building damage, EC services, hygiene 
standards, security, types of people attending the EC, staff dynamics and lessons learnt. The 
direct themes were the preventive protocols established to avert gastroenteritis outbreak at the 
ECs. The proceeding sections provide a summary of what were the indirect and direct themes 
identified, and how the indirect themes acted as a prelude to emplace the direct themes are 
discussed in the Chapter Five, the discussion chapter. The raw accounts for each EC are 
described in Appendices M, N, and O. The concatenation of direct and indirect themes are 
summarised in Figure 4-12 to give an overview of how the three EC’s averted gastroenteritis 
cases after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The proceeding sections give detailed outlines of 
the themes.  
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Frequency of Top 10 Keyword Themes for Three Emergency Centres 
Figure 4-11: Represents the top 10 keywords identified from the interview 
transcripts. The percentages, accompanying each keyword are derived from 
the number of counts that a keyword has been identified in transcripts for 
the top 10 keywords selected. The three emergency centres are Burnside High 
School, Cowles Stadium, and Linwood High School. 
74 
 
  
Figure 4-12: Showing the overarching concepts that averted a gastroenteritis outbreak at the three Emergency Centres (ECs): Linwood High School (LEC), Burnside high School (BEC) and Cowles Stadium (CEC). The study considered BEC 
and CEC for the February 22, 2011 earthquake while LEC was only opened for the September4, 2010 earthquake. The central concepts were the efficacious EC layout, which depicted and trickled other components, as shown on the 
diagram. 
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4.5 INDIRECT THEMES 
The proceeding sections describe the influential indirect-themes that were common to the three 
EC layouts. Identified indirect-themes are collective reflections of common occurrences, 
practices, characteristics and observations from the interviews. Namely, the indirect-themes 
were EC building type, EC layout, building damage, EC infrastructure services, provision of 
food, accommodation and social services, security, types of people, staff dynamics, and lessons 
learnt.  
 
4.5.1 EMERGENCY CENTRE BUILDING TYPE: HIGH SCHOOL VS. SPORTS 
STADIUM 
Type of building used for an EC framed the foundation for other concepts. Building type 
influenced the type of infrastructure available, EC expandability, number of evacuees housed at 
the EC, which in turn depicted the EC layout, and number of staff needed to operate the EC on 
a 24-hour cycle. Two building types were identified from the interviews: a high school (LEC 
and BEC) and an indoor sports stadium (CEC). Both building types had unique advantageous 
and disadvantageous.  
 
High school (LEC and BEC) ECs benefited from the common layout of a school; multiple 
classrooms in a building collectively called a classroom block. These classroom blocks were 
each serviced with essential infrastructure (such as lavatories, power and drinking water 
fountains) and equipped with school amenities—desks, chairs, tables. The classroom blocks 
provided separate sections to an EC layout that could “grow out” or contracted to suit ECs” 
needs and functions. A particular example utilising classrooms in LEC and BEC were multiple 
classrooms that were used as isolation rooms. A classroom was used as an isolation room to 
house an isolated individual or a family. The isolation units were equipped with lavatories 
belonging to the classroom block. At LEC, one unit had a kitchenette for isolated evacuees to 
utilise. If more isolation rooms were needed, more individual classrooms were opened within 
the classroom block. Similarly, BEC opened extra classrooms to provide religious requests, 
such as separate men’s and women’s sleeping area; and a prayer room. 
 
As the number of evacuees expanded, BEC assigned classrooms to social services such as work 
and income for traffic management and privacy (Figure N-1). 
Other distinct features of a school building were: 
 Principal’s office—At LEC senior management used it as an operation room at the 
outset 
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 School cafeteria—BEC and LEC used it as dining areas for safe food and beverage 
service where kitchen utilities such as water boiler was available for everyone 
 School gymnasiums—BEC and LEC used it as sleeping space that EC staff could be 
rearranged. Gym equipment such as gym mats was an advantage during the first 36 
hours whilst waiting for external supplies to arrive 
 School pupils—BEC had school pupils, who knew the school layout. They often acted 
as “runners” delivering “messages and notes” as spontaneous volunteers for the trained 
EC staff at the EC. 
 Utilise school resources-—using an atlas at the school in the reception area to identify 
tourists/evacuees with language barriers. School lavatories often had hand washing 
messages to maintain hygiene 
 Rubbish schools had skip—to dispose rubbish using the school rubbish skits. 
 
However, several disadvantageous of forming an EC at a high school included that evacuees 
and staff were disbanded across classroom blocks. This can hinder security efforts. Also, the 
community wanted the school re-opened for the students. Likewise, a sports stadium (CEC) 
had the particular advantage of using infrastructure and facilities catered for mass public events 
like basketball games. Infrastructure included installing emergency 10-15000L water tank and 
having access to stadium’s power supply, which can be connected to a generator with ease.  
Facilities such as sporting equipment were utilised for children’s entertainment (Table P-9). 
The large surface area inside the main stadium was separated by bleachers to provide 
multifunctional spaces (Figure O-1).  
 
Multifunctional open-space created a sense of “togetherness” and community for stressed 
evacuees.  From a security management point of view, it was easier to keep evacuees housed in 
a single building. At CEC, given that the CCC is the building’s proprietor, the sport stadium 
can devoid the pressure of reverting to the building’s original purpose. Unlike a high school, 
isolation units were housed within the main sports stadium that lacked the capacity to disband 
isolation units from the main stadium.  
 
Nonetheless, both building types required the understanding and expertise of the building 
manager or caretaker to access the building’s resources and facilities. For example, using a 
water outlet in one of the photography classrooms to install washing machines at BEC, and 
establishing communication systems for support section EC staff at LEC. 
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4.5.2 EMERGENCY CENTRE LAYOUT 
The three ECs—LEC, BEC, and CEC—had different EC layouts: although there were common 
components among the three ECs, each EC layout had a unique fingerprint because of the 
building type and the staff team adds the character to an EC. The common elements were 
reception, registration, accommodation, social services, catering, security, information, public 
information boards, entertainment, and volunteer co-ordination. The core EC services are 
described in detail in Appendix P.  Mainly, the building type features depicted the unique 
location of the core components outlined in Table P1-10 and shown in Figures M-1, M-2, N-1, 
N-2, O-1, and O-2. For example LEC and BEC had the capacity to expand the EC as required 
because of the classroom block set up. The main difference between the EC layouts was the 
location of the reception area. At BEC, the reception was located at the front of the EC entry 
driveway—away from the rest of the BEC sites. On the other hand, at LEC and CEC, the 
reception was based at the main entrance of the main building. This was not necessary better or 
worse, it was catering to the type of building EC was based on, although BEC’s reception area 
greatly averted unnecessary foot traffic.  
 
Generally, larger (or more spread) the EC layout, higher the number of evacuees housed which 
meant increased EC services required that can lead to higher number of staff required to 
maintain the EC 24 hours. Accordingly, LEC’s maximum evacuee number was 650 which 
required about 40-45 staff. BEC housed approximately maximum 850 evacuees with up to 30 
staff members (including spontaneous volunteers). CEC’s highest evacuee number was about 
300 with 26-30 staff members.  
 
4.5.3 BUILDING DAMAGE. 
The EC buildings did not sustain major structural damage due to the earthquakes, which meant 
adapting the EC layout in a post-earthquake environment. Before declaring the building as an 
EC, each building venue was approved by EOC and checked with a structural engineer. Only 
CEC inherited some minor damage to the building and surrounding areas. Minor damage 
included delimiting use of the food area to the first floor because of minor damage at the 
bottom floor (Figure O-1). As a result, access to the building was limited to the staircase 
entry— restricting disabled access. Also, CEC had liquefied areas, which hindered access to the 
private ambulance entry: an ambulance “got stuck” due to liquefied material (Appendix O).  
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4.5.4 EMERGENCY CENTRE INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES 
All ECs provisioned the core EC services with varying degrees, which are detailed with respect 
to each EC in Appendix P. This section summates the essential infrastructure—water, 
wastewater, power, food, shelter, social services—from Appendices M, N, and O. 
 
4.5.4.1 WATER 
The water supply was unavailable at BEC and CEC but functionally available at LEC following 
the initial hours the ECs were open to the public (Appendices M, N, and O). However, BEC 
regained limited water supply from the building’s infrastructure within 12-36 hours, but 
refrained from use due to concerned health reasons. For example, manually shut off the water 
drinking fountains around the school on day one (Table N-1). Contrary, CEC did not resume 
water services because of the damages to the water network.  
 
The ECs used commercial water tank (10-15000L) to reinstate the drinking water supply to the 
public, whilst bottled water was made available to the registered evacuees at the ECs (Figures 
M-1, N-1, and O-1). The ECs could not verify whether the water from the tank was suitable for 
consumption. Hence, information boards, located at front of the ECs, displayed warnings to 
boil the water for  minimum 3 minutes, which was emplaced for Christchurch residents at the 
time (Figures M-1, N-1, and O-1). Furthermore, to manage the incoming resources at BEC a 
“quartermaster” role was required to manage stocks such as water bottles in the storeroom 
(Figure N-1). At CEC, a pre-installed water tank (a lesson learned due to the September 4, 2010 
earthquake) was used to provide water to the building (Figure O-1). There was an incredulous 
demand for drinking water from the public. As a result, ECs modified their EC layouts by 
placing drinking water tanks closer to the street or at the EC entrance to delimit unnecessary 
foot traffic (Figures M-1, N-1, and O-1).  
 
4.5.4.2 WASTEWATER SERVICES AND POWER 
All ECs provided wastewater services using Portable Lavatories (PL), especially during those 
initial days the ECs were opened (Tables M-1, N-1, and O-1). The EC layouts had to be 
adapted to emplace PLs considering ease of emptying them for health reasons and efficacious 
people traffic flow (Figures M-1, N-1, and O-1). As the days progressed, wastewater services 
were supplemented using the buildings’ laboratories in addition to existing PLs for BEC and 
LEC. On the other hand, CEC relied on PLs for the short duration it was open (Appendix O and 
Figure O-1). 
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At CEC the PLs were being filled much faster than they were being emptied. At the outset CEC 
closed the building lavatories (although they were functional) because of the surrounding 
wastewater network damages. Demand grew for PLs whilst CEC was open to the public. On 
the last day CEC was open, apparent forced entry into a building lavatory, with what appeared 
to be diarrhoea was found. Because of the above reasons, CEC was closed immediately due to 
health concerns (Appendix O and Table O-1). 
 
The grid power supply at LEC was uninterrupted. However, grid power supply was unavailable 
for BEC and CEC for the first few hours, but returned by 7pm on the first night the ECs were 
opened to the public (Table N-1 and Table O-1). Both BEC and CEC used diesel generators of 
varying capacities as alternative power supplies for a short duration (Table N-1 and Table O-1). 
The grid power supply was constant henceforth as one participant said, “Once it was on, it was 
on”.  
 
4.5.5 PROVISION OF FOOD 
Provision of food and shelter required disparate sections within the EC. This requirement was 
heavily depicted by the building type that ultimately influenced the EC layouts because the 
largest spaces were reserved for food and shelter. All ECs adapted the main halls as disparate 
sleeping areas because of the large size, privacy, and ease to provide security (Figures M-1, N-
1, N-2, and O-1). The food area at LEC was the Linwood High School cafeteria whilst BEC 
and CEC adapted disparate hall areas, which was pre-installed with the required equipment 
such as kitchens (Figures M-1, N-1, N-2, and O-1). All EC meals were catered externally and 
transported into the EC during meal times: each meal was delivered hot (Table P-5).  Servery 
along with any food related duties were only administered, handled and maintained by 
Salvation Army. This was the common practice for all three ECs (Table P-5). To attend 
mealtimes, a Red Cross form was required to enter the food area because of the non-registered 
evacuees were attending the meal service, otherwise referred to by participants as “bystanders” 
(Appendix M). Security enforced this rule. Hence, the food area impacted EC layout because 
the need to emplace security, hand sanitiser stations, and carefully monitored footpaths to 
maintain strict hygiene standards.  
 
4.5.6 ACCOMODATION AND SOCIAL SERVICES 
The main halls for BEC and LEC were adapted as the sleeping areas whilst CEC utilised the 
segregated areas of the main stadium (Figure N-1, and Figure O-2). All ECs had bedding in the 
form of mattresses, blankets and pillows. However, LEC’s bedding was delivered 1-2 days after 
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LEC had opened (Table P-4) while BEC, for those first initial hours, used gym mats until 
proper bedding arrived on the first day. All ECs encouraged evacuees to vacate the sleeping 
area by day to maintain hygiene standards. The three ECs commenced cleaning the sleeping 
areas on different days—LEC day 4, BEC day 3, CEC day2 (Tables M-1, N-1, and O-1). 
Furthermore, during the night a security guard and a CD staff member patrolled the sleeping 
areas for security at the three ECs.  
 
The social services “trickled- in” once the ECs opened (Tables M-1, N-1, and O-1).  A 
comprehensive list of social services is provided in Table P-3.  Social services provided 
essential access required by evacuees such as work and income. All ECs adapted the main 
sleeping area for social services, although BEC later relocated social services to individual 
classroom blocks as social services trickled-in to grow in EC size and to provide privacy. 
Because of the high demand for social services, CEC adapted multi-functional areas: social 
service area by day, sleeping area by night (Figure O-2). 
 
4.5.7 SECURITY 
Security presence aided to implement the EC layouts. A collective team of professional security 
guards, EC staff security and NZ Police provided security to the ECs. Security reinforced the 
EC layout following by monitoring people entering the EC (such as paedophiles, and persons 
of interest) and to prevent bellicose behaviour, especially at night. Security maintained EC 
cordons around the buildings and secured entrances (Figures M-1, N-1, and O-1). In addition, 
security ensured that the EC layout was followed by evacuees such as orderly food cues; 
implement hand-sanitising protocols before entering the food hall; and impose isolated 
evacuees to remain within the isolated area for health reasons. In particular, at LEC security 
was needed to ensure isolated evacuees remained in the isolated units (Appendix M and Figure 
M-1). Security in their respective uniforms walking around the ECs gave evacuees (and staff) a 
sense of “presence,” “visibility” and a “safe” environment. Security intermingled with evacuees 
that gave “reassurance” to stressed evacuees. 
 
4.5.8 TYPES OF PEOPLE 
ECs welcomed evacuees from various backgrounds and characteristics. Three groups of 
evacuees were identified across the ECs: traditional, anxious and capitalise. Traditional and 
anxious evacuees comprised majority of the evacuees housed across all three ECs whilst 
capitalise evacuees representing the minority. Understanding these types of people helped the 
EC staff team to provide any assistance, sensitivity or services they may need.  
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Traditional evacuees were people and families that had lost their homes because of the 
earthquake without access to necessities that would otherwise be available.  Families, 
individuals, elderly were included in this group. They genuinely needed a place to stay and 
access the services offered at ECs. Often these evacuees would attend to their own issues 
during the day, and return to the EC in the evening to sleep. In others, the situation was 
reverted: homes were safe, but had no access to food and water; and sought services of the ECs. 
Some traditional evacuees reflected low socio-economic status due to limited resources 
available. These evacuees were known to services such as Work and Income and Child, Youth; 
and Family services. This was most prominent at LEC. Also included in the traditional group 
were airport-transit evacuees. BEC had a travel agency service set up to help tourists and 
visitors obtain flights as well as to provide temporary accommodation (Appendix N). BEC 
catered to airport-transit evacuees because the EC was originally designed to receive those 
evacuees in a post-disaster situation.  
 
Second group, anxious evacuees, consisted of people who were “psychologically stressed”. 
People were anxious to stay at home: being with other people was a coping mechanism to 
alleviate anxiety. LEC and CEC had influx of evacuees into the centre when a moderate 
aftershock above magnitude 5 on the Richter Scale was experienced. Anxious evacuees were 
mostly, single parents, in particular single mothers, elderly, individuals living alone, and 
families who have not experienced earthquakes. For example, BEC received families from 
different nationalities—Egypt, Korea, Afghanistan, Pacific community— wanting to be around 
people. ECs also catered to religious needs and requirements. For example, separate sleeping 
areas for women and men. In this group, “most people would leave the EC and return at night 
to sleep”. Part of this group was also mental health evacuees such as drug addiction and mental 
illness who needed to be in a supportive environment. 
 
The capitalise group referred to evacuees purposefully taking advantage of the EC system 
referred to as “freeloaders”. Evacuees would complete false Red Cross forms to obtain 
resources. For example at BEC, evacuees requested baby formula when a baby was not 
registered as part of the family on the Red Cross form.  LEC had issues with a member of the 
public selling water in containers that was re-filled with water from the LEC water tank supply. 
Of the total evacuees housed in the respective ECs, about 5% of the LEC evacuees were 
considered “freeloaders” whilst 15% at CEC with less than 1% of the total evacuees housed at 
BEC. 
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Some evacuees were reluctant to go home: “they were nesting”. Provision of food, water, 
shelter, hygiene, social services, safety with “sense of community,” 24 hours meant that 
everything was provided. In particular, the food service given at the ECs; it was “better than 
what they would have at home”. Because of this, people came into the EC who did not need 
help. As EC and social service, staff began to enquire if evacuees required any resources to get 
re-settled; it was found that some evacuees stayed unnecessarily at LEC for up to 7 days. EC 
staff instituted asking questions to understand and address evacuees’ needs to counteract 
“freeloaders,” and reduce evacuee “nesting,” allowing resources to be available to those in need 
most. Reception staff—with sensitivity in mind—began to inquire from incoming evacuees 
“Welcome to our EC. How can we help you? What do you need?” When CEC was ordered to 
close, only about “10%” of the evacuees registered accepted the offer to be relocated to another 
EC: the rest went home. 
 
4.5.9 STAFF DYNAMICS 
Collectively, staff dynamics composed the following attributes: staff training; personal 
characteristics; job roles and supporting representatives from different organisations. These 
factors synchronically framed staff dynamics at all three ECs. Two key tools facilitated staff 
dynamics: hand-over meetings and staff operating rooms.  
 
Half hour hand-over meetings took place during the overlapped period at the end of the current 
and beginning of the next eight-hour shift. These were mandatory meetings. Members of the 
upper management, team leaders (including representatives from additional organisations at EC 
shown on Table P-3) and necessary staff members were expected to attend the hand-over 
meeting.  A handover meeting provided an opportunity for situation updates, communicating 
specific concerns, especially regarding hygiene or health reasons. Hand-over meetings, which 
lasted half an hour minimum, occurred in the support section room: a room reserved for EC 
staff only (Figures M-1, N-1, and O-2). The support section room acted as the organising-hub 
for the EC resourced with information boards; paper work to run EC; and communications gear 
such as radio (Figure O-2). Any issues such as hygiene, isolated evacuees, or wastewater 
infrastructure status were updated on the information board. This practice optimised 
communication between staff members to nurture a collaborative environment. As a result, staff 
maintained the EC layout whilst providing services to evacuees. Staff with the current shift 
person would walk around and update the next person of any issues, persons, and things that 
needed to be done.  
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The EC staff members were a collective team of different team representatives from multiple 
organisations that operated synchronically to provide EC services to evacuees. An EC staff 
team was a combination of Civil Defence (CD) staff, CCC liaison, the EC manager, venue 
manager; and other official capacity volunteers. The CCC liaison ameliorated administrative 
process to make CCC resources available to the EC efficaciously.  Likewise, the venue 
manager—like the BEC caretaker or CEC manager— aided to modify the EC layout because of 
their knowledge in the EC building. For example, the BEC caretaker facilitated to connect 
drainage pipes to the washing machines (Appendix N). Another example, official capacity 
volunteers included Coastguards (CG) from Coastguard Canterbury. At LEC, CGs were needed 
to replace the resting staff, due to staff fatigue on day five. Because of CGs (Coordinated 
Incident Management System) CIMS training in command structure and emergency training, 
the CGs “moulded” into the CD staff team and improved the existing LEC operations 
(Appendix M-1). 
 
Also, after the September 4, 2010 earthquake, “about 90% of the CD staff was available to 
volunteer”. Yet, after the February 22, 2011 earthquake “only 40% of volunteers were available 
to work because the CD staff themselves were affected by the earthquake”. Hence, CG 
volunteers were required to fill the CD team. 
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The CD staff members were efficient in managing the EC layout because team members knew 
each other’s personalities, leadership skills, and strengths: they had trained as a single team 
over a long time. As a result, a CD volunteer’s job role suited the volunteer’s personality and 
was conducted efficiently which in turn contributed to overall efficient EC operations. One 
member commented that the “team had practiced together [and] knew each other”.  The CD 
volunteers were “all friends”. Up to 56% of the CD volunteers had trained together for 14 
years, as shown in Figure 4-13. Volunteers knew which staff roles (whether welfare or support 
section) best suited their preferences and expertise: “You’re wired for one or the other”. For 
example, CD staff members who are mothers worked in the welfare section to help evacuees 
with babies or young children: “Character is crucial”.  
 
Specifically at LEC, a friendly teamwork hindered staff members’ ‘chain of command’, 
because staff members were “friends”: they did not want to hurt each other’s feelings by 
critiquing decisions or ideas. Because of this, vacillating decisions inflicted the “chain of 
command” process. This situation waned when CG team helped with the EC shifts (Table M-1). 
The CGs’ CIMS training reinstated the “chain of command” process by amalgamating CD 
training, and further instilled successful practices such as “implementing some training on 
health and safety issues like fire drills”. 
 
Figure 4-13: Average number of years the emergency centre staff has 
been part of an emergency centre staff team. Abbreviation: CD= Civil 
Defence 
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In addition to CGs, other volunteer groups supplemented the three, eight-hour shifts needed to 
operate the EC 24 hours. Those groups included neighbouring wards within in Christchurch 
city and outside the city. However, differences in CD training for the ward outside the 
Christchurch city caused some temporary section operational issues. Auxiliary counterparts of 
an EC staff team were spontaneous volunteers. All ECs utilised spontaneous volunteers to 
monitor hand-sanitiser stations. Unless spontaneous volunteers were previously known to the 
EC staff team, they were employed with caution, because spontaneous volunteers could not be 
vetted for their qualifications and security. In addition, LEC did not use spontaneous volunteers 
due insufficient training in CIMS. At BEC other volunteer groups included using school pupils 
because of their knowledge on the school and gregarious character. The pupils acted as runners 
for the CD staff taking notices for staff located around the BEC. 
 
Community support from public members, volunteer groups and local companies played a vital 
role to contribute to the EC layout, which was collectively labelled as the good “samaritan 
effect”. Community support supplemented to set up the EC initially and provided resources and 
personnel to maintain EC layout and functions. Community support included:  
 Local companies donating clothing and food in trucks—Sanitarium Company bought 
breakfast cereal at BEC; local cafes bought food  
 A coffee cart provided free coffee to CD staff; Tip Top Company gave free ice creams 
  Cantabrians bought glut of cooked food especially home baking that was temporarily 
accepted but later declined and deferred to food banks  
 Church groups cleaned lavatories during the early days at LEC  
 Farmers bought 1000L water containers to BEC 
 Members of the public offered accommodation analogous to a billeting system. 
 
4.5.10  LESSONS LEARNT 
Improvements identified because of opening an EC due to the September 4, 2010 earthquake, 
served as important learning curves: lessons learnt that was inevitably be useful for the 
February 22, 2011 earthquake and beyond. Hence, many participants felt that the September 4, 
2010 earthquake was a “rehearsal” for the February 22, 2011 EC response. All three ECs were 
open after the September 4, 2010 earthquake for various short durations. BEC opened and 
closed after few days due to suspected building damage, and did not get an opportunity to 
provide a full service. CEC opened after BEC had closed.  
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However, LEC was one of the first ECs to open after the September 4, 2010 earthquake for 
remain open for 10 days. Lessons learnt at LEC spilled over to CEC and BEC, some of which 
were: 
1. The EC staff to be in an overarching manner to “micro-manage” their roles instead of 
concentrating on one particular task like cleaning. 
2. Through prior company arrangements have professional cleaners and security on site 24 
hours from day one the EC is opened to the public. 
3. The EC venue to store hand sanitiser supply to last the first 24-36 hours, which enables 
EC staff to inculcate good hand sanitising habits from the outset to evacuees. 
4. A staff roster enables EC staff to have a “stand down” period by limiting a single eight-
hour shift per day with maximum of five continuous shifts within a week. 
5. A single-page health and safety brief sheet for staff with the EC layout overleaf at CEC 
after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
6. From the outset, provide shower services at the outset and establish a shower roster . 
7. At BEC, the support section room got shifted to reflect school building changes for 
better radio reception. 
8. A quartermaster role was established at BEC to organise the storage room when 
resources arrived into the EC—milk powder, nappies, hand-sanitisers and water 
bottles— that ameliorated time delays to find resources. 
 
4.6 DIRECT THEMES 
4.6.1 PREVALENCE OF GASTROENTERITIS AT EMERGENCY CENTRES 
All three ECs received evacuees showing or later progressed with symptoms of diarrhoea, 
when the ECs first opened to the public. LEC had a family showing diarrhoea symptoms and 
vomiting (Table M-1) whilst BEC had 1-2 people with diarrhoea (Table N-1). CEC showed 
multiple symptoms of diarrhoea via high usage of portable lavatories. At all ECs, the isolation 
units were occupied with a range of illness such as flu, immunodeficiency, insulin-dependent 
diabetes and dementia.  
 
However, in the context of hundreds of evacuees using the LEC and BEC, only about “5%” of 
evacuees showed diarrhoeal symptoms whilst CEC showed about “40%” showed symptoms of 
stomach pains, fever, vomiting and diarrhoea. In all ECs, ill-health issues were immediately 
dealt via on-site health professionals. Nonetheless, given the presence of observed diarrheal 
illness, the following protocols were emplaced—which are highly interwoven—to prevent 
gastroenteritis outbreaks collectively from the three ECs. These protocols gave opportunities to 
 87 
 
 
manage any present issues; henceforth, embed those resolved issues as mitigative factors: 
preventive protocols born from theory but emplaced because of practical merit. One interview 
participant believed to have gotten diarrhoea from a pen, because evacuees were burrowing the 
staff member’s pen frequently. Luck, which all participants believed also, played a role to 
prevent gastroenteritis outbreak.  
 
4.6.2 PREVENTIVE PROTOCOLS CARRIED OUT AT THE EMERGENCY 
CENTRES 
A concatenation of protocols incorporated into the different EC core services. The  protocols 
included asking questions at the EC entrance; professional security; services offered at EC; 
hand-sanitisers at every entrance “gates”; separate areas within the building—sleeping, food 
and animal areas; isolation; health messages; and boredom alleviation amongst children. The 
following sections explain the concatenation of practices.  
 
4.6.3 EMERGENCY CENTRE  ENTRANCE: RECEPTION AND REGISTRATION 
Reception staff, at registration, commenced to ask evacuees questions about any ill health 
symptoms evacuees had experienced during the past day: “Have you in the past 24/48 hours 
had a cold or something”. Red Cross staff was also trained in First Aid and vigilant for 
evacuees showing general ill health. Any health concerns that evacuees expressed were referred 
to St John ambulance staff. This acted as the first surveillance point at the EC. 
 
At CEC, reception staff was equipped with a flow chart for procedures concerning health. 
Reception staff forwarded any health concerns to St John, who would make the decision to 
attend evacuee(s) at isolation or transported to hospital for further medical treatment. In doing 
so evacuees received information from the allied medical professionals and alleviated untrained 
responsibilities from the EC staff at reception. 
 
Professional Security reinforced preventive guidelines establish at the EC. Security presence 
forestalled any inappropriate behaviour such as paedophiles and bellicose evacuee behaviour, 
especially when accessing food or social services. Moreover, presence of security prevented lax 
attitudes within the EC for “prolific” use of hand sanitisers, in particular during meal times. 
 
4.6.4 SERVICES OFFERED AT THE EMERGENCY CENTRES 
Another surveillance protocol was provision of services provided at the EC (Appendix P). EC 
services included access to essential infrastructure (sewerage facilities, drinking water, and 
power), social services, food, and social services. ECs monitored available resources to provide 
EC services with adequate sanitation, hygiene and access to health-affiliated facilities. Constant 
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communication with EOC, the EC to obtained depleting resources to provide consistent EC 
services. To do this, EC retained communication with EOC to obtain depleting resources. For 
example high demand for drinking water and emptying portable lavatories required services 
initiated from EOC (Tables M-1, N-1, and O-1).  Further, health inspectors from Canterbury 
District Health Board (CDHB) visited the ECs. LEC did not receive health inspectors whilst it 
was open to the public. The health inspectors isolated areas for improvement such as mopping 
the floors in the crèche area at BEC. All participants believed that by providing the mandatory 
services, especially wastewater services and drinking bottled water coupled with hand 
sanitisers, acted as the main preventive protocols. 
  
4.6.5 HYGIENE AT THE EMERGERNCY CENTRES 
The size of the EC layout and increasing number of evacuees housed ultimately required 
professional cleaners to maintain adequate hygiene standards.  LEC had some hygiene issues 
for the first two days due to the welter of evacuees entering the EC. Consequently, EC staff 
members were inundated with work; coupled with a church group volunteering, to clean the 
EC. Initially, the LEC staff members underestimated the effort required to maintain hygiene 
levels (Table M-1). Nevertheless, once professional cleaners were on site on the third day (and 
coupled with hand-sanitisers) the hygiene levels greatly improved: a lesson learnt (Table M-1). 
Similarly, BEC and CEC promptly hired professional cleaners, and stayed on site 24/7, to 
professionally clean the ECs as required: implementing a lesson learnt from September 4, 2010 
earthquake (Table N-1 and O-1).   
 
Using hand-sanitisers became a customary hygiene habit at all three ECs. At BEC, some 
evacuees began to body-wash in the lavatories on day three that instigated BEC to provide 
washing machines, dryers and portable shower unit beginning on day four (Table N-1). To 
ensure hygiene levels were practically established, BEC and CEC underwent a health 
inspection from a CDHB public health officer (Appendix N and O).  
 
4.6.6 HAND SANITISERS 
All participants believed “prolific” hand sanitiser usage was the panacea that prevented a 
gastroenteritis outbreak at ECs, although some participants thought it was “overkill” (Appendix 
N). It was mandatory to use hand sanitisers; “a blanket policy” for everyone including staff. A 
hand sanitiser was present at the entrance, exit and corridors of every building; all social 
service desks; sleeping areas; crèche area; isolation units; food area; reception and registration: 
anywhere with a door, room or a table surface a hand sanitiser was found.  
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In particular, at BEC two gates accompanied by CD staff   acted as “choking points” (solid red 
line in Figure N-1). No person could pass the choking points without using a hand-sanitiser. EC 
spontaneous volunteers—such as school pupils at BEC—actively squirted hand sanitiser onto 
people’s hands to make sure people used hand sanitisers: “Quiet reliant on hand sanitisers being 
the killer all,  making sure you got squirt once; you got squirted 15 times”. At LEC, the hand 
sanitisers were mounted to the wall. At BEC, For example,  if an evacuee or a staff member 
planned to make a single journey from reception to the food hall via registration, an evacuee 
would have to apply hand sanitiser six times minimal (once at reception, registration, “choke 
gate”, leaving the registration building, entrance to food hall, before eating).  
 
LEC ran out of hand sanitisers during the first couple of days and was not being replaced but 
was rectified within the first couple of days; henceforth, hand sanitiser supply did not deplete 
(Table M-1, N-1, and O-1). Lessons learnt from the September 4, 2010 earthquake meant that 
the supply for hand sanitisers were already in storage at the ECs. Hand sanitiser usage 
commenced the moment BEC and CEC opened to the public. Largely, evacuees were receptive 
to “prolific” use of hand sanitisers. Inordinate hand sanitiser supply enabled EC staff to 
maintain uninterrupted hand sanitiser practice: “endless supply of hand sanitisers,” “we could 
sterile Christchurch”. In addition, staff also underwent intense hand sanitiser regime compared 
to evacuees. Each staff member was equipped with a personal hand sanitiser at the beginning of 
each shift. Staff members were encouraged to use hand sanitisers whenever needed. At LEC, 
the EC staff used hand sanitisers whenever minimal cleaning was done or hugging evacuees 
because staff members were well aware of the risk of a sick staff member. 
 
4.6.7 SEPARATE AREAS REQUIRED  
Essential components of the EC operated in disparate rooms that were depicted by the original 
building type: school or sports stadium. Disparate rooms—often housed in separate buildings—
included meals, sleeping, St Johns, isolation units, and social services. LEC and CEC had 
sleeping; and social services in the same main hall area whilst CEC had all three areas in 
disparate sections. Designated areas created a physical barrier to prevent contamination 
unnecessary foot traffic. Food consumption was delimited to the food area and nowhere else 
(especially in the sleeping area), which provided a physical barrier for evacuees to move from 
one service to the next. 
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Monitored by security, evacuees unregistered to sleep at the EC were prohibited to enter the 
sleeping area; thereby, abating unnecessary foot traffic. In addition, services conducted in 
disparate rooms efficaciously facilitated EC staff duties such as closing sleeping area 
temporarily to clean and ventilate the area. More importantly function of disparate rooms 
enabled to keep one integral EC function away from main heavy traffic EC areas: isolation 
rooms. 
 
4.6.8 ISOLATION 
A main protocol that participants believed to have prevented gastroenteritis outbreaks at ECs 
was the establishment and practice of isolation rooms. Isolated rooms, located away from the 
busy areas of the EC, were equipped with integral amenities—drinking water bottles, bedding, 
lavatories, food and emergency medical attention—for the evacuees occupying the isolation 
rooms. St Johns ambulance and affiliated medical staff such as General Practitioner (GP) 
doctors and nurses attended to isolation rooms because of their medical background. The CD 
staff did not attend to isolation room queries. Security dissuaded evacuees in isolated rooms to 
enter main EC areas because of health and safety concerns. LEC required this security 
persuasion for some isolated evacuees. Professional cleaners commercially sterilised the 
vacated isolation rooms. 
 
The isolation rooms required disjointed sections of the EC, away from the mainstream of EC 
functions. LEC and BEC adapted classroom blocks that were serviced with separate lavatories 
and PLs.  At CEC, a segregated “triage” area incorporated isolation units staffed with health 
professionals (Figure O-2). The triage area was located within the main hall (where social 
services and sleeping areas were housed), but disassociated using bleachers and chairs  (Figure 
O-2). The need for self-contained isolation units was heavily influenced by the EC layout 
because of the requirement to have disjointed sections within the EC. The need for isolation 
rooms was evident at LEC when the first family with diarrhoea arrived on the second day of 
LEC being opened (Table M-1). LEC and BEC denoted a block of classrooms for isolation—
Figure M-1 and N-1—more classrooms were opened as the need for isolation grew. 
 
Ancillary factors such as information boards and eliminating boredom amongst young children 
enacted to prevent gastroenteritis outbreak at EC (Table P-8 and P-9). Information message 
boards provided a communication method to display important health notices such as boiling 
water, medical contacts and importance of washing hands and if feeling unwell report to 
emergency staff  (Table P-8). Three types of message boards were used at the three ECs: public 
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information board; EC noticeboard for evacuees; and staff only information board placed in the 
support section room (Figures M-1, N-1, and O-2). At BEC, the EC staff reiterated health 
messages verbally during meal times. Participants believed that alleviating boredom amongst 
young children by establishing play area, crèche, and music prevented young children 
wondering around the ECs whilst providing supervised entertainment.   
 
4.6.9 STAFF 
EC staff practiced the above preventive protocols uninterruptedly. Intense training such as 
pandemic planning at BEC provided analogues insight into the risks and hygiene practices to 
avoid infectious diseases at an EC—“It was very much in everybody's mind”.  Hence, 
practicing rigorous hygiene standards for staff members were paramount: “can't run [a] WC 
[EC] with no staff”. After a staff member finished a shift, they were encouraged to go home get 
rest, and wash clothing worn on the day. Staff members were attending 12-hour shifts during 
the first 2-3 days of the ECs being opened to the public. In doing so, staff fatigue emerged, 
especially at LEC, which led to impetuous decisions. To counteract staff fatigue, rosters were 
established and staff members were encouraged go home and get rest after their shift; and to 
put their family’s wellbeing first. Furthermore, if staff was feeling unwell, staff members were 
encouraged to refrain from coming into the EC to commence their shift. These guidelines were 
further reminded during the hand-over meetings at the three ECs.  In addition, staff members 
were encouraged to take a break and get fresh air every 40-50min, hand-sanitise after handling 
bedding, lavatories, people, pens; and before consuming food. Each staff member had a 
drinking water bottle with his or her name labelled on it. Any uncollected bottles were disposed 
at the end of each shift, “It was not worth the risk”. Staff members were provided with gloves 
and masks to use.  
 
Moreover, staff roles and characteristics contributed to uninterrupted hygiene protocols 
practiced. During a shift, staff job roles did not change; although, some job roles between 
different shifts changed to reflect EC size and functions. This ensured hygiene continuity in 
two ways: staff became familiar with evacuees’ character and personalities; and staff yielded 
specialisation for their respective job roles. Hence, vigilant staff kept an eye out for change in 
personalities or showing signs of stress or ill health. Majority of the staff members carried 
notebooks—work that needed to be done— and passed onto the person doing the next shift. 
Staff members, particularly welfare section, had empathetic, friendly and approachable 
characteristics.  Because of this the following hygiene practices were carried out pleasantly. 
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Enforced “prolific” use of hand sanitisers in a humorous and inviting manner using friendly 
expressions; whilst, reminding evacuees the importance of hand sanitising: “Cleanness is 
goddesses, sterilise sterilise, sterilise…let’s do it again, you wouldn’t want to get sick”. This 
approach inculcated hand sanitiser usage: it instilled a good habit from the outset. Gregarious 
characteristics of the welfare support section team members meant that evacuees were 
comfortable to talk to staff members. At LEC, evacuees came forward about any health 
concerns: “We were sitting next to those people [family with diarrhoea] and we’re not feeling 
too well”. Staff could encourage evacuees to use EC facilities such as asking evacuees to have 
a shower or ask evacuees to vacate sleeping areas for cleaning. Further CD staff at LEC used 
spontaneous volunteers and some evacuees to maintain hand sanitiser stations as temporary 
avocation. 
 
 
4.7 FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES AT EMERGENCY CENTRES 
Collative improvements from the three ECs to prevent gastroenteritis outbreak at an EC—in 
addition to lessons transferred from September 4, 2010 earthquake—are framed into five 
common groups. The common groups are EC type and operations; EC layout; EC services; and 
staff. 
 
4.7.1.1 EMERGENCY CENTRE TYPE AND OPERATIONS 
The gist of suggested improvements was establishing a “multi-mobile” plan with specific time 
frames to run an EC.  An EC need a separate “multi mobile” operation plan for the first 3 days, 
4-6 days, and then 6-10 days. For the first three days, an EC needs to operate with minimal 
resources whilst setting up to provide EC services, most likely with limited staff. Another 
separate operations plan for the next 4-6 days with an additional plan for the following 6-10 
days to “wrap-up” the EC services and eventually closing. These stages require different set of 
resources, specialised people and number of staff to cater EC dynamics as time progresses.  
Further embedded in the “multi-mobile” plan is an EC staff member, preferably affiliated with 
the CDHB, that operate under the EC supervisor—under operations section—responsible for 
hygiene matters. This staff member needs to be provided with appropriate training—a “tool 
kit”—to attend to any hygiene matters such as monitoring hygiene levels across the EC or 
being vigilant for evacuees with any ill health. It enables additional information feed to the EC 
supervisor from a health-hygiene point of view, and relieves workload from the rest of the EC 
staff members. Collectively the “multi-mobile” plan grants adaptability for segmented 
operational periods, which were common to all the ECs (Table M-1, N-1, and O-1). This is 
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important because nature of the post-disaster setting depicts staffing and spaces available in the 
EC building.  
 
Future improvements included establishing small ECs across specific suburbs, in particularly 
the vulnerable suburbs with low socio-economic status, as opposed to ward representation. This 
would channel a local response by assessing specific needs of that community because local 
people understand their issues and needs. With CD input, localised ECs would allow resources 
to be distributed to those areas in most need first. Some participants suggested multiple 
organisations—like CCC, CD and Red Cross—hindered the EC response, and preferred to be 
housed under one organisation, CD.  
 
4.7.1.2 EMERGENCY CENTRE LAYOUT  
The EC layout improvements included evolving the existing EC layouts by implementing the 
following suggestions: 
1. The EOC to provide cleaning, especially lavatories and professional security 
immediately via-pre-arranged agreements with companies. This is paramount. Closely 
followed by lavatories and drinking water made available as soon as possible. 
2. Prearranged plans for food donated by members of the public are forwarded to other 
organisations like the food bank or a church group.  
3. The information board outside the EC contain notices on not accepting food from 
members of the public, and advertise this message outside of the EC. 
4. The EC layout can be further refined to “curb” evacuees even more to delimit 
“freeloaders” and facilitate more efficient foot traffic.  
5. The EC layout is set up “big scale” and constrict as needed because it’s difficult  to 
operate on reverse.  
6. The number of days an EC is opened to the public needs to increase from 4-7 days, 
which reflects the EC layout plans. 
 
4.7.1.3 EMERGENCY CENTRE SERVICES 
The EC services can be further enhanced by increasing the number of staff at reception to 
process the queues faster. Further, establish a health and safety briefing for evacuees at 
reception or registration: “Welcome to our EC, this becomes your home, these are our rules”. It 
sets the EC expectations for evacuees and warns off “freeloaders”. Likewise, adapt venues to 
vet spontaneous volunteers for their qualifications, and security before commencing EC duties. 
Provide shower services at outset and establish a shower roster. Finally, to improve EC 
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services, establish a routine to clean the sleeping area from the outset, and encourage evacuees 
to vacate the sleeping area during the day—weather permitting. 
 
4.7.1.4 STAFF 
Some of the suggestions put forward by staff to improve EC response were to train with other 
teams such as CGs or adjacent CD ward teams to be familiar with fellow colleagues to 
understand different team dynamics. Some participants also suggested more training on 
recognising stress and symptoms for isolating illnesses. Unique staff identify jackets would 
also aid to warn of members of the public imitating CD staff to gain EC access without 
registering. Finally, some felt cloistered during their shift without any updates on what was 
happening outside of the EC and some information from what was happening outside the EC 
may have helped. 
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4.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The summary points from the results chapter are outlined below. The Table 4-3 illustrates 
summary of quantitative results.  
Table 4-3:  Summary of results. Acronyms are as follows:  CAU= Census Area Unit; EC =Emergency Centre; 
FAC-NC= Non-Compliant Free Associated Chlorine (<0.02mg/L), GT= Grounded Theory, HS= Hot Spot.  The 
earthquake in the context refer to February 22, 2011 earthquake only, unless otherwise stated. 
Test or method Summary of results 
1. Gastroenteritis 
thematic maps 
 
Two clusters were identified over the South Island. Of all the recorded gastroenteritis 
point prevalence recorded, 91% of the recorded cases were in Christchurch area, thus 
Christchurch had the bigger cluster (Figure 4-1). 
Christchurch had 14-fold increase in recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence by 
comparing the recorded cases before (22-02-2010 to 28-04-2010) and after the February 
22, 2011 earthquake over 35 days (22-02-2011 to 28-04-2011) (Figure 4-2). 
2.Frequency 
Distributions 
All frequency distributions showed similar power-law graphs: large frequency with low 
damage counts with small frequency (less than 10 CAUs) with high damage counts. Less 
than 10 (Figure H-1).  
3.Spearman’s Rho (σ) Three levels of Spearman’s Rho were identified: high, medium and low (Figure 4-3). 
 High level was collectively infrastructure damage and liquefaction ground 
damage 
 Medium level was indicated by FAC-NC 
 Low level was Gastroenteritis point prevalence and E.coli. 
4.Thematic Maps 
Christchurch 
Thematic maps for water network and wastewater network damage, liquefaction ground 
damage, FAC-NC, E.coli and recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence (post-earthquake) 
over the  Christchurch area showed aggregated areas with similar damage counts for all 
factors except E.coli and gastroenteritis cases (Figures 4-4 and 4-5). 
5.Moran’s I For all the factors, Moran’s I was positive and showed clustered spatial patterns 
statistically (Table J-1). 
6.Hot Spot Analysis Hot spot CAUs were found. New Brighton was the most common HS for recorded 
gastroenteritis cases, FAC-NC, E.coli and water main pipe damage. Aggregated areas of HS 
were found amongst water, wastewater and liquefaction ground damage (Figures 4-6 and 
4-7). 
7.BYM Model E.coli was the best factor that spatially explained recorded gastroenteritis cases, although 
statistically non-significant. (Table 4-1). E.coli counts were best explained by water 
damage (main and submain pipes); liquefaction ground damage and wastewater with 
some statistical significance. (Figure 4-8). 
9.Earthquake 
Damage surrounding 
ECs 
The Hagley-Ferrymead Ward (that had the Cowles Stadium EC) had 52% more damage for 
(with the exception of Escherichia coli E.coli counts), water; wastewater; liquefied area; 
gastroenteritis prevalence; and FAC. This ward also had higher population density in the 
area (Table 4-2) 
8. GT There were two overarching themes: indirect and direct themes. The indirect themes 
were EC type of building and EC layout, building damage, EC services, hygiene standards, 
security, types of people attending the EC, staff dynamics and lessons learnt. The direct 
themes were preventive protocols established. 
 
Collectively, these results probe the following discussion: what is the relationship between 
infrastructure damages that can give rise to gastroenteritis-causing factors especially where 
EC’s are established? More importantly, how did the indirect themes and preventive protocols 
avoided gastroenteritis outbreaks after the February 22, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch? 
These are explored in the proceeding discussion chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigated two research questions: 
1. Can the recorded gastroenteritis prevalence in the aftermath of the February 22, 2011 
earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand be spatially explained by the associated 
factors: earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction ground damage (lateral 
spread and surface ejecta), and gastroenteritis agents? 
2. What protocols were implemented to prevent a gastroenteritis outbreak at three 
Emergency Centres (ECs)? 
The first question was addressed using quantitative methods, whilst the second research 
question used qualitative methods. The chapter is organised according to the structure outlined 
below: 
 The chapter begins with a synopsis of results 
 Interpretations of quantitative results and comparisons the findings with similar studies 
 Interpretations of qualitative research with a  focus on how the direct and indirect 
themes harmoniously interacted to implement preventive protocols; and compares the 
results to similar case studies from the literature review  
 The research limitations and future work is identified.  
5.2 RESULT SYNOPSIS 
The following provides a synopsis of quantitative and qualitative results from this research:  
1. There were two spatial clusters identified by comparing the recorded gastroenteritis 
cases for the South Island in New Zealand over 35 days following the February 22, 2011 
earthquake. The bigger cluster was in Christchurch with 91% of the total cases recorded.   
2. There was a 14-fold increase in gastroenteritis prevalence, by comparing recorded 
gastroenteritis cases over 35 days following the February 22, 2011 earthquake to the 
same time frame the year before (in 2010). 
3. There was spatial clustering with statistical significance (p<0.01 and p<0.05 for E.coli) 
by using Moran’s I, and hot spot analysis for each factor: water network pipe damage 
(main and submain), wastewater network pipe damage, liquefaction ground damage 
(percentage of liquefied area per CAU), and gastroenteritis agents-E.coli and FAC-NC. 
Henceforth liquefaction ground damage (lateral spreading and surface ejecta) will be 
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referred to as liquefaction ground damage. The statistical results for these are shown in 
Appendix J, Figures 4-6, and 4-7.  
4. Spearman’s Rho analysis indicated the existence of a tenuous, indirect association 
between gastroenteritis cases and the following factors: earthquake-induced 
infrastructure damage; liquefaction ground damage; and Non-Compliant Free 
Associated Chlorine (FAC-NC) (<0.02mg/L), but not E.coli. 
5. Gastroenteritis point prevalence was best spatially explained by spatial distribution of 
E.coli counts as shown from BYM Modelling. In turn, BYM modelling identified that 
spatial distribution of E.coli counts was affected by liquefaction ground damage, FAC-
NC, and damage to the main and submain water pipes. 
6. The Hagley-Ferrymead Ward, where CEC was located, had higher population density, 
water and wastewater infrastructure damage, liquefaction ground damage; and FAC-NC, 
except E.coli, which was higher at the Fendalton-Waimairi Ward. 
7. The qualitative analysis for ECs identified two themes called direct and indirect themes. 
The direct themes were EC entrance; services offered at the EC; hand sanitiser and 
hygiene; separate areas; isolation provisions; and staff. The indirect themes included EC 
building type; EC layouts; building damage; EC infrastructure; hygiene; security; staff 
dynamics; types of people; and lessons learnt from the September 4, 2010 earthquake.  
 
5.3 QUANTITATIVE DISCUSSION 
Two clusters were identified over the South Island, New Zealand, indicating apparent clustering 
of gastroenteritis cases in Christchurch. Some 91% of the gastroenteritis cases for South Island 
were located in Christchurch. This led to focus on gastroenteritis prevalence before and after the 
February 22, 2011 earthquake. This revealed a 14-fold increase in gastroenteritis cases1. 
However, this spike may not be due to the earthquake itself. 
 
Frequency distributions indicated there were only about 10 CAUs with high counts for 
gastroenteritis point prevalence, and for the following factors: water damage (main and 
submain), wastewater, liquefaction ground damage, FAC-NC, and E.coli. However, thematic 
maps showed those CAUs were aggregated together around the central-eastern areas of 
Christchurch in a heterogeneous mix of damage intensities for all the factors except E.coli 
                                                          
1
The 2010 data included only gastroenteritis cases as defined by Ministry of Health Communicable disease definitions by contract, the 
2011 database included all enteric disease cases. Moreover, GPs in Christchurch had been alerted to the importance of notifying enteric disease, so 
there was an increase in reporting of such cases outside the normal reporting criteria, which led to the 14-fold increase in gastroenteritis cases. The 
student was not aware of this information prior to the completion of her thesis, and neither her supervisors were made aware of these 
methodological constraints. This finding does not negate the results of the thesis study itself, of which, the main aims were to identify any possible 
correlation between gastroenteritis cases with the earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction ejecta on the ground, and the presence 
of gastroenteritis agents in the potable water along with mitigative factors that were carried to prevent gastroenteritis outbreaks at emergency 
centres. 
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(Figures 4-4 and 4-5). Common aggregated CAUs included Aranui, Avondale, Bexley, Chisnall, 
Ensors, Rawhiti, Linwood East, Linwood North and South Brighton. The common denominator 
for E.coli, FAC-NC, and gastroenteritis point prevalence was South Brighton. Thus, the results 
indicate that factors may be associated because of the common CAUs with similar damage 
counts. It can be considered that E.coli is less strongly connected to gastroenteritis prevalence 
than the other aforementioned factors. 
 
Spatial clustering of aggregated areas using Moran’s I indicated that those aggregated areas 
were statistically clustered with 1% probability (with 5% probability for E.coli) (Appendix J). 
This means there is 1% chance that the observed spatial patterns were due to chance for the 
considered factors: water damage (main and submain pipes); wastewater damage; liquefaction 
ground damage; FAC-NC; and recorded gastroenteritis prevalence. E.coli reflected a 5% 
probability; thus, 5% chance that the observed E.coli pattern was due to chance. The slightly 
lower probability reflects interspersed visual patterns observed in thematic maps (Figure 4-4 
and 4-4). 
 
Hot spot analysis identified areas with high and low counts. The number and location of Hot 
Spots (HSs) indicate that the eastern side of Christchurch had the highest damage that was 
statistically significant for earthquake-induced infrastructure damage (water and wastewater 
pipe damage) and liquefaction ground damage. Gastroenteritis cases and gastroenteritis agents 
showed interspersed HSs with South Brighton as the common CAU. This was initially observed 
in thematic maps. The results suggest that the specific set of factors may be influencing 
gastroenteritis point prevalence, E.coli and FAC-NC. However, all but one HS was identical to 
HSs identified for water (main and submain pipes) and wastewater damage, suggesting small 
HS clustering between the three factors.  
 
Spatial statistics have thus far have indicated some level of association based on common CAUs 
with similar damage counts among the different factors. Spearman’s Rho and BYM modelling 
showed how factors under consideration affected gastroenteritis point prevalence. The high-
level measure of association between collective infrastructure damage (main and submain water 
pipes, wastewater) and liquefaction ground damage suggest they are heavily interlinked, 
especially main; and submain water pipes. These damages may have influenced FAC-NC counts 
because of the medium-level association between infrastructure damage, liquefaction ground 
damage, and FAC-NC. Thus, the presence of FAC-NC in water pipes (both main and submain 
pipes) may have been associated with the promotion of E.coli or gastroenteritis point prevalence 
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on the grounds of low-level Spearman’s Rho correlations (Figure 4-3). Compliant FAC is used 
to remove E.coli transgression in the drinking water supply; thus, it can be argued that the 
presence of FAC-NC, E.coli may sustain in the water supply (MOH, 2012). Studies have also 
indicated that E.coli has been associated with gastroenteritis (Bruce A. et al., 2009; Hall, 2004; 
Pennington, 2010; Wanke & Sears, 2008), there was non-significant statistical association 
between E.coli and gastroenteritis point prevalence, which strongly signals that in a non-spatial 
context there are factors, other than or in addition to E.coli, influencing gastroenteritis point 
prevalence. It is important to emphasise that Spearman’s Rho is a measure of association and 
does not imply causation.  
 
From a spatial context, the BYM by contrast showed how the considered factors affected the 
outcome of recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence. The results indicate that E.coli counts per 
CAU best explained the recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence: although statistically non-
significant, a single E.coli count can increase the risk of gastroenteritis cases per CAU by 2.7% 
(Table 4-1). The results for E.coli are similar to those from Spearman’s Rho suggesting 
statistical non-significance. Thus, it indicates that although E.coli counts and gastroenteritis 
may not be statistically significant, the spatial distributions between E.coli and gastroenteritis 
point prevalence are similar. In turn, the presence of E.coli in the drinking water system was 
best explained by liquefaction ground damage, FAC-NC, and damage to the water network with 
some statistical significance (Table 4-1). Thus, an increase in E.coli count of a single increment 
(per MPN/100mL) can increase the gastroenteritis prevalence by 6% for liquefaction ground 
damage, and 5% for FAC-NC. The statistically significant Estimated Effects (EEs) suggest that 
liquefaction ground damage and FAC-NC are positively correlated to E.coli count.  
 
Arguably, the Spearman’s Rho results may warrant the following observation: the presence of 
E.coli in the water supply results from liquefaction ground damage contaminating the damaged 
main and submain water pipes. Hence, liquefaction ground damage acts as the E.coli source. 
There have been past cases of E.coli entering into the water supply from cracked pipes 
(Swerdlow et al., 1992). This may be exacerbated when there are non-compliant FAC 
concentrations in the water network (<0.02mg/L). This in turn may enable E.coli to sustain 
within the damaged water pipe network, and may get distributed  in the water reticulating 
network that was operating at reduced capacity to different parts of Christchurch (Gordon, 
2011). This may explain the interspersed high E.coli count observed in the thematic maps, and 
again reflected in Moran’s I; and HS analysis. Whether E.coli contributed to observed 
gastroenteritis point prevalence, as BYM modelling and Spearman Rho suggest, may have been 
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influenced by other factors may have reduced this risk such as public health measures like 
boiling water for minimum three minutes (Dell, 2012).  
 
Moreover, negative coefficients (shown in both models) for submain water pipes indicate that 
an increase in damage to water submain pipe decreases the point prevalence of gastroenteritis. 
This appears to contradict practicality. The submain water pipes are inextricably connected to 
the WSM pipes via an intricate pipe network. In addition, high level Spearman’s Rho also 
indicates that damages to WSM and WSB are affected by one other. The same is also true for 
wastewater damages, which appeared to have no statistical influence (0%) on the E.coli count 
(Table 4-1). A significance of the practical context posits that a negative Estimated Effect (EE) 
is therefore more likely to be associated with covariates that are interacting with other 
covariates as well as the dependent variables within the BYM Model equations (Equation 4.1 
and 4.2). This is because statistical insignificance does not necessarily indicate practical 
insignificance.  
 
However, the residual maps highlighted areas where the considered factors alone do not entirely 
explain the recorded gastroenteritis cases, particularly in the eastern areas of Christchurch. 
Although the BYM maps for expected counts of gastroenteritis and E.coli are low (Figure 4-8A, 
C, and E), the corresponding  residual maps (Figure 4-8 B, D, and F) indicate there are many 
parts of Christchurch, especially in the eastern and central parts whereby, the considered factors 
did not explain the spatial variation of gastroenteritis and E.coli. This means that other factors, 
which may influence gastroenteritis prevalence, were not included in the BYM Model. 
However, additional factors, such as those factors outlined in Figure 2-1, can be incorporated 
into the existing model with ease. Some of the factors not considered could also relate to 
assumptions made at the outset of this research. For example, assuming liquefaction ground 
damage to be a representation of geological properties such as soil composition may have also 
influenced the results. The residual maps also imply that gastroenteritis prevalence after the 
February 22, 2011 earthquake is CAU-specific. This means each CAU is affected by different 
factors expressed at different intensities. Thus, water contamination may be a significant factor 
in the eastern suburbs, but other factors such as food contamination may affect the western side 
of Christchurch. Therefore, understanding the unique risk profile for each CAU may provide a 
way to assess gastroenteritis prevalence following a disaster using a customised risk profiles for 
the Christchurch area. This can be particularly useful for local public health officials as part of 
an ID management protocol, especially for the more vulnerable CAUs that may be highly 
susceptible to gastroenteritis risk prevalence following a natural disaster.  
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Work conducted by Kingston and Semple (2005) identified local gastroenteritis clustering using 
spatial statistics with similar HS results in this research. However, some components of this 
research, and its results were comparable because of the data, which reflect the local 
environment. Spatial clustering  using Moran’s I for main and submain water pipe damage 
echoed work conducted by Piarroux et al. (2011), who used spatial autocorrelation techniques to 
understand clustering of water samples across the rivers following the Haiti Earthquake in 2011. 
However, the literature review was not able to identify a study that has incorporated thematic 
mapping, spatial clustering, and BYM modelling to explain the recorded gastroenteritis point 
prevalence in a post-earthquake context. By using both quantitative and qualitative methods, 
this research forms an integrated approach to study increased gastroenteritis prevalence 
following an earthquake using the Christchurch earthquake as a case study earthquake: 
recording the earthquake’s fingerprint using mixed methods. 
 
5.4 QUALITATIVE DISCUSSION  
The quantitative analysis showed a range of damage caused by the February 22, 2011 
earthquake. In spite of this, two Emergency Centres (ECs) were opened as part of the Civil 
Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) response. The locations of the emergency centres, 
Burnside High School (BEC) and Cowles Stadium (CEC) were subject to various amounts of 
damage to the surrounding areas such as water and wastewater network pipe damage (Table 4-
2).  In fact, ward that pertained to CEC had, on average, 52% more water network damage 
(main and submain pipes); wastewater network damage; liquefaction ground damage; recorded 
gastroenteritis cases and FAC-NC (Table 4-3). Despite this, there were no recorded outbreaks at 
the ECs (Dell, 2012). A participant mentioned that there were reports of “sewerage had 
exploded like bombs” in some areas, which meant evacuees might have trace particles of 
sewerage on their skin, especially when they were bringing food into the EC. This means 
evacuees may have entered, with a wide variety of pathogen sources. Thus, protocols 
implemented at ECs may have prevented gastroenteritis outbreaks. These protocols have been 
identified as themes in this research, as shown in Figure 4-12, and further discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
The interview results imply that implementation of protocols played a major role in preventing 
gastroenteritis outbreaks at ECs. All three ECs had evacuees arriving with gastroenteritis-like 
symptoms. Although Cowles Stadium Emergency Centre (CEC) had significantly higher 
numbers of evacuees presented with a range of symptoms. One participant mentioned that about 
30-40% of up to 400 evacuees showed symptoms of stomach cramps, and some diarrhoea, along 
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with flu-like symptoms (Appendix O). All participants believed those evacuees arrived at the 
EC showing the symptoms rather than originating at the ECs. The direct themes identified were: 
EC entrance; services offered at the EC; hand sanitisers and hygiene; separate areas; isolation; 
and staff. This study indicates that the direct protocols implemented did help to avert a 
gastroenteritis outbreak. However, the results also suggest that the direct themes were highly 
dependent on successful implementation of the indirect themes. Namely, the indirect themes 
were: the EC building type; EC layouts; building damage; EC infrastructure; hygiene; security; 
staff dynamics; types of people; and lessons learnt from the September 4, 2010 earthquake. 
Even though some indirect themes and direct themes overlap, each indirect theme acted as a 
prelude to another direct or indirect theme. Therefore, the cumulative effects of the indirect 
themes explained how the direct themes were practiced that in turn averted a gastroenteritis 
outbreak. Hence, the focus of the qualitative discussion is to explain the implications of the 
indirect themes that led to establishing the direct themes.  
 
5.4.1  EMERGENCY CENTRE ENTRANCE 
The EC entrance (Figure M-1, N-1, and O-1) served as part of the surveillance measures to 
identify gastroenteritis outbreaks at the ECs. The surveillance measures were not a formal 
framework emplaced at the ECs, but a collation of actions from St John ambulance (Wellington 
and Christchurch), medical staff, public health officers, and sit reports aimed to identify 
gastroenteritis outbreaks or issues with public health significance. The importance of 
establishing surveillance systems, whether passive, sentinel or active, is highlighted by WHO 
(2005, 2011a) and Yee et al. (2007). Thus, the EC entrance was an integral component of the 
direct protocols implemented. Reception and registration services were located at the EC 
entrance. Staff at reception and registration asked evacuees if they had experienced any ill 
health recently. This acted as the first port of call from a preventive aspect. In return, it gave 
both the evacuee and staff members the opportunity to assess whether medical attention was 
needed from St John at the EC entrance. This meant that the EC layout needed to be orientated 
so reception and registration were placed closer to the EC entrance. Hence, if an evacuee 
required isolation, this could be dealt with at the EC entrance.  
 
However, the choice of layout was limited by the existing EC buildings. For example, at BEC, 
the bike shed (located at the front of Burnside high school) was adapted to be the reception 
area—a lesson learnt from the September 4, 2010 earthquake (Figure N-1). CEC and LEC 
buildings, on the other hand, adapted the enclosed main entrances (Figure M-1 and Figure N-1). 
More importantly, people with the appropriate characteristics were needed to staff the reception 
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and registration areas, because as one participant said, “Character is crucial,” where evacuees 
mentioned to staff if they were feeling ill, “We were sitting next to those people [family with 
diarrhoea] and we’re not feeling too well.” Hence, asking health-related questions at ECs was 
influenced by the EC layout, type of building, and staff characteristics.  
 
5.4.2  INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 
The second preventive protocol was the EC infrastructure and the services provided at the ECs 
(Appendix P). The layout of the ECs enabled services to be provided through alternative 
infrastructure (water tanks, portable lavatories and power) and staff dynamics (which included 
security staff) facilitated to maintain those services uninterruptedly. The EC layouts were 
positioned so that the PLs, water tanks, and shower units (at BEC only) where they were 
accessible to evacuees and staff for efficient foot traffic. For instance, the PLs’ location at CEC 
granted easy access for vehicles to come through the driveway and empty the portable lavatories 
(Figure O-1). The water tanks at the ECs were placed towards the main roads for easy public 
access to limit unnecessary public access into the main EC sites (Figures M-1, N-1, and O-1).  
 
However, this study has noted the importance of providing portable lavatories at CEC. One of 
the main reasons, which led to its closure, was the inability to cope with immense demand for 
wastewater, especially in reduced circumstances. The lavatories for CEC were 1 lavatory per 18 
people (Table O-1). This estimate was in line with the Sphere Project, which advises 1 lavatory 
per 15-20 people for high-risk settings such as an EC (The Sphere Project, 2011). Thus, the 
results suggest the need for number of lavatories changes to meet the local demand as the post-
earthquake situation develops.  
 
Co-operative staff dynamics reported any shortcomings (especially as the days progressed) 
during hand-over meetings. For example, BEC staff noticed that some evacuees were body-
washing in the lavatories. To counteract this, alternative bathing facilities were established 
(Figure N-1). The security team also guarded the alternative EC infrastructure and services like 
the washing machines.  
 
To provide additional services—such as social services— the layouts of the EC were adapted as 
the demand for those resources grew. At BEC, the social service area was shifted to another 
location and the space replaced with the dining area (Figure N-2). The CEC and LEC layouts 
were adapted to hold multifunctional spaces with some areas doubling as social services by day, 
and sleeping quarters by night (Figure O-2).  
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5.4.3 SEPARATE AREAS  
Separate areas were required for different areas, like food service and isolation. Building type 
and subsequent level of earthquake damage governed this requirement. Existing building 
structures limited the number of separate areas available for use such as CEC having a 
capacious main hall, whilst BEC and LEC, had the capacity to expand (classroom blocks and 
gyms) as separate areas. Earthquake damage also restricted use of the buildings. Each disaster 
event, such as an earthquake, can damage buildings differently, thereby limiting use. This in 
turn had flow-on effects. For instance, CEC sustained minor damage to the ground floor of the 
dining area. Only the top floor was available for use, which meant the elevator was inoperable. 
Consequently, this prevented disabled access to the dining area. 
 
Provision of food—catered externally for all three ECs—required separate areas, but was 
restricted by the type of building and the layout of the EC. In addition, staff did not accept the 
glut of baking from the community, because of the inability to verify hygiene standards. 
Additionally, the EC layout ensured that security monitored foot traffic into the food area. At 
LEC for instance, the school cafeteria was used as the dining room for provision of food 
(Appendix M). 
 
5.4.4 ISOLATION 
Isolation was an important direct theme that all participants identified as a preventive protocol 
(Figure 4-11). Building type dictated the nature of isolation units at the ECs: separate 
classrooms for a school (BEC and LEC) or “triage” set up that was separated by bleachers 
(CEC) (Figure O-2). Medical personnel staffed the isolation units. This meant trained personnel 
were available to deal with health issues, thereby alleviating the pressure from the CD staff. 
This in turn affected the EC layout, because health professionals were permitted to manage the 
isolated areas and attend isolated evacuees. Security enforced this cordon, and guarded the area 
to discourage isolated evacuees from entering the main EC area. This enforcement was 
necessary at LEC. Thus, two main indirect themes affected establishment of the isolation units: 
building type and security. 
 
5.4.5 HYGIENE AND HAND SANITISERS  
Professional cleaners were on-site 24 hours a day to maintain the ECs to hygienic standards. 
The need for professional cleaners and for them to be constantly on-site was an important lesson 
learnt from the September 4, 2010 earthquake. The presence of security actively discouraged 
evacuees unwilling to participate in hygiene protocols, especially during food service. The hand 
sanitiser usage was “prolific” and was thought by all participants to be the panacea that 
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prevented gastroenteritis outbreaks at the three ECs. However, to implement and maintain a 
hand sanitiser system whilst the EC was open required three indirect themes: lessons learnt from 
the September 4, 2010 earthquake, EC layout, and staff. 
 
The experience of the September 4, 2010 earthquake led ECs to store hand sanitiser supply at 
the venue, in particular at LEC. Therefore, when an EC opened to the public, staff members 
were able to inculcate good hand sanitiser protocols from the outset. The main strategy used to 
denote hand sanitiser stations was “everywhere,” but particularly at “choke-points,” and door 
entrances that led into separate EC services (Appendix M, N, and O). As a result, the locations 
of hand sanitiser stations were conditioned by the EC layout because of the need to establish 
separate areas (such as food, sleeping quarters, PLs, isolation areas, animal welfare, and places 
dedicated to social services) to prevent cross-contamination, maintain hygiene and manage 
evacuee traffic flow. Inevitably, locations of the hand sanitiser stations were denoted by the 
separate sections, and location of those separate sections, which depended on the EC building. 
Staff dynamics, especially auxiliary volunteers (such as BEC’s school pupils), were the driving-
force, behind implementation of the hand sanitiser system before the EC was opened to the 
public (Section 4.5.9). However, it is plausible that if the EC layouts were practically 
inefficient, and staff duties were carried out unproductively, then the high volume of hand 
sanitisers may not have been as effective. This is because the hand sanitisers may not have been 
placed in effective locations using the EC layout to identify areas of high traffic flow and 
vulnerable areas. 
 
5.4.6 STAFF DYNAMICS 
The timely activation of direct themes were directed by staff dynamics and implemented over 
days (Appendices M, N and O). It could be argued that without the coherent staff response, 
many of the preventive protocols would not have been implemented effectively. Simple 
preventive protocols alone will not suffice, and there needs to be a support network to 
implement, promote, and maintain preventive protocols. Hence, staff members may be viewed 
as the most important preventive protocol, because they amalgamated preventive protocols for 
the duration of the time when ECs were open.  
The indirect theme, staff dynamics contributed to the success of preventing gastroenteritis cases. 
Staff dynamics included staff training, personal characteristics, job roles and auxiliary 
volunteers. An example would be, staff members identifying evacuees by type of evacuees to 
prioritise EC services according to need. Gregarious staff promoted hygiene standards by asking 
evacuees to vacate the sleeping area for cleaning, whilst activities were set up outside to engage 
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the evacuees while cleaning was being carried out. The dynamic staff team, for instance high 
school pupils, actively promoted evacuee participation in hygiene standards by going from 
person to person and squirting hand sanitiser.  
 
The dynamic composition and roles of a staff team (Civil Defence staff, Canterbury 
Coastguards, school pupils, social support, Christchurch City Council liaisons, spontaneous 
volunteers, community volunteers—church group) helped ensure that hygiene protocols and 
other staff duties were managed effectively (Figure 4-13). This research has found that it was 
the unique members from different organisations, which composed the staff team enabled in 
turn to adapt within a demanding environment. Although some staff members reported 
diarrhoea symptoms at LEC after 5 days (Table M-1). The establishment of staff rosters 
provided staff mandatory rest period. Senior staff members encouraged staff members to remain 
at home if they were feeling unwell.  
 
It can be argued that proactive community volunteers and groups may also have helped to avert 
outbreaks at ECs by bringing in resources when the ECs first opened to the public. The 
community groups and volunteers included church groups coming into LEC to clean; 
companies donating blankets and other goods; donated blankets from commercial companies; 
and members of the public offering temporary accommodation for evacuees. This study also 
implies that “luck” played a major role in averting gastroenteritis outbreaks, because there could 
easily have been staff shortages or excessive numbers of evacuees arriving at ECs with pre-
existing health problems.  
 
5.4.7 FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION 
Identifying the future improvements to prevent gastroenteritis at an EC can improve the existing 
preventive protocols. The study suggest that there needs to be more signage near the water tanks 
notifying to boil the water (in compliance with the health notice that was issued to boil water for 
a minimum of three minutes). 
 
One suggestion put forward by an interview participant was to consider a “multi-mobile” plan. 
This would involve having different EC operating plans for different time frames whilst the EC 
is open to the public. A plan for the first 24 hours, followed by another plan for next 3-4 days, 
with a separate plan for closing the EC. The multi-mobile plan suggests delineating a specific 
job role for monitoring hygiene levels equipped with a “took kit” that would operate under the 
Emergency Centre Supervisor (ECS). This can complement the CDHB visits and relieve 
additional workload from staff. This suggestion can complement the public health efforts after a 
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disaster in a pro-active manner. This is to reflect modulating resources, EC staff, and specific 
skills required to reflect the changing needs of the EC. Under the CDEM Act 2002 in New 
Zealand, an EC normally operates for 2-3 days as temporary accommodation, but this study has 
shown that ECs were opened up to a week and more, which reflected the nature of the disaster, 
and needs of the people in a post-earthquake environment. This finding is also noted in CDEM 
(2002). 
 
A second suggestion put forward by participants included setting up the EC “big scale” and 
constricting in size as needed. Of a particular suggestion mentioned by another participant was 
setting up a number of ECs that are resource specific at different suburbs, which is driven by 
local knowledge. This idea is also being suggested by  Mitchell (2012) and as a 
recommendation following the Japan earthquake of 2011 (WHO,2011a; WHO, 2011b).  
 
From an international context, the protocols identified in this study followed the same 
guidelines for managing communicable diseases after a disaster or at an EC as recommend by 
CDC (2011); ESR (2012a); WHO (2006), and highlighted in Table 2-2. The direct themes 
implemented were similar to those practiced at the Megashelter following Hurricane Katrina in 
2005 (Yee et al., 2007). For example, asking staff to refrain from working if they were feeling 
ill, using hand sanitisers and isolating rooms. However, whereas the Megashelter implemented 
those practices on a large scale only after an increased incidence of gastroenteritis was 
observed, the ECs in this research implemented such measures on the first day of operation, 
sometimes within hours of opening to the public.  
 
As Yee et al. (2007) suggest multiple exposure paths contributed to over 100 gastroenteritis 
cases at the Megashelter, and multiple protocols were necessary. All ECs in this research used a 
blend of indirect themes to implement the direct themes, even though LEC had a slightly 
delayed response, because the September 4, 2010 earthquake was the first time that ECs have 
been opened for such durations in recent times. Hence, it can be argued that blending different 
protocols at the ECs studied in this research may have averted a gastroenteritis outbreak at the 
three ECs. Thus, the findings suggest that indirect themes may have helped to implement the 
direct themes. Even the ECs setup after the Japan earthquake in 2011 reflects some of the direct 
themes shown in Figure 4-12, but does not place emphasis on the indirect themes.  
 
The qualitative results from this study posit that indirect themes may underpin the success rates 
of preventive themes carried out at various ECs. This in turn highlights the importance of 
108 
 
Figure 6-1: Illustrates the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) in terms of scale and zoning limitations. Diagram 
A shows scale problem by breaking down the aggregated areas into smaller unit shown in B; a highlighted cluster 
appears and changes the spatial pattern from A. Zoning limitation is shown when the units are aggregated into C 
by redefining the boundary according to the red lines shown in B. 
understanding the indirect themes, and how they can be used to develop preventive protocols. 
Furthermore, this study has identified the possibility of requiring CAU-specific spatial 
modelling to explain gastroenteritis point prevalence, which complements the localised 
qualitative analysis, thereby setting the precedence to study gastroenteritis prevalence following 
a disaster.  
 
5.5 LIMITATIONS 
The investigative methods used in this study implicated three major limitations: Modifiable 
Areal Unit Problem (MAUP), ecological bias, Simpson’s paradox, detection, multicolinearity, 
and recall bias. The first five limitations were specific to spatial regression analysis (aggregated 
table, thematic maps, spatial autocorrelation, HS and BYM modelling) whilst the last related to 
the qualitative component of the study. 
 
5.5.1 MODIFIABLE AREAL UNIT PROBLEM 
The MAUP refers to the possible source of error due to aggregation of data into predefined 
spatial unit (CAU, otherwise known as aerial units) because of administrative reasons 
(Openshaw, 1983). This is a limitation because changing the scale or the spatial resolution—
otherwise known as zonal boundary—will also change the appearance or pattern. Figure 6-1 
illustrates these concepts. When the resolution changes from A to B in Figure 6-1, a cluster (or a 
peak) is identified. Likewise, depending on how the boundary is defined, a different spatial 
pattern is observed (Figure 6-1C). Thus, by changing the scale and boundary of a study area 
(CAUs in this study), different spatial patterns are obtained, which ultimately will make a map 
appear different. 
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5.5.2 ECOLOGICAL FALLACY 
The second major limitation for the study was the ecological fallacy whereby associations found 
at aggregate level cannot be directly applied back to the individual level; it can only be applied 
speculatively (Lawson, Browne, & Rodeiro, 2003). This is because aggregating data changes 
existing individual-level associations. In the context of this study, associations found with 
respect to CAU-aggregated factors in Appendix B cannot evidently be applied back to 
individuals living within a CAU. 
 
5.5.3 SIMPSONS PARADOX 
Simpson’s paradox may also have influenced the BYM modelling whereby results obtained by 
adding the CAU’s together may reverse the result; if each of those CAUs are analysed 
individually. Consider the fictitious example shown on Table 6-2 within the context of this 
study. This example suggests that by observing the combined CAU column, that low pipe 
damage counts are associated with high E.coli counts. Thus, a bigger percentage of E.coli 
damage per WSM pipe damage in the combined CAU column. However, if you compare the 
count of E.coli between WSB and WSM pipes for each CAU, then it appears that the high pipe 
damage counts are in fact associated with low E.coli counts; a reversal of the first association. 
Thus Simpson’s paradox can may have been present in the study especially when the CAU data 
was added according to Wards in Tables 4-2 and in Figures 4-9; and 4-10.  
 
Table 6-1: A fictions example of Simpson's Paradox. The abbreviation CAU stands for Census Areal 
Unit—an area with a specified boundary, Escherichia coli (E.coli). 
Count CAU1 CAU2 
Total  
(for combined CAUs) 
Water Submain pipes damage count 
(WSB) 
20 80 100 
E.coli Count (MPN/100mL) 7 3 20 
Percentage of E.coli counts for WSB 
pipe damage 
35% 4% 10% 
Water Main pipe damage count 
(WSM) 
60 20 80 
E.coli Count (MPN/100mL) 6 10 16 
Percentage of E.coli counts for WSM 
for pipe damage 
10% 50% 20% 
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5.5.4 DETECTION 
Detection refers to the limited ability to detect data because of the method of data collection. 
Aggregating data per CAU limited data detection. This is because an aggregated damage count 
negated the following data characteristics: type of damage and the intensity of that damage for a 
factor. For instance, a wastewater (WW) damage count aggregated per CAU (inferred by repair 
damage) does not consider the type of pipe repair, such as sewer spillage or gravity pipe repair. 
Damage intensity also neglected E.coli concentration (per MPN/100mL) at a point location. For 
example, some point locations had 8 E.coli counts (MPN/100Ml), whilst other point locations 
had 2 E.coli counts (MPN/100mL). These point counts were generalised into a single count, and 
those individual counts were aggregated per CAU. Although aggregating the data helped in the 
application of spatial tests, it did contribute to information loss. 
 
Lack of data limited this study, and collecting more data of better quality may have improved 
the results of this study. A particular example is the confirmed gastroenteritis cases used in this 
study. This means gastroenteritis cases are recorded when a symptomatic person goes to a health 
professional and takes the required laboratory tests. Under a post-disaster environment, most 
people may lack access to a health professional, not to mention the fact that health clinics 
themselves may not be operating because of earthquake damage. Moreover, gastroenteritis is 
short-lived (1-2 days on average) (Hall, 2004). Thus, people may not go to a health 
professional, but may transmit the infection to surrounding people. Hence, the confirmed 
gastroenteritis cases may be an underrepresentation for the study period of 35 days. Moreover, 
the study assumed the covariates were immutable; in reality, the opposite is true: covariates are 
time-sensitive because damages to infrastructure and liquefaction ground damage can be 
reduced or increased over time. 
 
5.5.5 ADDITIONAL EXPLANATORY DATA 
Both of the BYM Models suggested that factors included in models did not fully explain the 
spatial distribution of gastroenteritis prevalence and E.coli counts. This indicated that other 
factors needed to be included in the model to improve spatial explanation of the dependent 
variables. Additional factors are outlined in Figure 2-1. Some of those factors include socio-
economic status; population mobility; high-risk people such as children and the elderly; 
subsequent events like aftershocks or heavy rain; and other pathogen sources such as 
contaminated food handling. One particular example that may have influenced the recorded 
gastroenteritis cases, which is not included in the model is the influence of contaminated rivers, 
which increases the exposure to possible gastroenteritis pathogens. Analysis conducted by ESR 
(2012b) identified that rivers—particularly the Avon River—had high E.coli counts in the river 
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after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Data unavailability prevented these factors to be 
included in the study, but the existing models can be expanded to include this factor with ease.  
 
5.5.6 MULTICOLINEARITY 
Another limitation that may have influenced BYM modelling was the effect of multicolinearity, 
to varying degrees. Formally, multicolinearity refers to high correlation between covariates in 
the regression analysis, which can lead to spurious results, and wide credible intervals (high 
uncertainty) (Berry & Feldman, 1985). Multicolinearity was evidenced in Spearman’s Rho 
analysis, especially for earthquake-induced infrastructure damage and liquefaction ground 
damage. This indicates that some variables reflect the same information (a property of the data 
as opposed to data collection). It can also be considered that for BYM modelling that 
aggregated covariate factors (which were independently recorded) may have interacted with the 
dependent variable and within covariates either for a positive or negative effect for spatial 
analysis.  
 
5.5.7 RECALL BIAS 
Finally, recall bias was the third limitation pertaining to the qualitative component of this study. 
Recall bias stems from participants recalling inaccurate information from past exposure or 
experiences that can arise from the participants or the interviewer (Nieto & Szklo, 1999). This 
can be due to inexperience at asking or answering the interview questions or responding 
objectively. At the time of the interviews, it had been 18 months since the February 22, 2011 
earthquake. Because of this time lapse, recall bias was a major potential factor, which could 
have impacted the findings of this research. Although this was not actively noticed, it cannot be 
excluded from the study. Furthermore, any conflicting responses were not included in primary 
coding of analysis to maintain data quality.  
 
To minimise recall bias, a large sample size that was practically feasible within the time frame 
of this research (30 participants) for GT analysis was used. In doing so, the interview questions 
were repeated for clarity and confirmation. In addition, interviewer recall bias was eliminated 
by audio recording the interviews and taking supplementary notes during the interview. The 
interview analysis commenced by transcribing the audio-recordings.  
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5.5.8 ANCILLARY LIMITATIONS 
Ancillary human errors may have acted as potential limitations for this study. These include 
incorrect data inputting to operate the WinBUGS14 model due to data quality, GIS handling 
errors as well as transcribing and interpretive errors. Notwithstanding such caveats, every 
precaution was taken to eliminate such limitations. It is also possible that the results derived 
from the interview participants represent their views and may not be a “complete picture,” as 
indicated by Charmaz (2006). Despite this, the information learnt from this case study can be 
immensely useful for future lessons. 
 
5.6 FUTURE WORK 
Further research needs to be carried out to understand the “micro-level” effects of how 
earthquake-induced infrastructure damage can potentially influence gastroenteritis agents. 
This study has indicated an intimate coaction between infrastructure damage on one hand and 
E.coli and FAC-NC on the other. Previous work conducted by Gupta et al. (2007) and 
Swerdlow et al. (1992) has already indicated how pathogens can enter water network systems, 
but not in conjunction with liquefaction ground damage amid an earthquake. This needs to be 
further investigated using ArcMAP10.0 at the level of point data. More specifically at the 
micro-level, the mechanisms involved when water and wastewater pipes buried in liquefiable 
soil, “break” or “crack” during an earthquake need to be explored more in detail. When this 
occurs, do pipes disgorge their contents out to the surrounding area (exfiltration), or does 
material enter the pipe from the surrounding environment (infiltration)? Given that 
wastewater pipes are located below the water pipes, it is possible to consider the following 
scenario: during an earthquake, the water and wastewater pipes crack or break. 
Simultaneously, the soil is liquefied into a semi-liquid state. Hence, the wastewater pipe 
contents exfiltrate into the surrounding semi-liquid state, which contaminates the semi-liquid 
with wastewater contents; this, sewage-contaminated semi-liquid is bought to the surface via 
sand boils, or as sewage-contaminated liquefaction ejecta. In the end, the liquefaction ejecta 
can result in surface flooding over an area is contaminated with sewerage contents, which can 
now spread.  
 
During this surfacing process, the semi-liquid contaminated with sewage must pass the water 
pipes, which may also be cracked, but still may be operating at reduced capacity. This 
indicates the following possibility: exfiltration of sewage-contaminated material can also 
disseminate through the water network as well as at surface level. Using the minimum solid 
wastewater guidelines, microbial estimates can be obtained for the volume liquefied material,  
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(New Zealand Water and Waste Association [NZWWA], 2003). Thus, in the immediate 
aftermath of the earthquake a possible microbial count can be obtained for a unit area by 
treating the area as a surface flooding scenario. There are many avenues by which pathogens 
can disseminate, and the scenarios considered above can also be exacerbated by subsequent 
events such as rain. 
 
Thus, deciphering the aforementioned scenario and applying the model in a post-disaster 
situation can aid emergency respondents. It enables emergency staff to get an approximation 
of general microbial concentration per unit area that is associated with common public health 
infections after a disaster, such as gastroenteritis, which in turn can identify possible public 
health issues. One particular application may be if an EC was to open near an area with 
sewage-contaminated surface flooding (due to liquefaction ejecta or lateral spreading). By 
understanding the possible intensity of microbial concentrations over an area, additional EC 
protocols can be established where needed. This can be an insidious situation if evacuees are 
entering ECs with sewage-contaminated footwear. One such protocol that can be to set up is 
sanitising footbaths. These are low cost to implement and maintain whilst an EC is open to the 
public. Footbaths can be incorporated into the EC layout at efficacious places such as the 
main entrance, or other “choke points” to prevent pathogen dissemination at ECs.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6-2: Diagram of a sanitising footbath. 
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CHAPTER 6: THESIS CONCLUSIONS 
 
This multidisciplinary research was designed to assess whether the recorded gastroenteritis 
point prevalence recorded following the February 22, 2011 Christchurch earthquake could be 
spatially explained by earthquake-induced causative factors including liquefaction ground 
damage; earthquake-induced infrastructure damage; and the presence of gastroenteritis agents 
(non-compliant FAC and E.coli) in the drinking water network. A further aim of this study was 
to discover and analyse integral protocols that prevented gastroenteritis outbreaks at three 
Emergency Centres (ECs).  
 
As a result of this study, an integrated database with a clear outline of gastroenteritis causative 
factors, and consequences following the Christchurch earthquake has been created. The study 
has also identified spatial associations of gastroenteritis agents with some success. The 
successful preventive protocols at ECs have been isolated, and translated into lessons learnt that 
could inform endemic infectious disease management plans.  
 
In more details, the quantitative analysis was designed to assess whether the recorded 
gastroenteritis point prevalence could have been spatially explained by the following associated 
factors: 
 The water network pipe damage count (main and submain pipes), whereby damage was 
represented as pipe bursts 
 The wastewater network pipe damage count, which included array of different types of 
damage such as sewer mains and pipe cracks 
 The liquefaction damage included lateral spreading and surface ejecta; henceforth, those 
damages will be termed collectively as liquefaction ground damage, which were 
represented  as the percentage of the total per Census Area Unit (CAU)  
 The levels of Free Associated Chlorine Non-Compliant (FAC-NC) (<0.02mg/L), which 
was the chlorine available to disinfect the drinking water supply; and, in this study, low 
levels of FAC-NC were considered as a gastroenteritis agent, because low FAC-NC 
levels in the water supply may enable pathogens to remain in the drinking water supply  
 Escherichia coli (E.coli) are the pathogens present in the water supply (MPN/100mL) 
and considered as a gastroenteritis agent in this study. 
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Spatial associations were assessed using quantitative spatial and non-spatial statistical tests, 
whilst qualitative methods involved conducting interviews, and analysing them by applying the 
Grounded Theory (GT) approach (therefore, a mixed methods approach). For quantitative 
analysis, a damage profile table was created, which amalgamated the aforementioned associated 
factors for each CAU in the study area. Creating the damage profile table allowed to generate 
thematic maps and to conduct the following statistical tests: frequency distributions, Moran’s I, 
Hot Spot Analysis (HS), Spearman’s Rho and Besag–York–Mollié Model (BYM Model). The 
Spearman’s Rho and BYM Models tested how the associated factors affected the outcome both 
spatially and non-spatially (Spearman’s Rho), whilst the remaining tests were applied to each 
associated factor for spatial distribution analysis. The quantitative spatial analysis identified an 
apparent spatial clustering of gastroenteritis cases in Christchurch compared with cases found in 
the South Island, New Zealand over 35 days following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. A 
second spatial association showed a 14-fold increase in gastroenteritis cases in Christchurch 
compared with the same study period the year before. BYM modelling showed that the 
gastroenteritis point prevalence was best spatially explained by spatial distributions of E.coli 
counts (even though they were statistically non-significant). The E.coli spatial distribution was 
best explained by water, wastewater damage, and liquefaction ground damage and this spatial 
combination some statistical significance. However, the associated factors considered in this 
study did not explain the prevalence of gastroenteritis for all CAUs. This suggests that other 
factors are needed to fully explain the spatial variation of gastroenteritis prevalence and they 
can be CAU-specific. Moreover, Spearman’s Rho analysis indicated that there was a weak and 
indirect association between gastroenteritis prevalence; and the following factors: water and 
wastewater network damage, liquefaction ground damage (lateral spread and surface ejecta); 
and FAC-NC. It was also found from thematic maps that the eastern sides of Christchurch had 
the greatest spatially aggregated counts of high damage per CAU for the considered factors. The 
research findings indicate that gastroenteritis prevalence is CAU-specific, and the results of this 
study can be used as a basis for identifying those factors specific to different CAUs.  
 
The qualitative analysis addressing the second research question involved interviewing 30 
participants from three Emergency Centres (ECs): Burnside High School (BEC), Cowles 
Stadium (CEC), and Linwood High School (LEC). There were no outbreaks of gastroenteritis 
recorded at the ECs following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Despite populations that may 
have been exposed to E.coli sources, this did not translate into a gastroenteritis outbreak. This 
suggested that the implemented protocols may have successfully prevented such an outbreak. 
The analysis of those interviews using GT yielded two themes: direct and indirect. The direct 
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themes were the prolific use of hand sanitisers, isolation room provisions, EC infrastructure 
services provided, and maintaining separate areas. The indirect themes included the EC layouts; 
lessons learnt; and staff dynamics that enabled implementation and maintenance of the active 
direct themes. Both direct and indirect themes were highly dependent on each other.  
 
Understanding the link between direct and indirect themes from this research can increase 
awareness of how to prevent gastroenteritis outbreaks at ECs for both the EC organisers and 
public health officials, especially managing resources. For example, public health officers can 
identify effective hand sanitiser stations more strategically by understanding the EC layouts 
instigated by the EC staff members. Likewise, the EC staff members can be aware of the 
implications that adapting an EC layout that may have on direct themes. This interrelationship 
can be used during EC training sessions to highlight flow-on effects of the indirect themes on 
the direct themes. For example, establishing choke points not only manages foot traffic, but also 
is an excellent opportunity to locate hand sanitiser stations. Although the results may be limited 
by recall bias, albeit minimal, understanding of such protocols can provide crucial information. 
This information can serve as a resource to other ECs that may open as part of a post-disaster 
response.  
 
Although many publications—such as IAVM (2005) and WHO (2005) — are available on the 
above-mentioned direct and indirect themes. Reviewing available literature indicated there is 
limited information on how the two themes interact harmoniously to prevent gastroenteritis 
outbreaks. This link has been investigated and analysed in this research. This research’s outputs 
provides greater awareness of preventing gastroenteritis outbreaks at ECs, and the outputs could 
be potentially incorporated into the NZ national endemic plans and internationally. 
  
Likewise, many studies have investigated gastroenteritis following earthquakes but very few 
studies that encompass geological changes (liquefaction ground damage), infrastructure (water 
and wastewater damage) and gastroenteritis agents (E.coli and FAC-NC) following an 
earthquake. Moreover, coupling quantitative with localised qualitative study further strengthens 
the approach to investigating gastroenteritis prevalence following a natural disaster. For 
example, the damage profile table can be adapted to create an integrated database of 
gastroenteritis consequences, hazards and exposure factors using the Figure 2-1. Additionally, 
this database can be used as disaster preparation and coupled with the questionnaire that has 
been used in the study to explore more vulnerable CAUs. Those vulnerable CAUs can be 
identified by implementing the integrated database into BYM modelling. Another area of 
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possible future research can be developing a surface microbial model from sewage- 
contaminated liquefaction ground damage following an earthquake. Consequently, following a 
major earthquake, where liquefaction ground damage is mostly seen as surface flooding, the 
microbial model can indicate pathogen concentration from a “worst case” scenario, which can 
inform emergency responders to allocate resources accordingly. 
 
In summary, this research analysed post-earthquake infectious diseases using a methodology for 
visualising data by creating a damage profile that was specific to a CAU, and then coupling this 
information with local qualitative data from EC staff. Using this approach enabled to investigate 
the correlation between gastroenteritis point prevalence, and associated factors. In addition, this 
study has also isolated mitigative protocols that were implemented at the three ECs. This 
research has collectively provided an insight into the intractable nature of gastroenteritis 
prevalence following an earthquake. Improvements for the mixed methods approach include 
extending the scale of the methodology to incorporate more data into the profile table and the 
BYM model. Thus, this research forms the stepping-stone for amalgamating qualitative and 
quantitative data to study infectious diseases in a post-disaster context; and it can inform the 
current infectious disease management plans following a disaster in New Zealand. Moreover, 
the preventive protocols identified can serve as guidelines to prevent gastroenteritis prevalence 
at an EC during a disaster response in New Zealand and globally.  
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APPENDIX A: The Study Area
Figure A- 1: illustrates Christchurch city: the study area considered for this research. 
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APPENDIX B: Summary of Variables Considered for Quantitative Analysis 
 
Table B-1: Summary of data collated for quantitative analysis outlining the recorded gastroenteritis cases. 
 
Data Name 
Data Type in 
Shapefile Format 
for ArcGIS10.0 
Date Range in 
which data was 
collected 
Comments 
G
as
tr
o
en
te
ri
ti
s 
ca
se
s 
an
d
 G
as
tr
o
en
te
ri
ti
s 
ca
u
sa
ti
ve
 a
ge
n
ts
 Escherichia coli 
(E.coli) 
Transgression 
(RESPONSE 
FACTOR) 
 
Point 
 
 
24/2/2011-
17/6/2011 
E.coli Transgressions means that minimum allowable number of E.coli has been detected in water 
samples. Tested samples were collected from restored water supply after the February 22, 2012 
earthquake (Dell et al, 2012). Each data point contains a value between 0-16 in MPN*/100mL. 
Collected water samples were tested at Canterbury Health Laboratories and Waimakariri District 
Council (Dell et al, 2012). MPN refers to Most Probable Number of E.coli is used as an indicator 
organism for possible human and animal excrement (MPN/100mL). The data was sourced from 
Canterbury District Health Board, New Zealand. 
Free Associated 
Chlorine (FAC) 
Or 
Free Available 
Chlorine 
(Non-Compliant) 
Point 
26/2/2011-
24/4/2011 
All point data was non-compliant (value less than 0.20mg/L). FAC is the Hypochlorous acid and 
hypochlorite ion concentration present in chlorinated water (NZ Drinking Water Standards, 2008). 
It is the residual chlorine concentration present in the water for disinfection.  
FAC must be at least 0.2mg/L within the water distribution system to reduce Coliform bacteria to 
insignificant levels (Ministry of Health, 2008). Concentration below this level was deemed non-
compliant. All point data has a value less than 0.20 mg/L. The data was sourced from Canterbury 
District Health Board, New Zealand. 
Acute 
Gastroenteritis 
cases 
Aggregated count 
(per CAU) 
22/2/2010- 
28/3/2010 
22/2/2011 –
28/3/2011 
Number of confirmed acute gastroenteritis cases notified to Environmental Science & Research 
(ESR) Limited New Zealand, per CAU for South Island and Christchurch. Obtained acute 
gastroenteritis cases did not name infection agent origin. The data was sourced (ESR).The criteria 
for which acute gastroenteritis cases notified to ESR are outlined in the following document by 
Ministry of Health, New Zealand: Ministry of Health, New Zealand, MOH. (2012). Communicable 
Disease Control Manual 2012. Wellington: Ministry of Health. ISBN 978-0-478-36622-8. 
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 Table B-2:  Summary of data collated for quantitative analysis outlining the Water and Wastewater Network Damage repairs. 
 
 Data Name 
 
Data Type in 
Shapefile Format 
for ArcMap10.0 
 
Date Range in which data was 
collected 
Comments 
W
at
e
r 
an
d
 W
as
te
w
at
e
r 
N
et
w
o
rk
 D
am
ag
e 
R
ep
ai
rs
 
Portable Water 
Network  Mains Pipes 
Point 23/2/11-11/6/2011 
Point locations of water repairs: locations are based on repair 
addresses with some errors in locations. Damage occurrence is 
closely linked to earthquake events as evidenced by job creation 
dates within the shapefile. The data was sourced from Stronger 
Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT). 
Portable Water 
Network  Submain 
Pipes 
Point 23/2/11-11/6/2011 
Point locations of water repairs: locations are based on repair 
addresses with some errors in locations. Damage occurrence is 
closely linked to earthquake events as evidenced by job creation 
dates within the shapefile. The data was sourced from Stronger 
Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT). 
Wastewater Network 
Pipe Damage 
Point 25/2/2011-21/9/2012 
Point locations of wastewater repairs: locations are based on 
repair addresses with some errors in locations. Damage to 
wastewater pipes were closely linked to earthquake events. This is 
because wastewater infrastructure is buried 4-8m below soil 
surface; hence, damage was invisible from the ground surface. 
Nonetheless damage had occurred which was exacerbated 
following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The data and 
information was sourced from Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure 
Rebuild Team (SCIRT). 
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Data Name 
Data Type in Shape 
file Format for 
ArcGIS10.0 
Date Range in 
which data was 
collected 
 
Comments 
Ea
rt
h
q
u
ak
e 
Fa
ct
o
r Liquefaction Polygon 22/2/2011-
22/2/2011 
Road scale maps or residential properties showing various 
categories (Figure B-1) of ejected material and lateral spreading 
that was visible at the surface following the February 22, 2011 
earthquake. The data was sourced from: Geotechnical Database 
(2013) "Liquefaction and Lateral Spreading Observations", Map 
Layer CGD0300 - 11 Feb 2013, retrieved July 2012   
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
Census Area Unit 
(CAU) 
 
 
Polygon 
Data from 2006 
Census, 
New Zealand 
(NZ). 
 
A Census Area Unit (CAU) is amalgamated meshblocks with a single 
geographical entity with a unique name, such as a suburb name. 
Meshblock is the smallest geographic unit where data is collated by 
Statistics New Zealand. The data was sourced from Statistics New 
Zealand: www.stats.govt.nz/tools_and_services/nzdotstat/2006-
census-pop-dwellings-tables.aspx  
 
Population 
 
Polygon 
Christchurch CAU 
in 2006 New 
Zealand Census 
 
Number of People screened at night, thereby assumed to be living 
in the Census Area Unit. (Number of people screen at night) 
(Statistics, NZ) Website: 
www.stats.govt.nz/tools_and_services/nzdotstat/2006-census-pop-
dwellings-tables.aspx 
 
Table B-3: Summary of data collated for quantitative analysis outlining the earthquake factors and population characteristics.  
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APPENDIX C: Liquefaction and Lateral Spreading Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Important notice 
Figures 4-3, 4-5, 4-7, 4-8, 4-10, Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 were created from maps and/or data 
extracted from the Canterbury Geotechnical Database 
(https://canterburygeotechnicaldatabase.projectorbit.com), which were prepared and/or 
compiled for the Earthquake Commission (EQC) to assist in assessing insurance claims made 
under the Earthquake Commission Act 1993. The source maps and data were not intended for 
any other purpose. EQC and its engineers, Tonkin & Taylor, have no liability for any use of 
the maps and data or for the consequences of any person relying on them in any way. This 
"Important notice" must be reproduced wherever Figures 4-3, 4-5, 4-7, 4-8, 4-10, Table 4-1, 
and Table 4-2 or any derivatives are reproduced. 
Figure C-1: Graded liquefaction damage for private properties after the February 22 2011 earthquake. 
‘’Geotechnical Database (2013) "Liquefaction and Lateral Spreading Observations", Map Layer CGD0300 - 
11 Feb 2013, retrieved July 2012 .  
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APPENDIX D: Normal Probability Distribution and Clustering Patters using 
Spatial Autocorrelation operation in ArcMap10.0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
z-score or standard 
deviation 
p-value Confidence 
interval 
<-1.65 or > +1.65 <0.10 90% 
<-1.96 or > +1.96 <0.05 95% 
<-2.58 or > +2.58 <0.01 99% 
Figure D-1: Table above informs how the normal distribution curve, z-score, p-value and 
confidence intervals. The figure shows the table’s relation to the clustering pattern 
(dispersed, random, and clustered) using Moran’s I index. Dispersed pattern reflects the 
blue shades, the normal pattern is shown by the yellow and the orange to red shades 
refers to a clustered pattern. The figure was sourced from (ESRI, 2013) 
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model 
{ 
  for (i in 1 : N) { 
     GAST[i]  ~ dpois(mu[i]) 
      log(mu[i]) <- log(E[i]) + a0 +  a1 * WSB[i] + a2 * WSM[i] + a3 * WW[i]  + a4 * FAC-NC[i] + a5 * 
LIQ[i] + a6 * Ec[i] +b[i] 
      RR[i] <- exp( a0 + a1  * WSB[i] + a2 * WSM[i] + a3 * WW[i] + a6 * EC[i] +b[i])   # Area-specific 
relative risk (for maps) 
  } 
 
  # CAR prior distribution for random effects:  
  b[1:N] ~ car.normal(adj[], weights[], num[], tau) 
  for(k in 1:sumNumNeigh) { 
      weights[k] <- 1 
  }  
  # Other priors: 
  a0  ~ dflat()   
  a1 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5) 
  a2 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5) 
  a3 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5) 
  #a4 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5) 
 #a5 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5) 
  a6 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5) 
  tau  ~ dgamma(0.5, 0.0005)     # prior on precision 
  sigma <- sqrt(1 / tau)                      # standard deviation 
} 
#INITS 
list(tau=1, a1=0,a2=0,a3=0,a6=0,a0=0, 
b=c(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E: WinBUGS14 Model 
WinBUGS14 Code used for the Besag–York–Mollié Model (BYM Model). 
Model 1 
 
WinBUGS14 Programme Citation: Lunn, D.J., Thomas, A., Best, N., and Spiegelhalter, D. (2000) 
WinBUGS -- a Bayesian modelling framework: concepts, structure, and extensibility. Statistics and 
Computing, 10:325--337. 
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WinBUGS14. Code used for the Besag–York–Mollié Model (BYM Model). 
Model 2 
WinBUGS Programme Citation: Lunn, D.J., Thomas, A., Best, N., and Spiegelhalter, D. (2000) 
WinBUGS -- a Bayesian modelling framework: concepts, structure, and extensibility. Statistics and 
Computing, 10:325--337. 
 
model 
{ 
  for (i in 1 : N) { 
     ECM[i]  ~ dpois(mu[i]) 
      log(mu[i]) <- log(E[i]) + a0 +  a1 * WSB[i] + a2 * WSM[i] + a3 * WW[i] + a4 * FAC-NC[i] + a5 * 
LIQ[i] +b[i] 
      RR[i] <- exp( a0 + a1  * WSB[i] + a2 * WSM[i] + a3 * WW[i] + a4 * FAC-NC[i] + a5 * LIQ[i]  +b[i])   
# Area-specific relative risk (for maps) 
  } 
 
  # CAR prior distribution for random effects:  
  b[1:N] ~ car.normal(adj[], weights[], num[], tau) 
  for(k in 1:sumNumNeigh) { 
      weights[k] <- 1 
  } 
  
  # Other priors: 
  a0  ~ dflat()   
  a1 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5) 
  a2 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5) 
  a3 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5)  
  a4 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5) 
  a5 ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-5) 
  
  tau  ~ dgamma(0.5, 0.0005)     # prior on precision 
  sigma <- sqrt(1 / tau)                      # standard deviation 
} 
 
#INITS 
list(tau=1, a1=0,a2=0,a3=0,a4=0,a5=0,,a0=0, 
b=c(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)) 
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APPENDIX F: Winbugs 14 Model Combinations 
Table F-1: The combination of variables used as covariates for analysis on WinBUGS14. The highlighted 
squares were the factors that were included in each combination model. 
 
 
Explanatory Factors Considered for WinBUGS14 
Modelling 
 
Combination 
Number 
Water 
Main 
Water 
Submain 
Lique 
-faction 
Waste 
water 
FAC E.coli Investigation Purpose 
Model 1: OBSERVED GASTROENTERITIS CASES EXPLAINED BY FACTOR COMBINATIONS BELOW 
iiiiiiii bEcaLIQaNCFACaWWaWSMaWSBaaGAST  6543210loglog
 
C1 
      If observed 
gastroenteritis cases 
were due to water and 
wastewater network 
damage. 
C2 
      Presence of E.coli 
explains observed 
gastroenteritis cases.  
 
C3 
      Observed gastroenteritis 
cases are influenced by 
FAC-NC and E.coli only.  
 
C4 
      Gastroenteritis cases are 
influenced by 
infrastructure damage 
(water and wastewater 
network damage) and 
presence of FAC-NC and 
E.coli in the drinking 
water system. 
 
C5 
      If gastroenteritis cases 
were because of 
damages from 
wastewater and water 
and liquefaction with the 
presence of E.coli and 
FAC-NC in the drinking 
water system. 
MODEL 2: OBSERVED E.COLI COUNTS EXPLAINED BY FACTOR COMBINATIONS BELOW 
iiiiiiii bLIQaNCFACaWWaWSMaWSBaaEc  543210loglog   
C6 
      E.coli presence was 
explained by water and 
wastewater damage. 
C7 
 
 
     If E.coli was a resultant of 
water pipe damage and 
liquefaction only. 
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 Explanatory Factors Considered for WinBUGS14 
Modelling 
 
 
Combination 
Number 
Water 
Main 
Water 
Submain 
Lique 
-faction 
Waste 
water 
FAC E.coli Investigation Purpose 
MODEL 2: OBSERVED E.COLI COUNTS EXPLAINED BY FACTOR COMBINATIONS BELOW 
iiiiiiii bLIQaNCFACaWWaWSMaWSBaaEc  543210loglog   
C8 
      If E.coli was due to water 
pipe damage and FAC. 
Places that were had 
severe water pipe 
damage and not able to 
chlorinate water 
properly. 
C9 
      If E.coli was due to water 
pipe damage, and 
liquefaction only (not able 
to chlorinate due to 
liquefaction damage as 
well). 
C10 
      E.coli count was not a 
direct result of 
liquefaction. It drew the 
idea that other things 
were present to 
contribute to E.coli count 
other than infrastructure 
damage. Compare results 
between 15 and 12. 
C11 
      E.coli count was 
combination of water, 
wastewater and 
liquefaction. 
C12 
      All factors were spatially 
associated with E.coli 
count in drinking water. 
Table F-2: Factor combinations of variables used as covariates for analysis on WinBUGS14. The 
highlighted squares were the factors that were included in each combination model. 
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APPENDIX G: Interview Questionnaire 
The questionnaire included a brief introduction to outline its purpose and the usefulness 
of the results in New Zealand’s context. More importantly, the introductions explained the 
questions were designed for the two earthquakes (September 4 2010 and February 22 
2011), which henceforth will be referred to as the Canterbury Earthquakes. The 
questionnaire was designed to guide participants to respond to the questions one category 
at a time. Each category comprised of questions that required descriptive answers and 
those requiring short answers. Therefore, beginning with volunteer details established 
channels of communication and provided a road map for proceeding questions such as 
essential lifeline services. Adopting this format avoided repetition and provided a semi-
constructed interview in which the questionnaire acted as a guide only. Consequently, 
certain questions were answered comprehensively to suit participants’ experiences and 
job roles.  
Components Attached to CD 
 Interview participation letter 
 Interview Information Sheet 
 Interview Consent Form 
 Interview Questionnaire 
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APPENDIX H: Frequency Distributions 
 
E 
F 
G 
C 
A 
D 
B 
Figure H-1: Frequency Distributions for factors considered for spatial modelling. All figures illustrate a power-law distribution. 
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APPENDIX I: Spearman’s Rho Results in Matrix Form 
 
Table I-1: Spearman's Rho results. 
 
 
E.coli Count in 
Drinking Water 
Taps 
(MPN/100mL) 
Free Associated 
Chlorine (FAC) 
Non-Compliant 
(<0.02mg/L) Count 
Number of 
Gastroenteritis 
Cases Between 
22/2/2011-
28/3/2011 
Water 
Damage- 
Main 
Pipes 
Water 
Damage- 
Submain 
Pipes 
Wastewater 
Pipe 
Damage 
Percentage 
of Area of 
CAU that 
was 
liquefied 
 
E.coli Count in Drinking Water 
Taps (MPN/100mL) 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .386
**
 .143 .339
**
 .293
**
 .256
**
 .294
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .117 .000 .001 .005 .001 
Free Associated Chlorine (FAC) 
Non-Compliant (<0.02mg/L) 
Count 
Correlation Coefficient .386
**
 1.000 .332
**
 .697
**
 .730
**
 .732
**
 .620
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Number of Gastroenteritis Cases 
Between 22/2/11-28/3/11 (Post- 
February Earthquake) 
Correlation Coefficient .143 .332
**
 1.000 .280
**
 .309
**
 .271
**
 .310
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .117 .000 . .002 .001 .003 .001 
Water Damage- Main Pipes 
Correlation Coefficient .339
**
 .697
**
 .280
**
 1.000 .782
**
 .788
**
 .640
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .002 . .000 .000 .000 
Water Damage- Submain Pipes 
Correlation Coefficient .293
**
 .730
**
 .309
**
 .782
**
 1.000 .842
**
 .676
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .001 .000 . .000 .000 
Wastewater Pipe Damage 
 
Correlation Coefficient .256
**
 .732
**
 .271
**
 .788
**
 .842
**
 1.000 .817
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .000 .003 .000 .000 . .000 
Percentage of Area of CAU that 
was liquefied 
Correlation Coefficient .294
**
 .620
**
 .310
**
 .640
**
 .676
**
 .817
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 . 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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APPENDIX J: Moran’s I Test Results 
(Using Spatial Autocorrelation Operation in ArcMap 10) 
 
 
 
Table J-1: Moran’s I index for gastroenteritis prevalence, infrastructure damage; liquefaction and gastroenteritis causative agents (FAC and E.coli) after the February 22, 
2011 earthquake. A z-score > 1.65 with a p value range from 0.10 to 0.01 indicate a clustered spatial pattern. A dispersed spatial pattern is indicated when the z-score is <-
1.96 (with corresponding p-values of 0.10 to 0.01). A random spatial pattern is denoted with a z-score between -165 to 1.65 (p-value=0.10). Moran’s Index (I) range from -1 
to +1. When I <1 dispersed pattern; I=0 random pattern; and when I >1 clustered pattern. All factors showed clustered spatial patterns. All factors were clustered. 
Variables Tested for Spatial Autocorrelation on ArcMap10.0  
Moran’s I Index 
(-1 to +1) 
(2dp) 
z-
SCORE 
(2dp) 
p-
VALUE 
(2dp) 
 
Spatial Pattern 
(Dispersed, Random, 
Clustered) 
Gastroenteritis 
Exposure Risk 
Factors 
E.coli 0.015 1.90 0.058 Clustered 
Free Associated Chlorine (FAC-NC) 0.12 7.07 0.00 Clustered 
Gastroenteritis Cases per 10000 people 0.05 5.55 0.00 Clustered 
Damage Counts 
from 
Infrastructure and 
Earthquake 
Factors 
Water Network Damage-Main Pipes 0.26 13.026 0.00 Clustered 
Water Network Damage-Submain Pipes 0.21 10.59 0.00 Clustered 
Wastewater Network Damage 0.21 10.74 0.0 Clustered 
Liquefaction 0.23 11.48 0.0 Clustered 
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APPENDIX K: Moran’s I Results for Besag–York–Mollié Model (BYM Model) 
Table K-1: Spatial Autocorrelation of WinBUGS residuals from E.coli risk maps. Z-scores greater than 2.58, which reflect a low p-value, are statistically 
significant. 
 
 
 
Combination 
Number 
Factors included 
Moran’s I Index 
(-1 to +1) 
(2dp) 
z-SCORE 
(2dp) 
p-VALUE 
(2dp) 
 
Spatial Pattern 
(Dispersed, Random, 
Clustered) 
C2 GAST=EC 0.23 23.36 0.00 Clustered 
C9 EC=W+FAC-NC 0.09 9.26 0.00 Clustered 
C11 EC=W+WW+L 0.04 4.40 0.000011 Clustered 
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APPENDIX L: Emergency Centre Leadership Structure 
 
Figure L-1: The hierarchical structure of an Emergency Centre (EC) after the Christchurch February 
22, 2011 earthquake. The top tier of an EC are ECS and Christchurch City Council (CCC) Liaison 
Officer who works together to oversee EC operations. The liaison officer operates with the CCC to 
free resources required by the EC. The support section is involved with technical aspects of the EC 
such as operating communications with the emergency operations centre, which oversee regional 
emergency response. The welfare section attends rest of the matters: everything to do with people 
aspects such as accommodation. 
  
Christchurch City Council 
(CCC) Liaison Officer 
Emergency Centre 
Supervisor (ECS) 
Support Section Team 
Leader (SSTL) 
Support Section Team 
(SST) 
Technical Focussed:  
Sit Reports, Stock Take, 
Communications 
Welfare Section Team 
Leader (WSTL) 
Welfare Section Team 
(WST) 
People focussed: 
Accomodation, Clothing, 
Food, Evacuee Welfare, 
Social Services, Cleaning 
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APPENDIX M: Emergency Centre Raw Results for Linwood High School 
Emergency Centre 
LINWOOD HIGH SCHOOL EMERGENCY CENTRE (LEC):  LAYOUT 
OVERVIEW 
LEC had and a single main entry and exit that was guarded by professional security at all 
times. The evacuees would enter LECs main entry, a pedestrian walkway, and approach 
reception (Figure M-1). Security staff ensured that people entering the LEC approached 
reception first for traffic management. Approaching reception was mandatory for everyone—
staff, volunteers, and evacuees. In following this procedure, LEC had an inventory of 
everyone housed at LEC for security, health and safety reasons.  
 
At reception, CD staff would assess evacuees’ needs and requests. If evacuees required 
services at LEC, they were advised to approach registration (Figure M-1 and M-2). At 
registration staff recorded the required services in a Red Cross Form (per family). A Red 
Cross form acted as a “permission slip” to access services. From registration evacuees may 
seek specific services needed. Initial LEC layout, designed before the earthquakes did not 
change once LEC was open to the public. 
 
LINWOOD HIGH SCHOOL LAYOUT: INFRASTRUCTURE 
From the outset, water, power and sewerage facilities were available on the first day at LEC. 
It took 2-3 days for social services to get established at LEC because during those initial 
days, LEC was figuring what out particular services were needed at LEC. Some of the first 
core services to get instigated were NZ Police, Work and Income and St Johns Ambulance 
service. In particular, NZ police helped to identify suspicious characters such as paedophiles. 
LEC staff also provided security services for the first 2-3 days but heightened by 
incorporating professional security guards in the coming days. Of most importance, security 
created a “presence” to reassure distressed evacuees and protected the cordon for isolated 
areas. A particular example, security had to deal at LEC was to patrol the water tank, where it 
was found that a person refilled water from the LEC water tank and sold it to the public 
nearby.  
 
LINWOOD HIGH SCHOOL LAYOUT: SERVICES AND MEALS 
A particular service, meal times were exploited by the public when LEC first opened to the 
public- predominantly because the meals were ‘simply delicious”. Initially, LEC did not 
require a Red Cross form to attend meal times. This instigated a large discrepancy of people 
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requiring meals. Number of people arriving for meals was greater than the number of people 
registered.  It was found out that “bystanders” were using the meal service intended for 
evacuees at LEC.  As a result some EC staff and evacuees missed out on meal. To rectify, a 
mandatory rule was put in place: the entrance to the dining area had security staff whereby a 
person requiring meals must present a completed Red Cross form. This identified a registered 
evacuee; not a bystander. Because security could identify EC staff members, Red Cross form 
was necessary. Meal times were co-ordinated in groups where the first 100 people were 
invited for meals followed by the next 100 people and so on.  
LINWOOD HIGH SCHOOL LAYOUT: STAFF 
LEC staff trained together as a team for years: staff knew team members’ personalities, 
strengths and weakness and supported each other to build a cohesive team environment. 
Hence, LEC staff had synchronised team dynamics. Combination of loyalty to forge ahead, 
adrenaline, and the immense workload meant some staff required persistence to relive of their 
duties. LEC had 40-45 staff working an average 12-hour shift for 3-4 days with many of the 
shifts feeling “like a long exercise.” Eventually, staff fatigue emerged; followed by reports of 
diarrhoea illness among staff on day five (Table M-1). Consequently staff rosters were 
established: an eight- hour shift per day with no more than five continuous shifts per week 
that ultimately gave staff rest.  
 
To compensate for resting staff, Coastguard Canterbury (CG) volunteers’ were called in as 
additional staff to run the LEC. Coastguard volunteers complemented the existing LEC staff 
team because of Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) training command 
structure, and for their routine practices in emergency scenarios. The Coastguard team 
“moulded” into EC staff duties. They also contributed to improve the existing LEC 
management at the time such as implementing fire drills. 
 
LINWOOD HIGH SCHOOL LAYOUT:  HYGIENE 
The first couple of days when the volume of evacuees coming into the LEC increased, effort 
to maintain adequate hygiene levels especially in the sleeping area and lavatories were 
grossly underestimated. EC staff was underequipped “we couldn’t keep up; we didn’t have 
the gear for it”. Once professional cleaners were on site and coupled with volunteer 
organisations the hygiene levels immensely improved. Similarly, at the outset LEC had 
insufficient amount of hand sanitisers, which was rectified on the second day. Henceforth, 
every door entrance had a person (whether an evacuee or staff) with a hand sanitisers asking 
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passing people to sanitise their hands. This process was heightened during meal times: no 
entry into the dining room without using hand sanitisers. 
 
Initially personal food items (such as baby food, yoghurt) were permitted inside LEC. But as 
days progressed this was heavily discouraged to abate contamination risk, unless for personal 
dietary requirements (e.g. gluten free diet). Some contaminant risks people exposed to were 
sewerage, because reports of “sewerage had exploded like bombs” in some areas and there 
were concerns that evacuees may have been contaminated with sewerage on their skin. In 
addition grocery stores were selling perishable food items during the initial hours after the 
earthquake, when power was unavailable.  
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Figure M-1: Linwood High School Emergency Centre Layout following the September 4, 2010 earthquake. 
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Table M-1: Timeline of events for Linwood High School emergency centre following the September 4, 2010 earthquake. Abbreviations: 
EC=Emergency Centre, LEC= Linwood High School Emergency Centre, NC= No Change to previous day, PLs= Portable Lavatories. 
 
Number 
of Days 
EC Open 
Evacuees 
Housed 
(Approx.) 
Main Infrastructure  
Comments 
Water Sewerage Power 
DAY 1 
4-Sep 
400-500 
-Building Water 
Supply: Not used 
-External 
drinking water 
tank 
-Building 
Lavatories 
Grid 
Power 
-Large volume of evacuees 
-No bottled water available 
-Underequipped to clean EC 
-EC staff average 15-18 hour shifts (senior EC 
management staff did 24 hour shifts)  
DAY 2 
5-Sep 
400-450 
-Same services 
as day 1 
-Bottled Water 
Available 
-Building 
Lavatories 
-PLs arrive 
to cater to 
increased 
evacuees. 
NC 
-Cleaning: Church volunteers, professional 
cleaners not on site yet 
-Support agencies arrive after took 2-3 days 
to understand what type of services needed 
at LEC 
-Community resources arrive: Plunket 
-Spontaneous volunteers registered 
-Isolation set up- diarrhoea family arrive 
-EC staff average 12 hour shifts 
-Hand sanitiser supplies arrived and supply 
did not deplete henceforth 
DAY 3 
6-Sep 
550-650 (NC) NC NC 
-Cleaning: professional cleaning on site and 
Church Volunteers 
-Professional security arrive & gets 
established 
-First Diarrhoea family arrive at EC 
-EC staff average 12-18 hour shifts 
DAY4 
7-Sep 
600-650 NC NC NC 
-Services present: cleaning, support agencies, 
professional security: NC 
-Second Diarrhoea family arrive at EC 
-Professional psychiatric help arrives for 
evacuees 
-Staff rosters established: Staff doing 8-10 
hour shifts 
-Clean sleeping hall 
- Routine established for running EC 
DAY 5 
8-Sep 
600-650 NC NC NC 
-Cleaning, support agencies, Professional 
Security: NC 
-Staff rosters established: Staff doing 8-10 
hour shifts 
-Diarrhoea among few EC staff 
(approximately 5 staff members) 
-Commenced cleaning the sleeping hall as 
routine henceforth 
DAY 6 
9-Sep 
600-650 NC NC NC 
-Services present: cleaning, support agencies, 
professional security: NC 
-EC Staff Fatigue set in: Coastguard 
Canterbury other volunteer groups to help 
with EC shifts 
DAY 7 
10-Sep 
450-500 NC NC NC 
-Services present: cleaning, support agencies, 
professional security, psychiatric services: NC 
-Coastguard Canterbury & other volunteer 
groups help with EC shift rosters 
 
DAY 8 
11-Sep 
400-450 NC NC NC 
-Services present: cleaning, support agencies, 
professional security: NC 
-Coastguard Canterbury & other volunteer 
groups help with EC shift rosters 
DAY 9 
12-Sep 
50-70 EC 
CLOSED 
NC NC NC 
-Services present: cleaning, support agencies, 
professional security: NC 
-Remaining evacuees were transferred to 
other ECs that were open. 
-CLEAN VENUE TO CLOSE 
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APPENDIX N: Raw Results For Burnside High School Emergency Centre 
 
BURUNSIDE HIGH SCHOOL LAYOUT: OVERVIEW 
The Burnside High School Emergency Centre’s (BEC’s) layout operated in a similar fashion 
to LEC. Instigated by security at the front entrance to BEC, all evacuees “signed-in” for 
information or services via reception area (Figure N-1). It was mandatory for all EC staff to 
sign-in at reception. From reception, two manned gates guided evacuees into the registration 
area as well as the specific areas where social services were housed (Figure N-1).  When staff 
or evacuees left BEC, it was mandatory to “sign-out” at reception for the same health and 
safety reasons as LEC.  Analogous to LEC, a Red Cross from enabled access to all services 
offered at BEC, especially meals. Initially BEC services were limited to the main hall with 
staff carrying out majority of the services (Figure N-2).  
 
The BEC layout changed as types of social services and evacuee number increased. Initially, 
social services and registration was housed inside the main hall (Figure N-2). After 2-3 days, 
those services moved into disparate classrooms. It allowed extra space, better traffic flow, 
privacy, cater to increased social service staff and cultural sensitivity like specific sleeping 
arrangements (Figure N-1). More importantly using classroom blocks, enabled social services 
(with their respective staff) to set up efficiently and “free-up” BEC staff to oversight roles: 
rather than “doing” a job, they were micro-managing collaboratively with social services 
staff.  
 
BURNSIDE HIGH SCHOOL LAYOUT: SERVICES 
Services offered at BEC and timeline are outlined in Table N-1. For the first 8 hours, BEC 
operated on a camping generator with no grid power. Compared to CEC, installing power was 
more difficult at BEC due to building type. Without knowing damage to the infrastructure 
systems, BEC locked all lavatories and disabled water drinking fountains across the school 
for health and safety reasons. 
 
The water tank, originally located inside BEC layout, got relocated to the BEC entrance upon 
refill, because of the growing public demand for water. In doing so, it abated unnecessary 
foot traffic inside the BEC.  For caution, there were notices on the public information board 
to boil water obtained from the water tank because BEC could not verify if the water was 
tested. 
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Social services “trickled in” over the initial days BEC was open. One of the earliest social 
services to arrive was representatives from a travel agency. BEC received busses of visitors-
tourists, conference participants and international sports teams arriving from central 
Emergency Centres (ECs) (Cranmer Square/Hagley). In most cases, those people did not hold 
any travel documents nor travel luggage because their hotels were cordoned-off due to 
earthquake damage. The travel agency helped displaced visitors to arrange travel documents 
and flight arrangements. School vans with school teachers as drivers transported visitors to 
the airport. BEC was initially designed to cater to airport passengers as transit venue to the 
airport in the event of a disaster emergency.   
 
BURNSIDE HIGH SCHOOL LAYOUT: STAFF 
BEC operated with 10-12 trained volunteer staff with spontaneous volunteers working for the 
trained staff. In total up to 30 staff (per shift) operated BEC. Spontaneous volunteers included 
host of people—professionals, school volunteers, pre-school teachers and nurses. Involving 
spontaneous volunteers required a trained staff member dedicated to managing rosters to 
confirm and request shifts. It made managing rosters often an arduous process. School pupils 
formed an essential component of the spontaneous volunteers’ team because of their 
knowledge in the school and its surroundings. Among other responsibilities—such as 
assisting with communication systems and hand sanitiser stations—BEC school pupils 
efficaciously acted as runners for the trained staff: deliver hand-written notes, messages, and 
paper work to staff located at the opposite end of BEC.  
 
When BEC first opened to the public, the staff shifts lasted up 18 hours because of the time 
taken to establish social services and staff routine. On day three, staff rosters were 
implemented to prevent staff fatigue. This change coincided with the BEC establishing 
overall routine services (Table N-1).  
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Figure N-1: Burnside High School emergency centre layout following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The photographs B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I represent the 
various components of the emergency centre outlined in A. Abbreviations: CD=Civil Defence, EC=Emergency Centre. The photographs are courtesy of Resilient 
Networks. 
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Figure N-2: Burnside High School emergency centre layout of the food hall following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
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Table N-1: Time line of events for Burnside High School emergency centre following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Abbreviations: EC=Emergency 
Centre, NC= No Change to previous day, PLs= Portable Lavatories. 
 
 
Days EC 
Open 
Evacuees 
Present 
(Approx.) 
Main Infrastructure 
Comments 
Water Sewerage Power 
DAY 1 
22-Feb 
400 
-No building water supply 
for 12-36 hours 
-Bottled water available 
 
-Building lavatories 
functioning but 
prohibited use due to 
sewerage network 
damage 
- Around 20 portable 
lavatories arrived 
within 8 hours of EC 
opening. 
-No grid power 
-Used a 
camping 
generator and 
two spotlights 
in the court-
yard 
-Grid power 
returned by 
7pm 
-EC opened in the evening when emergency declared by officials 
(2-3 hours after the earthquake) 
-Tourists, arrived from Central city in busses 
-Mandatory hand sanitiser stations that were manned with EC staff 
at all times established henceforth 
-Commercial cleaners present 
-Portable lavatories arrived within 8 hours (main form of sewerage) 
-Sleeping arrangements using gym mats 
-Mandatory hand sanitisor stations established 
-Large volume of evacuees from  
-No bottled water available 
-Underequipped to clean EC 
-EC staff average 12-18 hour shifts 
-Lavatories cleaned twice 
-Portable lavatories emptied as needed 
-Isolation rooms used- immunosuppressant evacuee 
- Shut off fountains around the school to prevent evacuees” 
drinking water from the fountains 
DAY 2 
23-Feb 
850 
-No building water supply 
for 12-36 hours. 
-Water tagged unsuitable to 
drink 
-Bottled Water available 
-Water tank-Drinking water 
was delivered in a milk tank. 
Heavy public demand for 
water. Water had to be 
boiled for drinking. 
-Building Lavatories 
-Portable Lavatories 
 
-Grid Power 
-Change EC layout for registration, reception, social services.  
-Professional cleaners stationed on site 24/7 henceforth, especially 
for lavatories because cleaning twice a day was not enough. 
Cleaned all EC spaces 
- Portable lavatories emptied as needed 
-Social services started to “trickle” in over the next few days. One 
of the first social services present was Wellington Ambulance, NZ 
police, travel agents. 
- Resources arrive- sleeping mattresses & blankets. 
-Spontaneous volunteers registered 
-Isolation set up & used: Diarrhoea family arrive 
-EC staff on average did 12 hour shifts 
-Professional Security present 24hours 
DAY 3 
24-Feb 
No Data 
Available 
-Water tagged unsuitable to 
drink 
-Water Tank 
-Bottled Water 
NC NC 
-Beginning to have people body washing in the lavatories 
-Isolation Rooms used- Diarrhoea family (at EC for approx.3 days) 
- Rosters setup for EC staff to do 8 hour per shift with a hand-over 
meeting henceforth. A shift can be one of three time slots: 7am-
3pm, 3pm-11pm, 11pm-7am. A hand-over meeting designed to last 
30minutes for each shift change. 
DAY4 
25-Feb 
No Data 
Available 
-Water tagged unsuitable to 
drink 
-Water Tank 
-Bottled Water 
NC NC 
- Shower Units set up and toiletries provided 
-Health Officials” inspection: Initial inspection took about 4- hours 
-Number of evacuees housed decreased compared to previous day 
-Cleaning roster set up within professional cleaners and PL serviced 
regularly, or as needed 
- Hand sanitiser  usage was strictly enforced 
-EC staff roster followed 
DAY 5 
26-Feb 
No Data 
Available 
-Water Tank 
-Bottled Water 
NC NC 
-Health Officials” inspection that lasted about an hour 
-EC services are beginning to transform into a regular routine. 
-Number of evacuees decreased compared to previous day. 
-Cleaning roster set up within professional cleaners and PL serviced 
regularly, or as needed 
- Hand sanitiser usage was strictly enforced. 
DAY 6 
27-Feb 
No Data 
Available 
-Water Tank 
-Bottled Water 
NC NC 
-Health Officials” inspection, about an hour 
- 14 Washing Machines and 14 Driers arrive and provided with 
washing materials such as washing powder. The machines were 
guarded with security at all times 
-EC operation routine fully established 
-Number of evacuees housed decreased compared to previous day. 
-Cleaning roster set up within professional cleaners and PLs 
serviced regularly, or as needed 
- Hand sanitiser  usage was strictly enforced 
-EC staff roster followed 
DAY 7-10 
28-Feb 
No Data 
Available 
NC NC NC 
- EC operated by following a daily routine whilst the number of 
evacuees using the EC dropped sharply 
-Cleaning roster set up within professional cleaners and PL serviced 
regularly, or as needed 
- Hand sanitiser  usage was strictly enforced 
-EC staff roster followed 
Day 10-14 
3-Mar 
100- EC 
CLOSED 
   
-Existing evacuees were transported to another EC that was open.  
-Also, evacuees were asked if any further helped or resources was 
needed to help evacuees resettle 
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APPENDIX O: Emergency Centre Raw Results for Cowles Stadium 
Emergency Centre 
 
COWLES STADIUM LAYOUT: LAYOUT OVERVIEW AND SERVICES 
The CEC layout was depicted by the building type; a sports stadium. The core facilities were 
housed inside the capacious sports stadium. The stadium was separated into disparate 
sections and walkways using chairs and bleachers (Figure O-2). Some sections had multi-
functions for efficient use of space. For example, social service area by day; men’s sleeping 
area by night.   
 
The first “meet and greet” upon entering CEC was reception located in the main foyer of the 
sports stadium (Figure O-2). Evacuees were then forwarded to registration using a single 
thoroughfare into the sports stadium main hall (Figure O-2). Reception and registration 
functions remained same as LEC and BEC. Once a completed Red Cross form was obtained 
which outlined required services—evacuees were free to use services housed inside the sports 
stadium hall. Like LEC and BEC, evacuees and staff had to “sign-in” and “sign-out” every 
time leaving or entering the CEC. 
 
EC services were inconveniently hindered by liquefaction damage around the back of the 
sports stadium that delimited road access to ambulances (Figure O-1). An ambulance “got 
stuck” at the main entrance of the triage area in one instance. Unique to CEC, the EC layout 
included a triage area that was separated by bleachers and chairs in the main sports stadium 
(Figure O-2). The self-contained triage area had its own lavatories, isolation rooms, staff 
room for health professionals; and private entrance for ambulance staff (Figure O-1). The 
setup was open 24 hours that enabled registered evacuees to enter the triage area voluntarily 
to be seen by a doctor. 
 
COWLES STADIUM LAYOUT: INFRASTRUCTURE 
When CEC opened, it had no grid power, neither running water nor building sewerage 
facilities. However, alternate facilities were implemented within hours. Power was connected 
via a diesel generator because of the sports stadium grid layout, an hour after CEC had 
opened. Water was restored utilising 10,000-15,000L water tanker that was installed after the 
September 4, 2010 earthquake. In addition, a drinking water tank was stationed on the main 
street which, allowed public access to water whilst bottled water was reserved for CEC users 
(evacuees and staff). Eight PLs, from various commercial companies delivered to 
accommodate sewerage facilities on the first day; with another eight delivered the next day.  
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Initially, there was an issue with emptying filled PLs: only the PLs belonging to the 
respective companies were being emptied. This meant some PLs were emptied whilst the rest 
stayed full and unable to use. It was rectified promptly, given a “state of emergency” was 
declared across the city.  
 
Many participants had felt the PLs were being filled faster than they were emptied. In one 
instance, a staff member “physically emptied” a PL in order to prevent overflowing: a duty 
that was “over and beyond the call” of volunteer duty. It showed assiduous staff effort to 
operate CEC: do what was needed to be done.  
 
Building lavatories were locked to stop evacuees from using them because of the damaged 
sewerage network in the CEC ward. Yet, on the last day CEC was open, a building lavatory, 
had what appeared to be diarrhoea. Because of this reason couple with the progressive 
demand for PL usage, health officials asserted to close CEC that afternoon. 
COWLES STADIUM LAYOUT: STAFF  
Operating CEC required 26-30 staff that included volunteers from Coastguard Canterbury. 
Like LEC and BEC, the staff shifts lasted 10-12 hours initially during CEC setup but reduced 
to 8 hour shifts the next day, with a hand-over meeting at the beginning and end of each shift. 
Staff required reading a health and safety form at the beginning of each shift; a lesson learnt 
from operating LEC to introduce a health and safety form for staff. The health and safety 
form consisted of the following information: sign in or sign out, chain of command, 
evacuation area, earthquake procedure, ambulance, suitable clothing, food handling and 
consumption; drinking water, regular breaks, lavatories, general hygiene; and briefings. 
Upper management ensured staff members were taking regular breaks. In addition, 
spontaneous volunteers’ names were collected but delimited its use because they could be 
vetted for their neither qualifications nor background check.
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Figure O-1: Cowles Stadium emergency centre layout following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Abbreviation EC= Emergency Centre. 
161 
 
 Figure O-2: Cowles Stadium emergency centre. The main hall layout following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Abbreviations: EC= Emergency Centre, EOC= 
Emergency Operations Centre. 
162 
 
Days EC 
Open 
Evacuees 
Present 
(Approx.) 
Main Infrastructure 
Comments Water Sewerage Power 
DAY 1 
23-Feb 
250-300 -No building 
water supply: 
Bottled 
Water 
available 
-10 to 15000L 
installed 
water tank 
but took 
some time to 
establish as 
some 
connecting 
pipes were 
stolen before 
the February 
22, 2011 
earthquake  
-Building 
lavatories 
functioned 
but had no 
water amid 
damaged 
sewerage 
network-
Prohibited 
use 
- 8 PLs 
arrived 
-No grid 
power 
-Diesel 
Genera-
tor at the 
back of 
the truck 
for 
continuou
s supply: 
full power 
by 7pm 
-EC opened in evening(around 6pm) 
-Heavy public demand for water 
-Professional cleaners 2-3 times per day 
-Resources arrive: community help, blankets, 
and donated goods 
-Support agencies including security, St John 
ambulance, arrived and stationed for 24 
hours with rotating shifts for respective staff  
-Some PL companies emptied PLs  belonging 
to their company only: especially not 
competitors. This was rectified immediately  
-Despite prohibited lavatory use, the 
lavatories were used by evacuees: put locks 
on lavatories 
- PLs  placed in car park because easier to 
empty 
-Mandatory hand sanitiser stations emplaced 
and manned by CD staff henceforth  
-10-12 hour shifts 
DAY 2 
24-Feb 
250-300 
- No building 
water supply 
-Bottled 
Water 
available 
-10 to 15000L 
installed 
Water Tank 
 
No 
functioning 
building 
lavatories 
- Another 8 
PL arrived 
-16  PLs  
total 
-1 lavatory 
per 18 
people 
-Grid 
Power 
-Professional cleaners stationed on site 24/7 
henceforth. Cleaned all areas of the EC. The 
lavatories were cleaned about every 3 hours 
- PLs full and could not empty at the rate 
they were being filled. Hence, had to restrict 
PL use that were already full capacity 
-Spontaneous volunteers registered 
-Isolation set up- Diarrhoea family arrive 
-EC staff on duty did 8 hour shifts on roster 
basis 
-Mandatory  hand sanitiser usage to 
everyone intensified 
-Entertainment and childcare area 
established 
DAY 3 
25-Feb 
350-400 
-Due to 
health 
concerns 
EC was 
closed by 
EC staff 
in the 
evening 
 
-No building 
water supply 
-Bottled 
Water 
available 
-Installed 
Water Tank 
10-15000L 
NC 
-Grid 
Power 
- Intense cleaning continued and intensified 
such as cleaning the sleeping hall 
-By the afternoon, most PLs were full and 
could not be emptied at the rate being filled. 
- Afternoon stomach pains, fever, diarrhoea 
and vomiting were observed 
- A person had broken into the locked 
building lavatories where diarrhoea was 
found 
-Health officials evaluated the situation in the 
afternoon and ordered to close the EC on 
public health grounds 
-Evacuees were told the EC was closing down 
due to health concerns and offered services 
from another EC. 
- 78 evacuees were transported to another 
EC 
- Laundry and 3 shower blocks (with 6 
showers in each block), was put in place at 
Cowles Stadium for the community, after the 
EC had closed (about 2-3 weeks) 
 
 
Table O-1: Time line of events for Cowles Stadium emergency centre following the February 22, 2011 earthquake.   
Abbreviations: EC=Emergency Centre, NC= No Change to previous day, PLs= Portable Lavatories. 
163 
 
APPENDIX P: Core Services Provided by the Emergency Centres 
 
Table P-1: Reception service (part of the Core services) provided at three emergency centres 
following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
Descriptive Components of an 
Emergency Centre  
Emergency Centre (EC) 
Component 
Name 
Component Description Linwood High 
School EC 
(LEC) 
Burnside High School 
EC 
(BEC) 
Cowles 
Stadium EC 
(CEC) 
1
) 
R
e
ce
p
ti
o
n
 
 First-port-of-call for 
incoming evacuees. 
Reception EC staff assess 
necessities, issues or 
special needs. Special 
needs could have been 
elderly, infectious 
diseases, stress, language 
barriers, cultural 
sensitivities, and medical 
status. 
 All evacuees and staff 
must sign a form each 
time to enter/leave an EC. 
Reception acts to filter 
services that are needed 
by the evacuees before 
entering the EC. 
 Reception has at least two 
Civil Defence (CD) staff. 
Depending on the site, 
reception is located at the 
gate or a conspicuous area 
with open access. 
 Reception would also be 
equipped with a 
telephone message pad, 
EC checklist and a 
volunteer form. 
 Reception was 
located inside 
the building 
foyer with 2 CD 
staff. 
 Security ensured 
all entering LEC 
was guided into 
reception. 
 
 Reception had an 
atlas (using the 
school resources) 
to identify people 
with different 
languages. 
 A 3-car garage 
within the school 
premises was used 
as a reception area. 
Hence, reception 
area was sheltered 
and located at the 
very entrance into 
the BEC.  
 The entrance was 
manned with 
professional 
security guards to 
guide evacuees 
into the EC via 
reception. 
 There were 
minimum 2 CD 
personnel present 
at reception at all 
times. 
 
 Reception 
was located 
at the 
opened 
entrance to 
the CEC. So 
all 
incoming 
and 
outgoing 
evacuees 
must use 
this 
entrance to 
sign in and 
sign out.  
 At least 2 
CD staff 
attended 
Reception.  
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Table P-2: Registration service (part of the core services) provided at the three emergency centres 
following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
Descriptive Components of an 
Emergency Centre  
Emergency Centre (EC) 
Component 
Name 
Component Description Linwood High 
School EC 
(LEC) 
Burnside High School 
EC 
(BEC) 
Cowles 
Stadium EC 
(CEC) 
2
) 
R
e
gi
st
ra
ti
o
n
 
 If evacuees required EC 
services (other than 
publicly available 
resources), a registration 
form, called Red Cross 
from, was filled. This 
enabled to trace 
individuals, reunite 
families, and provide 
assistance.  
 Red Cross From enacted 
as “permission slip” to get 
access to various parts of 
the EC. 
 Had to have a Red Cross From to get pass gates staffed with  CD 
personnel such as into social services and food service. 
Registration was open 24 hours. 
 Registration was 
placed inside the 
sleeping hall  
 Initially, CD staff 
manned Registration 
desk for a single 
night and then 
replaced by Red 
Cross staff.  
 
 Registration 
was 
conspicuousl
y placed at 
the entrance 
of the 
sleeping hall.  
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Table P-3: Social and emergency centre services (part of the Core services) provided at three 
emergency centres following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
 
 
Descriptive Components of an 
Emergency Centre 
Emergency Centre (EC) 
Component 
Name 
Component Description Linwood High School 
EC 
(LEC) 
Burnside High 
School EC 
(BEC) 
Cowles 
Stadium EC 
(CEC) 
3
) 
So
ci
al
 S
e
rv
ic
e
s 
&
 E
m
e
rg
e
n
cy
 C
e
n
tr
e
  s
e
rv
ic
e
s 
 Both government and 
non-government co-
ordinated and 
provided on-site social 
services.  
 Selection of services is 
shown below from 
EMTC.  
1. Child Youth & 
Family- Family 
concerns  
2. Citizens Advice 
Bureau – General 
Advice  
3. Canterbury District 
Health Board (CDHB)- 
Community Health  
4. Housing New 
Zealand –
accommodation  
5. Plunket-Child and 
Family Health  
6. Red Cross-
Support/registration  
7. Royal New Zealand 
Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals (RSPCA)- 
Animal Welfare  
8. Salvation Army- 
(Counselling/ food 
distribution/ clothing/ 
bedding)  
9. St John Ambulance 
10. Work & Income 
New Zealand- Financial 
Support  
11. Victim Support- 
Emotional Support  
 
 
Social Services 
present: 1-6, 8-11 
Additional Services: 
 Linwood College 
Principal 
 Professional 
Security Companies-
Armourguard/ADT 
Security, Red Badge, 
Red Guard. 
 NZ Police 
 NZ Defence Force 
 Professional 
Cleaning Company- 
Spotless Cleaning 
Company, ICT 
 Insurance (ACC) 
 NZ Police 
 Department of 
Corrections 
 Christchurch City 
Council events 
team- 
entertainment 
 District Nurse 
 Parliament Services 
 Commercial 
Catering- 
Continental 
Catering 
 Deaf and Blind 
Supports Service 
 Christchurch Dog 
Shelter at Bromley 
 Physiatrist 
 Bi Polar Support 
Group 
 Christchurch dog 
shelter at Bromley. 
 
 
Social Services 
present: 1-6, 
8,10-11 
Additional 
Services: 
 Burnside High 
School 
Caretaker 
 CDHB Public 
health 
inspectors 
 Wellington 
Ambulance on 
Site 24/7 
 NZ Police 
 NZ Defence 
Force 
 Professional 
Cleaning 
Company 24/7- 
Spotless 
Cleaning  
 Health Nurses 
 Volunteer CD 
staff that acted 
as language 
interpreters. 
 Tentative 
travel agency 
personnel to 
arrange flights 
& travel 
documents for 
tourists and 
visitors. 
Social Services 
present: 1-6, 8-
11 
Additional 
Services: 
 Cowles 
Stadium Site 
Manager 
 Australian 
Field Hospital 
Medical Team 
 Insurance-ACC 
 Professional 
Security 
 NZ Police 
 Department of 
Corrections 
 NZ Defence 
Force 
 Professional 
Cleaning 
Company-24/7 
- ICT 
 CCC events 
team for 
entertainment 
 General 
Practitioner 
(GPs) Doctors 
 Christchurch 
Dog shelter at 
Bromley 
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Table P-4: Accommodation service (part of the core services) provided at the three emergency 
centres following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
Descriptive Components of an 
Emergency Centre 
Emergency Centre (EC) 
Component 
Name 
Component 
Description 
Linwood High School 
EC 
(LEC) 
Burnside High School 
EC 
(BEC) 
Cowles Stadium 
EC 
(CEC) 
4
) 
A
cc
o
m
m
o
d
at
io
n
 
 Emergency and 
temporary 
accommodation 
provided in a safe 
area. 
 Emergency 
denoted by CD 
manual is 
overnight or up to 
three nights 
maximum. 
 EC 
accommodation 
layout was 
depicted by 
family groups, 
personal needs, 
age and culture. 
Gyms were used as sleeping areas, and evacuees were encouraged 
to be outside the sleeping areas during the day.  
 Provided mattresses, 
blankets and pillows 
from Salvation Army. 
Used cupboard 
space within 
sleeping area to 
store sleeping 
material during the 
day. Used school 
gymnasium as the 
sleeping area. 
 
 Used gym mats 
initially then 
upgraded to 
mattresses bought 
by Salvation Army 
the next day. Used 
school gymnasium as 
the sleeping area. 
 No food was allowed 
inside the sleeping 
areas. 
 Used bleachers 
and chairs to 
separate social 
services area 
into men’s 
sleeping area 
at night. Used 
the stage area 
as sleeping 
areas. 
 
Providing clothing 
items was not 
mandatory. 
However, ECs 
made available 
donated clothing to 
evacuees. 
  Clothing was available to evacuees, which were donated from 
Salvation Army. Clothing items included extra blankets and coats. 
However, it was noted that EC could not verify the quality of the 
clothing. 
 LEC denied some clothing items donated from the public due to 
hygiene reasons. 
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Table P-5: Catering service (part of the core services) provided at the three emergency centres 
following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
Descriptive Components of an 
Emergency Centre 
Emergency Centre (EC) 
Component 
Name 
Component 
Description 
Linwood High 
School EC 
(LEC) 
Burnside High 
School EC 
(BEC) 
Cowles Stadium 
EC 
(CEC) 
5
) 
C
at
e
ri
n
g Evacuees and staff 
members were 
provided with food 
and refreshments 
 Breakfast, lunch and dinner were provided at the EC. In 
addition, tea/coffee with snacks was available 24 hours. 
 Food prepared and delivered by commercial caterers. Food 
was distributed at the EC by Salvation Army staff. Only 
Salvation Army staff handled food and accessed servery 
area. Catering was provided for support section staff as well. 
 To access food service facilities evacuees had to have a 
completed Red Cross form. 
 Using hand sanitisers located throughout the food area was 
mandatory. 
 Meal times were approximately as follows: 
o Breakfast: from 8.30am-11am 
o Lunch: 12-2pm 
o Dinner:  4.30pm-6pm 
o Sometimes afternoon tea was given 
 There was tea/coffee available 24/7. 
 Hot perishable food was not available other than meal 
times—uneaten hot food was taken off the premises or 
disposed of immediately after meal times. 
 Meals were available to EC staff and volunteers as part of 
their shift. 
 Any rubbish was removed at the end of each meal using the 
building skits.  
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Table P-6: Security service (part of the core services) provided at the three emergency centres 
following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
Descriptive Components of an 
Emergency Centre 
Emergency Centre (EC) 
Component 
Name 
Component 
Description 
Linwood High School 
EC 
(LEC) 
Burnside High School 
EC 
(BEC) 
Cowles Stadium 
EC 
(CEC) 
6
) 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
 Maintain safety to 
EC dwellers by 
monitoring 
restricted access, 
managing traffic 
flow and meeting 
visitors. 
 Initially CD staff 
provided security 
then sought 
professional 
security personnel. 
Henceforth 
professional 
security & NZ Police 
were present 24/7 
at the EC. 
 
 Professional Security was present on the 
second day. NZ Police continually 
present from evening to following day 
morning, and intermittently present 
throughout the day.  
 Children play areas were observed by NZ 
police for suspicious behaviour. 
 
 Two security 
personnel in the 
sleeping area at 
night- a male 
professional security 
personal and a 
woman from EC 
staff (to attend to 
young children). 
 Security supervised  
cordoned areas  
 BEC had members of 
the public 
impersonating EC 
staff by wearing 
high visibility vests. 
Security attended to 
those issues. 
 
 Police would 
come in with 
their 
documentation 
for people of 
interest.  
 NZ police being present provided additional security, especially 
at night. NZ police also kept watch for sexual offenders and any 
misconduct in behaviour. Having professional security coupled 
with NZ police provided a sense of “presence” to both the 
evacuees and the staff. 
 NZ Police was stationed at night. 
 Security guards conducted routine walks around the EC to check 
unused areas were not occupied by the public. 
 Security curbed people that were coming into the EC just to use 
the free service. 
 Security representative attended the EC debrief meeting at the 
end of each shift. 
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Table P-7: Animal Welfare (part of the core services) provided at the three emergency centres 
following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
Descriptive Components of an 
Emergency Centre 
Emergency Centre (EC) 
Component 
Name 
Component 
Description 
Linwood High School 
EC 
(LEC) 
Burnside High School 
EC 
(BEC) 
Cowles Stadium 
EC 
(CEC) 
7
) 
A
n
im
al
 W
el
fa
re
 
 Animal welfare 
shelter was 
established at EC 
vicinity to aid 
owners to 
provide basic 
welfare needs 
for their animals. 
Basic welfare 
needs include 
water, food, 
shelter and 
medical care. 
Owner remained 
responsible for 
their pets. 
 Guide dog for the 
blind came into the 
LEC. The dog was 
allowed to enter 
LEC because it was 
classed as a 
companion animal.  
 A companion 
animal was 
considered if the 
animal provides 
medical related, 
psychological 
support or physical 
disability. 
 Animal shelter was 
fenced area set up 
with shelter  
 6-7 crates for 
animals. 
 Had issues where 
the owner did not 
want to be 
separated from the 
owner. 
 Only companion 
animals were 
allowed to enter 
buildings but BEC did 
not receive any such 
requests. 
 Animals were 
left in the 
owners’ cars. 
Most evacuees 
opted to keep 
their pets in the 
car overnight. 
 Only 
companion 
animals were 
allowed to 
enter the 
buildings within 
the LEC 
 Animal Control 
was doing 
rounds for all 
the ECs. They 
would come 
around register 
animals and 
look after them 
off site until 
reunited with 
owner. 
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Table P-8: Public information board (part of the core services) provided at the three emergency 
centres following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
Descriptive Components of an 
Emergency Centre 
Emergency Centre (EC) 
Component 
Name 
Component 
Description 
Linwood High 
School EC 
(LEC) 
Burnside High 
School EC 
(BEC) 
Cowles Stadium EC 
(CEC) 
8
) 
P
u
b
lic
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
B
o
ar
d
s 
 
 To supply 
applicable local 
information to 
the public and 
for evacuees.  
 Some of the 
material written 
on Information 
Board (IB) as 
they come to 
light. 
 Information 
included places 
to find petrol, 
food, roading, 
water 
treatment, 
WINZ, weather, 
accommodation, 
medical, phone 
numbers, 
utilities, 
situation update. 
 An outside board with information available for the public 
located at EC entry. 
 CD staff had an information board for strictly for EC staff only.  
 Information boards were updated to match routine reports to 
the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC). 
  Public IB1-Main 
Road entry into EC  
 Inside IB2 –
Reception 
 Staff only IB3-
information on 
things that need to 
be done, shift 
changes and any 
additional notes  
 IBs updated every 
two hours to 
coincide with sit 
reports (reports 
sent to Emergency 
Services Centre 
[EOC]) or as 
needed. 
 Public IB1-entry 
gates at Reception 
 Inside IB2 –Gates to 
social services 
 Additional 
information 
available to 
registered evacuees 
such as meal times 
and crèche times.  
 Staff only IB3-
information on 
things that need to 
be done, shift 
changes and any 
additional notes.  
 IB4- Eating Area 
IBs updated every 
two hours to 
coincide with EOC sit 
reports or as 
needed. 
 
 Public IB1-Main 
Road entry into 
EC 
 Inside IB2 -
Reception 
 Staff only IB3-
information on 
things that 
need to be 
done, shift 
changes and 
any additional 
notes 
 IBs updated 
every two hours 
to coincide with 
EOC sit reports 
or as needed. 
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Table P-9: Entertainment (part of the core services) provided at the three emergency centres 
following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
Descriptive Components of an 
Emergency Centre 
Emergency Centre (EC) 
Component 
Name 
Component 
Description 
Linwood High 
School EC 
(LEC) 
Burnside High School EC 
(BEC) 
Cowles Stadium EC 
(CEC) 
9
) 
En
te
rt
ai
n
m
e
n
t 
 Entertainment 
to reduce 
tension and 
boredom for 
the evacuees, 
especially 
children.  
 TV DVD area 
children.  
 Adults helped 
to fold cloths 
donated by 
Salvation Army. 
 Used members 
of the public to 
man the door 
for hand 
sanitiser 
stations. 
 Set up classroom for 
Crèche with two pre-
school teachers.  
 Art Room  
 Youth instructor ran 
games 
 Dave Dobbin played 
music 
 Army Band Played 
music 
 Bouncy Castle by a 
Church Group. 
 Encourage evacuees to 
go outside and socialise 
rather than sitting on a 
mattress.  
 Sports equipment 
taken out of the 
sports hall for 
children to play 
outside. 
 Dave Dobbin Came to 
play music. 
DVD”s playing for the 
kids.  
 Children’s play area 
with security being 
present. 
 Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGO) 
& Churches come 
and run children’s 
programs. 
 
  
172 
 
Table P-10: Volunteer co-ordination (part of the core services) provided at the three emergency 
centres following the February 22, 2011 earthquake. 
Descriptive Components of an 
Emergency Centre 
Emergency Centre (EC) 
Component 
Name 
Component 
Description 
Linwood High 
School EC 
(LEC) 
Burnside High School EC 
(BEC) 
Cowles 
Stadium EC 
(CEC) 
1
0
) 
V
o
lu
n
te
er
 
 C
o
-o
rd
in
at
io
n
 
 Co-ordinate 
trained and 
spontaneous 
volunteers at 
an EC. They 
can be any 
member of 
the public. 
 
 Spontaneous 
volunteers log 
sheet was taken, 
but not used as 
you could not 
have “vetted” 
them 2-3 days 
after. 
 Feed Back to 
council 
 250 spontaneous 
volunteers 
logged. 
 
 Large volume of 
Spontaneous volunteers 
recorded. 
 From all different 
backgrounds. In a rostered 
setting became unreliable. 
Could not do back ground 
checks to verify 
qualifications. 
 Nurses came off shift to 
help. 
 Asking spontaneous 
volunteers to help out on 
shifts. Spontaneous 
volunteers working for the 
trained volunteers. 
 Burnside High School pupils 
as runners and carry out 
small errands. They were 
good because they knew 
the building.  
The 
community 
effect. Group 
of volunteers 
came before 
CEC had 
opened to the 
public to help 
and delivered 
water tanks.  
 
